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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates relationships scholars have with information and art associated
with aesthetic and theoretical disruptions. Its governing metaphor is the surprise affect,
figured as a rhetorical and aesthetic event. My purposes are to evaluate institutional and
scholastic responses to both desirable and disastrous information-aesthetic liminalities, trial
performative engagements with surprises, and propose viable ways of engaging “innovation”
for writing instruction. It is argued that aesthetic (i.e., relational in the sense that it is not
immediate), performative, and temporal engagements with surprising objects of study are
relatively viable options when considered alongside the “critical” manuscript. While the
aesthetic has sometimes occupied a minor and inferior position relative to codified and
metricized intelligences, such relegation rests on false and pernicious but well known and
persistent dichotomies including intelligibility v. sensibility, knowing v. feeling, thinking v.
experiencing, and aesthetic v. epistemic. The intelligibility presupposed by the critical model,
however, cannot achieve immediate engagement with its ostensible “object”; it therefore
remains relational and aesthetic. Few would counter the claim, yet actual performances of
relation are rare. To test its payoff, the dissertation performs two engagements with
challenging objects associated with surprise: novelty or “the new” as such, and the currency
of idiosyncrasy in the timbre of recent electronic music. While not incidental, novelty and
timbre are examples in the project’s larger attempt to rethink not just any given surprise, but
ways of treating and dealing with the inevitability of metaphysical shock and overhaul.
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PRELUDE

This is Surprise. The period in the title of the project is deliberate. It signifies the tendency,
if not primary function, of scholarship to explain, control, and make known its putative
objects of study. While this is not a counterproductive arrangement, as the sole modality of
inquiry it can reinforce the myth that we may finally know and control even the catastrophic
and the unimaginable. If such phenomena are “surprising” in the sense that their weight,
trauma, effect, or affect are, at least temporarily, unintelligible or irreducible to articulation,
explanations thereof are belated reintegrations of shock to the ordinary and manageable.
Such accountancy cannot know a surprise. No one can. If they did, no surprise. Yet it is
precisely these coarse divisions between known and unknown that are complicated in the
following pages. My way of showing this is to maintain that relational modes of academic
discourse are relatively viable options for engaging “surprises” when considered alongside
the critical manuscript. The idea is that since learning and teaching are inventive, ongoing,
and non-immediate processes of making legible worldly phenomena, I surmise that rhetoric
should not only acknowledge this disjuncture, but perform it as well.
Of particular interest, then, is the question of how, in distinction from what, to know,
do, and make of surprises. The project therefore hopes to surpass an account of noteworthy
breakdowns, liminalities, wonders, excitations, and devastations, or bringing to light some one
new or neglected object to the discourse for consideration. I do all the above, inevitably and
necessarily, but I do not stop there. The project’s principle offering, instead, is best construed
as a mood or a mode—a sensibility—for discoursing that seeks viable ways of bringing forth
these phenomena into the domain of intelligibility that preserve epiphanic potential and
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meaningful intellectual growth. The argument therefore has less to do with surprises
themselves than with handling or treating surprises in scholarship.
The first chapter develops these prefatory remarks and then offers a selective review
of one of the longest and most controversial dialectics in the history of Western thought:
intelligibility and sensibility. Traditionally, the former has been associated with intellect,
reason, and codification; the latter, with phenomenal experience, mood, emotion, and so on.
As a disorientation, surprise seems to fit better with the merely sensible, but, as I will argue,
this convenient categorization is rash and premature. Twin registers of experience,
intelligibility and sensibility have since antiquity been contrasted against one another for
ideological reasons and interests. While the project argues the value of keeping the two
separated severely limits inquiry into one’s relationship with information, these lines in the
sands (and disciplines) are historical and persistent; a review is therefore appropriate and
necessary. We check in with the Greeks and Germans, of course, but also with
trandisciplinary contemporary theorists to learn how the issue has appeared in different
guises for different reasons in more recent conversations. The project then situates itself
within rhetorical studies debates on “aesthetics of rhetorics,” whose origins are in still earlier
scholarship on whether and the extent to which rhetoric is “epistemic.” My move there is to
position the aesthetic and the sensible not as alternatives to epistemic and “traditional” forms,
but to see intelligibilities like the scholarly article as aesthetic or relational after all.
Three attempts to do precisely this are developed across as many chapters. The first
involves novelty or “the new” as such. Like surprise, the novel as a grammatical entity in this
sentence cheats itself out of its own meaning. Most can relate to acquiring a new widget,
traveling to a foreign place, or experiencing unfamiliar art works. But “the new” as referent
seems to require and (or?) result in something recognizable, referential, and termed. It
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thereby saws off the branch on which it supposedly rests. In this way, the new is like surprise
in that everybody nows what “new” is, but nobody knows what it is. Necessarily. For this
reason, the new is a favorite dead horse. Scholarly treatments of novelty typically resign
themselves to bureaucratic accounts of self-proclaimed progressive artists, writers, and
thinkers, and read their rhetorics as empty, cheap, commercial—a vain and delusional
egotism at best. Yet, the material, affective, temporal, and existential dimensions of engaging
art and information pose serious challenges for the rhetorical frame of accountancy seen in
critiques of the new and, as the German philosopher Martin Heidegger has demonstrated,
for metaphysics in general. Evaluated are Michael North’s Novelty: A History of the New, Boris
Groys’ recently translated On the New, and Jacques Rancière’s Aisthesis: Scenes from The Aesthetic
Regime of Art for their relative viability as means of engaging the new. From there, the
chapter comports itself with an approach to aesthetics and rhetorics characterized by an
“anxiety” (angst) with the “work of art” according to Heidegger.
The third movement lends an ear to renewed attentions for “sonic rhetorics,” taking
experimental electronic music’s predilection for idiosyncratic texture and timbre as an
opportunity to engage arts innovation. Chapter Three, “Drop.,” takes up the problematics
and excitations of relating to music in the media of alphabetic writing. Writing about music
is notoriously difficult, and the inadequacies of transposition from one media to another are
well known, but my suggestion here is that the problem is uniquely manifest in the aesthetics
recent electronic dance music (EDM) and other experimental electronica. As a nod to the
durational qualities of engaging sonic information, the dissertation’s trajectory is organized
by the logic of a typical early 2010s electronic dance music production: meter, build, drop,
interlude, and bridge. This music, known both for innovation in timbre and machinic
regularity in meter, is an ideal candidate for inquiry into surprise because its effects are
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temporal, transient, and affective. As it happens, a curious silence surrounds our relationship
with sound. The terms “timbre” and “tone color” in music theory refer to the idiosyncratic
character of different instruments playing the same note, which at once makes the concepts
both singular and relative. Felt and heard in this chapter are the aesthetics of recent
electronic dance music as well as experimental artists like Holly Herndon and Ryoji Ikeda. I
argue the emphasis novel sonic and temporal affects in the work of these and other artists
creates both renewed and unique challenges for scholars, who are scrambling to account for
new sensibilities pioneered by these producers as they report, invent, and anticipate (a)new
relations with digital information infrastructures. Fair use of audio clips are embedded right
into the Portable Document Format file for the sonic experience of the “reader.”
The fourth act, an Interlude, slows the tempo and develops an aside on the case of
Roland Barthes. This chapter compares the aesthetics and ethics of writing in his work
alongside more recent thought in rhetoric, composition, and feminist theory. Although often
remembered for his aesthetic jubilations of irrationality we might associate with surprise and
the sensible, I work to recall another side of Barthes involving a veritable floundering within
what he understood as the violence of structural, codified, and disciplinary ways of relating
with the text. Discussed are the separate works of Lynn Worsham, Cynthia Haynes, and
Gayatri Spivak, all of whom the dissertation argues are particularly adept at navigating and
“negotiating structures of violence,” as Spivak would say. These writers along with Barthes
are disciplinary “impostors” to their discourses; they work from within convention while at
the same time revealing the inadequacy of these very mechanisms for knowledge production
specific to their areas. Intelligibility and sensibility meet, merge, and dissolve into one
another.

xi

Before the curtains close, the fifth chapter develops a pedagogy of “information
aesthetics” for writing instruction featuring not graphic or visual design per se, but rather the
conceptual blur between phenomenal experience and reflective knowledge making. The
focus is on the material, affective, and existential dimensions of engaging apparently
“nonaesthetic” informations and wisdoms. The proposed instructional technique there
nourishes understanding of the dynamic relationships between students and their supposed
objects of perception, reflection, and study. The idea is to acknowledge and meaningfully
integrate into the curriculum the relational quality of the interaction among writers and their
so called “content,” data, or research. Too often the ideal academic writer is framed as a
disaffected compiler or synthesizer, but arranging the already known in advantageous
configurations is an apolitical proceduralism that downplays or erases aesthetic and
inventional qualities of composing. However, learning is an affective event and teaching is a
performative act that exceeds content delivery. Investigation of the manner and purposes
with which arts practices can inform relational writing instruction is necessary to respond to
well known issues in composition studies of student affect and engagement. The argument
there is that bridges between contemporary arts and the practice of academic writing are
untapped opportunities for developing meaningful relationships with information.
Interestingly, however, teaching relationships with information requires neither experimental
forms nor an emancipatory narrative for the a liberated student subject. Instead, arts
integrated composition pedagogies encouraging alternative relations with even those forms
dealing most steadfastly with “intelligibility” may well provide means by which to responsibly
address the recent currency of “innovation” in higher education. Advanced in this final
chapter are seeds for curricula designs fostering healthy, flexible, resilient relationships with
information in a cultural moment when surprises of a certain type are in high demand.
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CHAPTER ONE
METER

For if existent things are visible and audible and
generally perceptible, which means that they are
external substances, and of these things which are
visible are perceived by the sight, those that are audible
by the hearing, and not contrawise, how can these
things be revealed to another person? For that by which
we reveal is logos, but logos is not substances and existing
things. —Gorgias1
life’s not a paragraph —e e cummings2

One of the most basic assumptions of Western cultures is that information is a good thing.
Knowledge is power, a positive gain, or a desirable acquisition. Yet if “a way of seeing is
also a way of not seeing,”3 and if any given perspective “reveals dominations and
possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point[s],” 4 it is no stretch to say that
information un-informs while informing. Knowings, perspectives, and understandings are as
dangerous as useful—and the issue is by no means a purely theoretical one. From sophistic
relativism to deconstructionist play, from the hermeneutics of suspicion to critiques of
positivist Enlightenment mentalities—there is no shortage of lessons that information is
only as good as the interpretation, reflection, and implementation it receives. The scholastic
enterprise, endowed with its system of checks and balances, standards of rigor, and patient
discipline in the treatment of its objects, might seem like the best bet when it comes to
interacting with information. With its rubrics of clarity, comprehensiveness, replicability, or

1

The first epigraph is recollected and attributed to Gorgias by Sextus in Against the Schoolmasters,
excerpt trans. George Kennedy in The Older Sophists, ed. Rosamond Kent Sprague (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001),
DK82B3.
2 e e cummings, “since feeling is first,” Complete Poems: 1904-1962, ed. George J. Firmage (New York:
Liveright, 1991), 291.
3 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 49.
4 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (New York: Routledge, 1991), 154.
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accountancy for the historical contingency of its claims, scholarly discourse is thought to be
the highest caliber information available. I commence, however, with what might appear as a
surprising claim: our relationship with information is dysfunctional.
The dissertation takes up an issue that is often bypassed or summarily dismissed. The
topic is an experience or condition that has been historically construed as beyond, prior to,
or in excess of knowledge that is knowable because it is codified or replicable. We live and
communicate in discursive networks that rely on systematic operations, of course, but we
also relate to discursive networks and their commonplaces, assumptions, and givens. This
project explores the capacity of scholars and scholarship to relate to information in ways
that exceed endorsement, rejection, and mixtures of these two frames in the forms of
compromise or paradox.
The instability of relationality is ever present and indeed inescapable as a sort of
analog constant when subjects approach objects. Yet it need not be consciously
acknowledged, and is easily ignored or trivialized as wasteful, unlikely, temporary, or
impossible to wield. Known only by belated translation, this “sensibility” nevertheless forms
and is prerequisite for articulable rhetorical experience. This latency undeniably arises,
however, in the experience of surprise—and especially surprises made manifest not only by
the failure of expectations, but the rupture and dissolution of expectation and perspective
altogether. The topic of the present writing is such a breakage figured as a rhetorical and
aesthetic event. As an unforeseeable interjection, surprise seems to stand in a negative
relationship with information. Yet it is only informational stimuli that surprises.
There are long and diverse tendencies of thinkers in a wide variety of discourses to
seek out and push toward interpretive thresholds, aesthetic limits, margins of
(in)comprehensibility, and affective boundaries. Surprises transcend disciplinary borders and
show up as uninvited guests, paradigmatic breakthroughs, terrifying doomsdays, and
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aesthetic ecstasies. The present text will treat surprise as a necessarily ephemeral, lived
experience of novelty, wonder, awe, shock, or epiphany as events in reading, listening,
writing, thinking, and living rhetorically. Such experiences, while they can be traumatic and
debilitating, can also bear immense potentialities for alternative modes of existence.
Surprises can be annoying, inconvenient, and even terrifying. They can also deliver
heretofore unknown nectars in rhetoric and learning.
To the extent an inevitably inadequate operationalization of surprise is useful, the
invention and reception of knowledge may be construed as something grander than mere
data, mere content to be compiled, synthesized, and arranged advantageously. Alternatively,
this project attempts to articulate a relational mode of scholastic inquiry: an epistemological
project that would be an aesthetic project and vice versa. To get there, I will tour histories of
related impulses and inklings heard in discourses of rhetoric, philosophy, aesthetics, art,
music, and more with a certain attitude or state of mind that does not desire the closing of a
circle, the cellophane wrapped ontological proposition, or advanced noticed of the precise
trajectory between cause and effect.

Consider the Following.
The term “sensibility” is used in the following pages alongside “intelligibility” to
indicate two modalities of relating to information. Although these terms are sometimes
pitted against each other for polemic effect, the simple truth of the matter is that they are
not contraries. The point is not to have the former negate the latter and win out in
fulfillment of some grand emancipatory narrative. In fact, one of the purposes of the
project is to demonstrate the inextricability of each contestant in this false and overrated
dialectic. The terms are intertwined not simply because each depends upon its negative for
conceptual identity, but because both experiential registers are simultaneously and ceaselessly
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active in the continuity of being. But the pairing does indeed make what I hope will be a
productive and provocative juxtaposition from which to begin a project that springs from an
obsession with the ways humans and scholars in particular perceive and live their
relationships with information and knowledge—including but, as we will see, not limited to
surprises.
Related and similarly problematic dualisms include experiencing vs. knowing or
feeling vs. meaning. Such negative differences are useful only insofar as they recall a too
often neglected mode of relation to the world, art, argument, or information. In using these
terministic pairs, this project does not pretend to toggle from one from side to the other at
will. But if surprise is (im)precisely constituted or made manifest by an utter lack of relation,
the failure of interpretation to assimilate experience to what made sense earlier, then it must
be distinguished from an intelligible phenomenon.
Surprises in this sense exhibit a sort of violence unto the interpreting subject, and it
is precisely this trauma that warrants attention to the phenomena. Dauntingly inaccessible,
impossible lines of inquiry are worth pursuing, ironically, for exactly this reason. Immense
and radically incomprehensible topics such as The Holocaust, the complex emergence of
pathogenic outbreaks, and school violence demand thought and discourse precisely because
they cannot be adequately apprehended. In perhaps all knowings, but especially engagements
with topics such as these, we must agree with Gorgias: experience and knowing, while not
mutually exclusive, are not the same. On the other hand, this dissertation maintains that
knowing is an experiential event and never fully rid of this vulnerability. If the material
encounter or mere register of signals by the perceptual organs (including the brain) is
something different than the assignment of linguistic operators to these signals, knowing is
temporal, lived, embodied—an essentially creative act. We would seem to need a mode of
inquiry broad enough to attend and respond to that which falls outside the purview of
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rhetoric and communication as intentional, transmissive enterprises of transference and
accounting. It is worth recalling that aisthesis from the Greek simply means “perceive” and
carries no denotation of beauty, pleasure, or taste; the derivative “aesthetic” is a relatively
recent invention more closely associated with formal recognition and identification of
perception. 5
“Aesthetic” is thus sometimes used interchangeably with “sensibility” in the
following pages, and the term framed as such is to be distinguished from its canonical
associations that persist in some contemporary usages. Instead, “aesthetic” is deployed in the
Nietzschean sense for the sake of highlighting the material, embodied, and artistic
dimensions of meaning making lurking in even the most stringently regulated and
hyperinstitutionalized venues: “only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating
subject . . . does man live with any repose, security and consistency.”6 His idea that
perception itself—all cognition prior to, during, and (therefore) conscious recognition itself
—is an artistic act jives with Gorgias’ proposition that “nothing can be known.” The
connection is that retrospectively knowing an experience does not duplicate the experience.
If this is true, “‘the adequate representation of an object in the subject’—is a contradictory
impossibility. . . . [T]here is, at most, an aesthetic relation: I mean, a suggestive transference, a
stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue.”7 Bypassing relation for
5

Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art, trans. Zakir Paul (London: Verso,

2013), x.
6

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” trans. Daniel Breazeale in The
Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Boston:
Bedford, 2001), 1176 (emphasis in the translation). Hayden White makes the related point that not only
language but perhaps conscious apprehension itself is inherently tropological: “[r]endering of the unfamiliar
into the familiar is a troping that is generally figurative.” Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 5.
7 Nietzsche, “Truth and Lies,” 1176. The Breazeale translation cited here includes the following note
on the phrase “aesthetic relation”: “ein ästhetisches Verhalten. A more literal translation of Verhalten is ‘behavior,’
‘attitude,’ or perhaps ‘disposition’” (Ibid., 1176n18). Less a deliberate approach than a physical, physiological,
and existential situation, this “relation” in distinction (yet not opposition) to the security of stable, routinized
engagements with objects is relatively open to surprises or alternative engagements with objects, arts,
information, and so on.
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identification is therefore an unacknowledged struggle of coercion, a forgotten erasure of
envelopment.
Still, the challenge for the present writing is a double-bind of contending with
surprises in scholarly writing. I think it can be claimed without much controversy that the
general tone of the relations between scholars and their studies is basically regulatory. But
the “characteristic” feature of surprises, if I may hazard a generalization, is being caught off
guard: losing one’s head, composure, marbles, shit. It happens. Sometimes for the better; other
times: catastrophe. Regardless, rupture, breakdown, and liminality have long and diverse
genealogies in which these and related terms are valorized for any number of reasons: desire,
engagement with Being, avant-garde potentiality—take your pick. One senses the problem.
How to approach disruptive thinkers and artists who turn up, unleash, and dilate perceptual
limits in a way that doesn’t amount to stamp collecting and lip service that would reduce the
radical to anecdote? Can rhetorics somehow do a greater service to its noisy “objects”? How
might one attempt to perform the aesthetic or affective dimensions of experiencing such
disruptions?
Perhaps the trick is in the relations and relationships scholars have with information and
art more so than information and art themselves. The focus is not on an ontology or even a
genealogy of surprise (though both of these appear below). This project cannot help
wondering how, in distinction from what—to know, do, and make of surprises. It therefore
hopes to exceed a simple account of noteworthy breakdowns, liminalities, wonders,
excitations, traumas, and so on. The project also attempts something grander than bringing
some new or neglected object to the discourse for consideration. I will do all the above,
inevitably and necessarily, but I won’t stop there. The project’s principle offering is best
construed as a mood or a mode—a sensibility—for discoursing that seeks to engage with its
texts and artworks as mutually- and co-productive constituents along with the subject in the
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experiential event; the focus is neither content nor form, but precisely our approach or
relationship with each of these variables in our scholastic-artistic activities. The claim therefore
has less to do with surprises themselves than with handling or treating surprises in
scholarship. My sense is that a composition on surprise ought to perform its approach, and
that such a performance should strive for an aesthetic relation with its phenomena.

Tick Tock: Sensibility & Intelligibility.
Like meter, dialectical thinking and knowing function rhythmically, grounding our
conceptual relation to that about which we discourse. Negative difference furnishes an
apparent stability, but the web of negations implied in any identification suggests that polar
thinking is not enough to engage the breadth and multiplicity of any one concept. Still, by
invoking a distinction between intelligibility and sensibility, I make reference to one of the
longest, most contentious, and vertiginous dialectics in the history of Western thought.
While the sensible has been exalted as uniquely human, ethical, and aesthetically maximal, it
has also been framed as dangerous, naively utopian, wasteful, bourgeois, solipsistic—even
imaginary. As antinomies, these terms beget sweeping generalizations, careless dismissals,
and blithe mis/understandings.
I use the term “sensibility” to signify a processual relation with an object, idea, text,
or art work. Others have used different words for both related and unrelated purposes in
accordance with their specific contexts, hopes, and desires. While an exhaustive treatment of
relations between aesthetic thinkers and their epistemologies would require a dozen volumes,
the following sections review aesthetics and sensibilities associated with surprise affects in
the sense of rendering habits of understanding inapplicable, untenable, or inadequate.
Reasonable and productive engagement with this pair of alleged antitheses is possible by
focusing the analysis on those variations that concern surprise affects: loss of control,
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grounding—even breath. I proceed thusly with the presumption that to engage surprise is to
engage sensibility and the aesthetic relation.

Greek and German Origins: The Inferior Faculty.
Besides Gorgias, other Presocratics questioned the relationship between knowledge
and the senses. Heraclitus, for instance, observes that humans “are at odds with the logos,
with which above all they are in continuous contact, and the things they meet every day
appear strange to them.” 8 Heraclitus refers not to logos “the word” or language, of course,
but rather a cosmological order. I am deliberately conflating logos as language and logos as a
natural superstructure of the universe, however, to highlight their similarity in the sense of
concealing themselves precisely at the point of their revelation. Meanwhile in Abdera,
Protagoras is cooking up his infamous “man-measure” doctrine, which is thought to be the
first instantiation of relative meaning. “He used to say that soul was nothing apart from the
senses”—that the only conceivable reality was in perception—and in this way “everything is
true,”9 new, and changing. More than a shortsighted anthropocentrism, it is Protagoras’ idea
that all things are processually becoming rather than statically being that informs this
apparently radical subjectivity. The human itself is in such a “flux” of becoming, a
statelessness which coincides with the salient feature of sense impressions: change as a
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Attributed to Heraclitus by Marcus Aurelius. Mediations, in A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and
Testimonia, trans. Richard D. McKirahan and Patricia Curd, ed. Patricia Curd, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett,
2001), 27(B72). Fittingly, the Aurelius passage goes on to recall that Heraclitus rebuked and overreliance on
received wisdoms: “we ought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and speak as we
have been taught.” Meditations, trans. George Long (London: The Chesterfield Society, 1890), IV xlvi.
9 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1972), IX viii. Socrates can hardly believe it. Let me get this straight, he asks,“‘[t]hings appear,
or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them? . . . . Perception is always of existence, and
being the same as knowledge is unerring?’” Plato, Theaetetus, in The Dialogs of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 3rd
ed., vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 152a-153a.
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constant.10 In each case—Gorgias, Heraclitus, and Protagoras—what is involved is making
articulable the experience of phenomena, a slippery activity of rendering sensate
information conceptual that occupies many Presocratics.11
Although Plato’s banishment of the poets from his ideal society12 is the commonly
cited emblem of the rift between a truth seeking philosophy and a merely imitative poetry,
the closing scene of the Symposium better enacts the issue because the dialog involves an
essential fusion of beauty and wisdom. Late into the night, Alcibiades stumbles into the
gathering in honor of Agathon’s poetic successes. Sloppy, the party crasher professes his
sexual frustration with Socrates, who seduces his students in “philosophic frenzy” with
words alone but never shows lust himself.13 The contrast between Socrates’ claim to “mere
truth,” the means to an impersonal, unceasing, and essential beauty atop the ladder of love,14
and the stupor of Alcibiades is gratuitous. Plato takes great pains to figure ideal beauty in
distinction from worldly, material, and bodily pleasures; the former is “pure and unalloyed;
not infected with the flesh and color of humanity,” whereas the latter is epitomized by the
naivety and animality of the drunken guest. Elsewhere, as we know, Plato indicates that
sensuous experience is not even to be trusted precisely because they report a perpetual flux
while the realm of ideas is unchanging.15
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Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954),

46.
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James Porter, Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece: Matter, Sensation, and Experience (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 47-48. On other early thought concerning the intelligible and sensible,
see also Catherine Osborn, “Reality and Appearance: More Adventures in Metaphysics,” in Presocratic Philosophy:
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 61-79.
12 Plato associates poetry with pleasure, the body, and charm—all threats to reason, habit, and
composure. Republic, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), 606a-608a.
13 Plato, Symposium, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), 218b.
Alcibiades likens the words of Socrates to music, which Plato memorably frowns upon because of its affective
indeterminacies. Thomas Rickert, “Language’s Duality and the Rhetorical Problem of Music,” in Rhetorical
Agendas: Political, Ethical, Spiritual, ed. Patricia Bizzell (New York: Routledge, 2010), 158.
14 Plato, Symposium, 199b; 210c-212d.
15 Michael North, Novelty: A History of the New (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 23.
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One way of reading the Symposium is to conclude that Alcibiades is a bad student like
the antihero Max Fischer in Wes Anderson’s film Rushmore. An enthusiastic but
underperforming student at a prestigious prep school, the brace faced Fischer is enamored
with the aesthetics of academic life, but shuns the labor of study. His résumé features a
goofy array of extracurricular padding—to wit: Stamp & Coin Club Veep, Kite Flying
Society, Model United Nations (Russian delegate), President of Rushmore Bee Keepers, and
so on—but he is ultimately kicked out for poor marks. Tears fall on his blazer embroidered
with Rushmore’s seal during the expulsion proceedings.16 This kind of hankering to be a part
of the team, the institution, or the elite duplicates Alcibiades’ immaturity, stuck as he is in the
excitation of worldly experience. But one could also say that Socrates’ cerebral resignation is
itself an aesthetic relation to the ideas about which he seems to discourse so cooly. Let us be
reminded: there is pathos in logos. Hence, while one could read the memory of Socrates
frozen in place for an entire day contemplating an especially challenging problem as an
indication of his godlike intellectual dexterity,17 one could just as easily read the episode as a
“hysterical seizure” or “traumatic intrusion of something New”18 prior to apprehension.
Learning is surprising.
Aristotle’s remarks in the opening pages of Metaphysics are also telling in this regard.
The sensory apparatus of the body can be appreciated for its own sake, he says, but without
memory these senses are “mere experience” and cannot produce knowledge.19 The function
of memory here is to equalize the multitude of recurring experiences in our days,
professions, and lives: to “produce the effect of a single experience,”20 thereby eliminating
16
17

Rushmore, directed by Wes Anderson (1998; New York: The Criterion Collection, 2011), Blu-ray.
Plato, Symposium, 220c-220d.

18 Slavoj Žižek, Event: A Philosophical Journey through a Concept (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2014), 70-71
(original capitalization).
19 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933),
981a.
20 Ibid., 980b-981a.
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surprise. Causality, of course, is the currency backing Aristotle’s metaphysics, and, lest there
remain any confusion, “sense-perception . . . has nothing to do with Wisdom” precisely
because it does not involve contemplation or explanation for sensed phenomena.21 It’s true
that the third installment in his epistemic triad—knowing, doing, and making—requires
improvisation as a sort of craft or art (techne). However, for Aristotle there is no relationality
to universals or particulars, and he frames techne as an activity essentially driven by reasoning
based on past experience.22
Plotinus, too, pits “the Intellectual against the sensible,” and declares it “better for
the Soul to dwell in the Intellectual, but, given its proper nature, it is under compulsion to
participate in the sense-realm also.”23 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten cites precisely this
passage in his attempt to legitimate the sensate faculties as a veritable area for inquiry for a
context of rationalism, yet in Reflections on Poetry he nevertheless works with the tired
hierarchy and identifies the sensible as “lower” relative to the intellectual: “things known are
to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; things perceived [are to be known
by the inferior faculty, as the object] of the science of perception, or aesthetic.”24 Immanuel
Kant, for his part, famously asserts a radical subjectivity that would seem compatible with
sensibility, but the fierce criticism he inspired with what sounds like a universal beautiful
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makes recouping his project tricky. 25 However, it is worth noting this supposed universality is
only so if communicated successfully, which tempers at least to some degree the typical
tsk-tsking Kant receives. Judgments might be radically subjective, but expression of
judgments implies such assessments can (and should) be shared.26
In any case, the real surprise for Kant is the sublime. Unlike the charming beautiful,
the sublime “arises only indirectly” and evokes both “limitlessness” and “totality,”27 which at
once approximates the sublime with everything and nothing in particular. A series of
overwhelming spatial qualities—greatness, vastness, and magnitude—are tossed out as
characteristics of the sublime, but the common theme is a resistance to the subject’s
apprehensive faculties. Given its associations with “displeasure,” “incapacity,”
“astonishment,” and even “terror,”28 one might reasonably conclude the sublime scares Kant
precisely because its impenetrable wall grinds his analytic to a halt. Sections twenty-three
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Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 75; cf. 89. Hayden White is relentless in his critique of what he calls
Kant’s extremist “ideology of aestheticism,” which promulgated “the difference, apprehended as an opposition,
between literacy and literature” thusly:
literacy is considered as consisting of basic writing skills to be used primarily for the efficient communication of
practical information, a certain kind of thought, and commands; . . . literature is considered as the product of a
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intuitions, feelings, and thoughts of a certain impractical nature by virtue of their individuality, subjectivity, or
idiosyncrasy [surprise!], on the one side, and their status as products of a rare, inborn talent, even genius, on the
other.

In short, “a sensibility wholly imaginative (neither rational nor practical) in nature.” White, “The Suppression
of Rhetoric in the Nineteenth Century,” in The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory,
1957-2007, ed. Robert Doran (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 296. The consonances
among rhetorics, sensibility, innovation, and the teaching of writing here are fortississimo: fff. The notion of a
rhetorical literacy as somehow non-aesthetic is not only illusory, but a detriment to the progress of both arts
and sciences. Education policy trumpeting the humanities as the university’s “creative” province in
contradistinction to “vocational” departments and majors is consistent with this ideology. Ironically, such
attitudes coupled with department-specific budget cuts in higher education today actually inhibit innovations
beyond those of a narrowly defined variety—read: “monetizeable”—take energy and credit hours away from
the pursuit of invention so desperately needed in undergraduate curricula. See my fifth chapter below for an
elaboration of this point.
26 Sensibility and intelligibility meet. Sensibility by itself, in Kant’s terms, is at best “good” or merely
“agreeable.” Thomas Hove, “Communicative Implications of Kant’s Aesthetic Theory,” Philosophy & Rhetoric
42, no. 2 (2009): 103-114.
27 Kant, Judgment, 128.
28 Ibid., 142-143; 152.
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through twenty-nine on the sublime in the third Critique fall to the floor like darts without
tips—and this is exactly the point. It’s a discourse that talks about precisely not talking about
the sublime. In this way, the notion has a funny correspondence with Hegel’s “symbolic”
form of art characterized by an undeveloped and fumbling relation between the subject and
its object that is “rather a mere search for portrayal than a capacity for true presentation”;
consequently, in symbolic art “the relation of the Idea [reason] to the objective world
therefore becomes a negative one.” 29 Although symbolic art’s attempt to shape its concepts are
thereby “fantastic and monstrous,”30 this first form is probably the most honest of the three
—that is, most reflective of the situation when human animals convert the sensible to the
intelligible.

Danger as Life Enhancing.
In the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud gets frightened.
“Anxiety” describes a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may
be an unknown one. “Fear” requires a definite object of which to be afraid. “Fright,” however, is the
name we give to the state a person gets into when he has run into danger without being prepared for
it; it emphasizes the factor of surprise.31

Note this definition’s lack of criteria. Freud is writing about psychoanalysis and trauma, of
course, but I am inclined to stretch and repurpose his distinctions for an inquiry into
surprise as such. Given the “danger” is aesthetic, “fright” starts to sound like a desirable
rhetorical experience for a study of sensibility. This is not an argument, however, for a no
holds barred aesthetics. Car crashes, ebola outbreaks, crimes against humanity, and snuff

29 The symbolic is first and least mature relative to what Hegel calls the “classical” (presentation
perfected) and “romantic” (pursuit of an unrealizable human spirit) forms. G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on
Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, vol. 1 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 76-77 (emphasis in the
translation; brackets mine); cf. 75-81.
30 Ibid., 76n1 (translator’s note).
31 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. and ed. James Stachey (New York: Norton, 1990),
11.
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film, for example, are surprises this dissertation would not endorse. It is an argument,
however, that we give the utterly catastrophic its due—precisely by resisting the impulse to bring
surprise as such to intelligibility. It cannot be done. Such a resolve would require not merely
announcing one’s being open to new experiences, but actually seeking out a kind of
interpretive vulnerability. Foolish as it seems, willingness to lean into the unknown has utility.
The value of liminal states is not unrelated to the rule that “a building is earthquake proof
when it has built-in fissures and intentional crevices. Normed solidity, or, rather, rigidity is a
sure killer,”32 by definition unprepared for the supposed impossibility of otherwise, caught off
guard—unable to stand tall—when the inconceivable nevertheless arrives.
Deleuze and Guattari speak of a denegative “schizophrenic experience of intensive
quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable—a celibate misery and
glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended between life and death, and intense
feeling of transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form.”33 This
dissertation will make much of such cognitive dissonances, philosophical suspensions, and
transitional experiences. Deleuze and Guattari identify the origin of such uncanny
encounters as exposure to a simultaneous register of “attraction and repulsion”—not as
oppositional or even balancing forces, but coincidental affectations. The poet William Blake
was also interested in attraction and repulsion. He not only uses these same two words, he
says that “without contraries is no progression.”34 Apparent negatives of each other, he
nevertheless maintains that “Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate,

32 Avital Ronell, “Stormy Weather: Blues in Winter,” New York Times, February 2, 2013, http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/stormy-weather-blues-in-winter/.
33 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley,
Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Penguin, 2009), 18.
34 William Blake, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, ed.
Stephen Greenblatt, 8th ed. (New York: Norton, 2006), 1432.
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are [all!] necessary to Human existence,”35 though we are remarkably efficient at privileging
one term in these (only) apparently dialectical pairs under the rubrics of logic and reason.
Artists associated with the Situationists and those involved in Happenings
deliberately pursued an aesthetic or affect we might associate with sensibility. Allan Kaprow
described Happenings as cultivating “risk and fear” or perhaps a “fine nervousness”—an
energy that catalyzes something like a schizophrenic experience, comparable not in content
or form, but in spirit: “you giggle because you’re afraid.”36 Guy Debord, best known for his
unnerving critique of the spectacle, strikes a different and more productive tone in his other
writings on the Situationist International, whose modest goal was “to generate previously
non-existent feelings.”37 Additional avant-garde movements and their relations with surprises
are considered below in the second chapter on novelty.
Anthropologically, I would understand the experience of such gestures as “liminal,” a
term I borrow, stretch, and repurpose from Victor Turner’s work on transitional experiences
in rites of passage rituals. Working with Arnold van Gennep’s three stages in rites of
passage, “separation, transition, and incorporation,” Turner explores the interpretive
ambiguity in these experiences of social evolution. He treats each period of the tripartiate
sequence in turn, but it is the middle period which primarily interests him in light of
inventional opportunities therein. He writes: “[i]n this intervening phase of transition, called
by Van Gennep ‘margin’ or ‘limen’ (meaning ‘threshold’ in Latin), the ritual subjects pass
through a period of and area of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo” in which subjectivities and
therefore confident interpretive capabilities are unavailable. 38 I also recall Luce Irigaray’s
35
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rereading of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave with attention to the “forgotten path” of transition
between the shadowy underground and the blinding exteriority:
the “go-between” path that links two “worlds,” two modes, two methods, two measures of
replicating, representing, viewing . . . . Between truth and shadow, between truth and fantasy, between
“truth” and whatever “veils” the truth. Between reality and ream. Between. . . . Between. . . . Between
the intelligible and the sensible. 39

Other liminalities are desired in the baroque aesthetics of Jorge Luis Borges and suspensions
in the cinema of Alfred Hitchcock, whose rule of thumb was “always make the audience
suffer as much as possible.”40 The latter’s Vertigo in particular is useful here. The film shows
James Stewart as the acrophobic Scottie Ferguson dreams he is floating in air over a coastal
Californian church which bears significance in the plot. But scenery fades to white, leaving
only Stewart’s body, which free falls into white.

Figure 1.1: Scottie, held out in nothing. Still from Vertigo (1958)41

A climatic chase scene later, in waking life, forces him to climb a windy staircase to the
church’s bell tower, which he does in haste, inadvertently conquering his fear in the heat of
the moment. The character’s aversion to heights, of course, is relevant and available as a
means of interpreting the scene. But, if for only a moment, not only the character but the
audience is denied orientation and grounding. There is simply blankness—not only an utter
39 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1985), 246-247 (first ellipsis mine; the second and third appear in the translation).
40 Quotation from the supplementary material for Alfred Hitchcock: The Masterpiece Collection, ltd. ed.
(Los Angeles: Universal Studios, 2012), Blu-ray (box set).
41 Vertigo, directed by Alfred Hitchcock (1958; Los Angeles: Universal Studios, 2012), Blu-ray.
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lack of bearing in which the poor man’s body twitches like an upended cockroach, but
precisely a positive representation of that struggle. Stewart is simply held out, dangling. A
related aesthetic appears in Borges’ “The Garden of Forking Paths,” which tells the riddle of
one Ts’ui Pên who was supposed to have created “a labyrinth of labyrinths . . . . in which all
men would become lost.”42 Decades after the Pên’s murder, however, no maze is to be
found. With no small amount of detective work, his descendent Yu Tsun realizes the puzzle
is not an actual garden, but an apparently incomprehensible manuscript left behind by the
dead relative and thought by all who read it to be unfinished, contradictory, and incoherent.
As it turns out, the labyrinth is a sort of infinite text—“forking in time, not in space”43—
warping and twisting the narrative into plural and incommensurable sequences. “‘I examined
it once,’” Yu Tsun recalls. “[I]n the third chapter the hero dies, in the fourth he is alive.”44
Bluntly: a denial of resolution, a sustained shock, an “infinite execution of a rhetorical
experiment.”45 Paradoxically, such a condition is inherent to the enterprises of learning and
education, if only temporarily.

Simultaneities.
Schiller made the point simply: “[o]ur psyche passes, then, from sensation to thought
via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the same time. Precisely
for this reason, however, they cancel each other out as determining forces, and bring about a
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negation by means of an opposition.”46 Although the notion of an opposition is
problematic for reasons I hope are clear by now, Schiller’s conception of sensate and rational
faculties of the human as mutually involved reminds us that intelligible is firstly sensible.
Indeed, this “middle disposition” between physical sensation and rational apprehension—as
well as our ability to make this distinction at all—creates the possibility for a notion of
sensibility: “if we are to call the condition of sensuous determination the physical, and the
condition of rational determination the logical or moral, then we must call this condition of
real and active determinability the a e s t h e t i c .”47 Recalling that Schiller asserts a productive
role for the aesthetic in politics, we might recall Kenneth Burke’s related suggestion that “the
service of the aesthetic [is] in keeping the practical from becoming too hopelessly itself.”48
Instead, each becomes a kind of strategy for dealing with the inevitability of the other in
deliberative, forensic, and epideictic contexts—from the quotidian to the extraordinary. This
constant simultaneity of both the sensible and the intelligible highlights the co-productive
relationship between thinker and thought, spectator and art, scholar and discourse.
Specifically, routinized habits of communal interpretive practice (such as those of an
academic discipline) are probably better understood as contingent, accidental—discursive
modalities susceptible to Rancière’s “redistribution of the sensible,” an appearance or
disappearance of that which is possible or available for sense experience, perception,
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Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters, trans. Elizabeth M.
Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 141.
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hearing, viewing, utterance, or performance.49 Socioeconomic and material circumstances
along cultural and technological innovation condition the possibility of things like novels,
theatre stages, performance art, internet video, microphones, and typography. Rancière is
particularly interested in “redistribution” or appearances of new sensible possibilities. In a
word, s u r p r i s e s . His work on such innovations is engaged in the second chapter below.
The key for both Schiller and Rancière is an approach to sensibility that understands the
political as aesthetic and the aesthetic as political—and not by any act of will. The point is
that it is impossible to talk about one from a context cleansed of its partner term because
intelligibilities shade off into one another.

Body’s Languages.
Although I will not engage the issue directly, my project is in many ways indebted to
the body’s sensory apparatus and work on essentially embodied nature of interpretation. As
Brian Massumi reminds us, “the skin is faster than the word.”50 His daring endowment of
affect with a certain “autonomy” ventures into a “virtual” zone of conceptual indeterminacy
between the body’s register of phenomena and the subsequent event of re-cognition. A
fleeting moment, to be sure, but one where cognitive apprehension is temporarily
unavailable prior to the application of intelligible conceptuality. Add unconsciousness to the
mix, and you’ve got yourself a mind-body-hand-eye-mouth-ear-nose machine that is a
stranger to both itself and its world while having convinced itself it knows better.51 Others

49 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, ed. and trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Bloomsbury,
2014), 7-8. The translator describes the sensible as simply “what is visible and audible as well as what can be
said, thought, made, or done.” Ibid., 89.
50 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press,
2002), 27.
51 “What are recognized object attributes and owned emotions if not old surprises to which we have
been more or less accustomed? . . . . Is recognition anything more than the habit of no longer see what’s new?”
Ibid., 221.

19

have established a depth to the apparent superficiality of the lived and the affective. The
sensorimotor capacities of infants, for whom everything is new, has interested the arts and
sciences alike. For prelinguistic babies, perceiving and manipulating objects is not a
metaphysical activity because they “learn about our world not with conceptual and
propositional knowledge, but more fundamentally, via bodily interactions and feelings” they
cannot even identify. The connection is not excessive. This is a situation from which we
never fully depart, a lifetime of conceptual schemata notwithstanding, because even returns
to things remembered—physical and metaphysical
—are mediated by the body’s apparatus. Human
animals making legible the sensible world are “big
babies.”52 As Anna Munster has demonstrated, the
rule applies even to the apparent cleanliness and
order of binary code. Far from a “reduction or
erasure of the organic body’s relation to the
cybernetic,” digitality is better conceived not as a
control mechanism, but rather a genesis of a new
“universe constituted primarily out of
information”53 that is inherently aesthetic. No glitzy
visualization required.
For the sake of acknowledging and
performing such a relation, this dissertation
considers scholarly approaches to “the new” and
52
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sound with particular attention to electronic music in the second and third chapters,
respectively. As we will see, these two discourses are uniquely positioned to help us think and
live both surprise and sensibility for academic writing. The goal will be to actually enact and
perform such a relation temporally across the duration of the text. “What shall we call such
discourse?,” asks Barthes. “[E]rotic, no doubt, for it has to do with pleasure; or even perhaps:
aesthetic, if we foresee subjecting this old category to a gradual torsion which will alienate it
from its regressive, idealist background and bring it closer to the body.”54

Existential Registers
Martin Heidegger asserts that a mood receptive to sensibility is necessary to
undertake and more so experience his attempt in Being and Time. His “analysis” required a
posture not typically associated with academic thinking: “as a state-of-mind which will satisfy
the methodological requirements, the phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our
analysis.”55 This analysis would be no mere narrative, no mere explication of Being that
could only betray its dynamism. Instead, Heidegger dared to imagine an engagement with
Being that was somehow outside of negation. A fascinating passage on this point appears in
the lecture “What is Metaphysics?,” delivered two years after the treatise:
Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein, only slightly in
those who are jittery, imperceptible in the “Oh, yes” and the “Oh, no” of men of affairs; but most
readily in the reserved, and most assuredly in those who are basically daring. But those daring ones are
sustained by that on which they expend themselves—in order thus to preserve the ultimate grandeur
of existence.56

54 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 84
(emphasis and lowercasing in the translation).
55 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper, 2008) 227 (original emphasis).
56 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The Task
of Thinking (1964), ed. and trans. David Farell Krell (London: Harper, 2008), 106.
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This anxiety as latent in even the most familiar situations suggests an uncanny inability to
comprehend the full extent of its implications for our Being-there in the world. For me,
what is most remarkable about the essay is that it actually performs its anxiety. Consider the
opening tease: “‘What is metaphysics?’ The question awakens expectations of a discussion
of metaphysics. This we will forgo.” 57 There are no easy ways out in Heidegger’s critique of
Western metaphysics and its reliance on empiricism, rationality, and faith in its own
observations. World and Being can be much more surprising than the prevalence of
intelligible accounting would indicate. And yet, for all this, he proceeds in the essay with his
characteristic, early Heideggerian analytical rigor and a necessarily sequential plan: first x,
then y, then we will be prepared to z. Intelligible and sensible registers blur.
In any case, the combination of “reserved” and “daring” attributes in those inclined
toward anxiety suggests a kind contradictory synthesis of active and passive states. Hence
Cynthia Haynes, taking a cue from Heidegger, points out that “things do not depend on
human reason, they emerge before us on their own.”58 What does this mean? We can come
up with an infinite array of methods in a kind of imperial conquest to know the world and
our relation to it, stacking the latest iterations of this incessant chattering of discourse upon
one another, and still be so far removed from any understanding of our ontological
condition. Heidegger is key on the issue, not only because of his propositional ideas, but
because of the manner in which he presented or performed them in his writing.
Sociologist Marvin Zuckerman’s research with his “Sensation Seeking Scale” is still
further work on this issue as I am construing it across disciplines. The instrument is a series
of tests he and some colleagues developed in the late 1960s to gauge one’s propensity for “a
trait defined by the need for varied, novel, and complex sensations and experiences and the
57
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willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of such experience.” 59 This work
when fused with rhetoric reveals interesting relationships between risk taking and other, less
so called “behavioral” and more epistemic and/or aesthetic tendencies. One such disposition
of import for my project involves a tolerance on the part of sensation seekers for ambiguity,
where “intolerance for ambiguity represents a tendency to react to ambiguous ideas or
situations as a threat rather than a challenge.”60 Aporia and paradox pose a relatively low
“threat” to the sensation seeker, who delights in murky questions such as those posed by a
discourse of “sensibility” as construed by this dissertation.

Rhetorics of Possibilities, Possible Rhetorics.
A sensibility for aesthetic and epistemological variation is a readily identifiable
Sophistic emphasis on novelty. John Poulakos, for example, associates the Sophists with “the
novel, the unusual, that prior to which we have no awareness, the unprecedented.”61 His
favorite example is Hippias, who is reported to have boasted in conversation with Socrates
his standard of discourse: “‘I always try and say something new.’”62 But, for the present
writing, this isn’t a new for its own sake. As already indicated, aesthetics are political and vice
versa. Victor Vitanza’s perpetual reinclusion of “some more” in The canonized History of
Rhetoric as well as the affective experience of “denegation” he attempts in his writing are
hysterical efforts to recoup the sensible downplayed in the accountancy of the archive.
Instead: improbabilities, possibilities, potentialities, and “incompossibilities”—that is, plural
conditions of possibility that cannot be reconciled but nevertheless occur alongside each
59
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other simultaneously. Entertaining such ideas helps safeguard against our tendency to
eliminate surprise, outlier, and error with instruments of regularity and salience such as bell
curves.63 Such tendencies are what Burke calls a “trained incapacities,” a term he borrowed
from Thorstein Veblen and refigured for criticism as a “state of affairs whereby one’s very
abilities can function as blindnesses,” where one’s “training would work against them.”64
Poulakos’ formulation of the Sophists as being interested in “the possible” or “the
world as it is not” since such a rhetoric of possibility “opens new horizons and advocates
their pursuit, thus giving man the chance to venture finding what he lacks.”65 Vitanza goes
even further, beyond lack, in a trajectory from “One (homogeneity) to Two [possible/actual]
(heterogeneity homogenized) to Some More (i.e., to Radical Heterogeneity)”66 to allow for the
perpetual inclusion for alternative, marginalized, and oppressed notions of rhetorical
possibility in the first place. The result is an ongoing, baroque aestheticization of
information, archive, and canon having no necessary characteristic of beauty or taste, but
rather texture.

Scission.
“Surprise” for this project, then, is not something new under the sun.67 Instead,
these pages will investigate a necessarily transient experience of unassimilable phenomena or
information and accountancy for such experiences in scholarly venues. It is my belief that
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such an experience is only ever identified retrospectively, after trauma subsides and the
comfort of composure returns. In drawing these writers, thinkers, and artists together, I
hardly intend to conflate their obvious differences. But I would like to highlight a
commonality of a desire to engage in creative processes of exploration “without criteria,” to
borrow a term and a phrase from Lyotard.68 Insofar as such is possible.
The problem, of course, is that as soon as one attempts to articulate sensibility, one
mediates the experience not merely in the envelope of representative language, but, more
importantly, in proposition, in grammar, thereby engaging in a kind of betrayal by forcing a
“stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue.”69 While I deal with subjects and
objects, I am more so interested in postures, attitudes, and moods we might assume during
necessarily transient experience of objects and events that confuse, disrupt, and unsettle. I am
less interested in a critique of the binary (although that is certainly an important issue) than I
am in augmentations, alterations, and enhancements of the subject so that the object might
be experienced anew. And I will need an object, after all, if I am to advance past the stasis of
conjecture. In light of Heidegger’s argument that basically all methodologies are avoidance
mechanisms against alternative understandings—the most powerful assumptions being those
about which we are totally unaware—I am most interested in novel conditions of
possibilities for academic work. Specifically, I would acknowledge and embrace our aesthetic
relation with our discourse. Intelligibility as intervention underscores a relegation of mental
and experiential activity prior to the arrival of communicable knowledge.
The dissertation is “about” precisely this tension between a would-be inventive
writer and their discourse conventions that rely on intelligibility and code—yet are also
capable of “registering” on the level of the sensible. The separate works of Julia Kristeva
68
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and Roland Barthes are immensely helpful on this point. Kristeva’s distinction between
symbolic and semiotic analysis reclaims aesthetic or affective dimensions of what could very
well otherwise be mere decryption. Similarly, Barthes speaks “a discomfort [he] had always
suffered from: the uneasiness of being a subject torn between two languages, one expressive,
the other critical.” 70 What comes out in reading Kristeva and Barthes is a realization that we
are always already both within and without structural analysis. This duality and the anxiety it
creates is my “object.” In addition to Kristeva and Barthes, I also plan to revisit the outsideron-the-inside performances in Spivak’s “negotiating with structures of violence,” Lynn
Worsham’s implosion of hermeneutics, and Haynes’ attempt to “draw us away from the
shoreline of philosophical reason and its alluring beacon of argumentation,” pointing our
sterns, instead, toward “abstraction”; she continues: “In casting off from ground metaphysics
(a difficult and dissuasive move), we occupy a paradoxical position; we must stand with one
foot on land and one foot on our vessel.”71 I see these writers as brushing against the limits
of a discursive apparatus by means of stretching from the inside out. This trio of
“impostors” to their discourses, along with Kristeva and Barthes, are the focus of the fourth
chapter below.
But there is a potential for misdirection here, as the famous dualism arises. As I’ve
stressed, the difference between sensibility and intelligibly is not negative, but positive. In
light of the literature, I propose “sensibility” as an open-ended capacity to undergo a
necessarily ephemeral experience of discovery, surprise, novelty, shock, wonder, awe, eureka!,
epiphany, and the transitional experience of ex-stasis itself during the activities of thinking,
reading, writing, and, especially for this dissertation, listening. Surprise is a strange and
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visceral rendition on the Socratic paradox in which one claims to know that they do not
know.

The Finest Quality.
Surprises can be catastrophic and/or invaluable. Scholarship as explanation—a
search for causalities amounting to a challenging-forth of the so called “content”—seems to
stand in direct contrast with surprise. Here, then: “the paradox of wonder: it is the beginning
of inquiry, . . . but the end of inquiry also puts an end to wonder.”72 Rather than seek to iron
out interpretive wrinkles, I have presented a discourse of texts, thinkers, art works, and more
that embrace and hope for surprising, “sensible” events to serve as reminders that our world
and our rhetoric could be otherwise—for better or worse. Rickert puts it particularly well in
saying that “when we tether intent to self-consciousness, we cut off large swaths of human
activity from rhetorical practice in our rhetorical theory.”73 Let’s face it: cogent ideas simply
do not comprise the full breadth and scope of the rhetorical subject’s experiential and
interpretive capacities. Scholarship should reflect this situation and benefit from this
productive ambiguity besides.

Ought: Aesthetics of Rhetorics.
Such interpretive stretching, of course, will only ever take place from inside the very
constraints we identify as limiting—which is to say that such stretching will take place
casuistically, whereby “one introduces new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to
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old principles.”74 Deterritorializations have territorialized origins. The trick and the challenge,
then, will be to enact or perform a sensible writing that incites dissonant affects while
nevertheless operating within the protocols of academic writing.
My argument is that what is needed is not novel objects of study or new vocabularies
with which to undertake rhetorical study of sensibility, not another reading that will settle,
once and for all, the matter of reading the bibliographies below—but entirely new moods
and modes of discoursing that are not merely content to be self conscious of and apologetic
for the fixation inherent to the scholarly apparatus, but attempt to wobble that paradigm
through the introduction of not only novel propositional content but novel ways of talking
about sensibility that minimize the undesirable calcifications promoted by the typical goals
of critical discourse: fixation, operationalization, control, capitalization. All of which seems
especially important if your “object” of study is the affective experience of surprise brought
on by the limits of a paradigm or a discursive apparatus.
Steve Whitson and John Poulakos certainly surprised rhetorical studies with their
1993 essay “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric.” Aligning themselves with the
philosopher, they claimed that rhetoric is essentially artistic and not, as virtually all
composition textbooks and pedagogies would have it, an activity of constructing
knowledge.75 As foils to Robert Scott and his memorable claim that “rhetoric is a way of
knowing” and is thus “epistemic,”76 Whitson and Poulakos provoked an aesthetic disruption
74
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in the tireless accumulation of knowledge through propositional logic. Picking up
Nietzsche’s declaration that the subject’s intellectual and reflective capacities are not capable
of reproducing objects because we stand in a basically aesthetic relation to the world,
Whitson and Poulakos import Nietzsche for rhetoric to stress that knowledge is itself
aesthetic because our relationship with the world is sensuous; encounters with objects, arts,
others, and especially important for me, discourses are firstly sensate or sensible. Notably,
aesthetic rhetoric is associated with the body and the senses: “because we have nothing to go
on except nerve stimuli from our senses, linguistic signs intervene to expand the stimuli and
forge them into concepts”77 during a process neuroscience reminds us is entirely physical.
Probing these issues drops us right on the meta/physical threshold between intelligibility and
sensibility.
While I am empathetic with Nietzsche and largely in agreement with Whitson and
Poulakos, the line drawn between aesthetic and so called epistemic rhetorics replays the
ancient divide even as it proclaims the primacy of the aesthetic. It’s not hard to see why the
essay drew a blistering critique from James Hikins, who, like an epistemic playground bully,
makes a series of layup arguments against the duo of aestheticians. The critique is that
aesthetic rhetoric is actually “eristic,” a playful technique Hikins describes as gaming systems
and lacking actual, propositional argument.78 Like a modern day Isocrates, who charged the
sophists with eristic and bashed their flashy discursive tricks because they could not found or
facilitate political affairs, Hikins makes a similar dismissal. In line with the practicality his
teachings prioritized, Isocrates equated the practices of the sophist’s. “Jugglers’ tricks,” he
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called them, which “do not profit anyone yet attract great crowds of the empty-minded.”79
While Whitson and Poulakos claim to be attacking the epistemic tradition from “within,”
Hikins maintains they are in fact “without” because they lack an argument beyond the claim
that aesthetics is prior to rhetorics. And yet, there it is: Whitson and Poulakos’ article in the
pages of The Quarterly Journal of Speech. 80 The lesson we might learn from these exchanges is
that there exist alternative intelligences in addition to intelligibilities, and that these are
worthy of acknowledgement and inclusion in everyday academic practices.
Both parties maintain some essential divide between aesthetics and epistemology that
results in an interesting but ultimately circular conversation. And to varying degrees, the
responses continued this circularity. Douglas Thomas tries to broker a deal between the two
“competing” approaches, but winds up reaffirming the binary in a “risk/reward” costbenefit analysis where neither side has anything to offer the other.81 Chief among the
Nietzschean platform’s risks is “allowing aesthetics to overwhelm our sense of critical
purpose,”82 a sentiment that replays an earlier concern that “the contemporary age does not
demand merely ‘charm and impact,’ but sober consideration of the complex problems
confronting it and effectual solutions.”83 The notion that aesthetics has nothing to offer so
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called real world policy making—higher educational, geopolitical, economic, etc.—is an
exceptionally unfortunate and deep misunderstanding.84 Whitson and Poulakos’ fantastical
approach notwithstanding, the aesthetic as superfluous or inhibiting incorrectly presupposes
we can bypass form for content as if each did not bleed into each other. Furthermore, the
ability of the arts to anticipate, reflect, or catalyze social and economic developments is well
known.85
With the benefit of hindsight, we can easily sense it is not a question of whether
rhetoric is or is not aesthetic or epistemic, but that the question makes it possible to engage
our relationship with knowledge beget by rhetorical work. For me, the question is not an
ontology of rhetoric, but a sensible relationship with rhetorical action and potential surprise
with regard to the discursive capacities we thought we knew as primarily or exclusively
epistemic. Because Whitson and Poulakos continue the commonplace of pitting epistemic
rhetoric against aesthetics, they all too quickly concede their essay is of the former tradition:
Is this essay written in the aesthetic tradition of rhetoric? No—the conventions of academic writing
militate against the kinds of prose Nietzsche would have endorsed. As written, this essay
acknowledges that academic writing generally privileges the epistemic tradition; at the same time, it
suggests that the epistemic tradition is not altogether impervious to a critique from within.86

While the tongue is in the cheek, the authors conspicuously stop short of a full embrace of
an aestheticism they themselves frame as somehow antithetical to an epistemic tradition.
Two decades later, with multimodal scholarship and alt presentations up to and including art
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installations seen at conferences in rhetoric and composition, we might begin to think the
aesthetic tradition has been assimilated. Yet a more viable way of reading Whitson and
Poulakos —one more consistent with Nietzsche, really—would be to suggest they were
always already aesthetic.
Might it be possible to integrate meaningfully such faculties or capacities into
academic writing? Which is mythical, that we have something like a “sensibility,” or the idea
that we can transcend it?
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CHAPTER TWO
BUILD: NOVELTY

Bow on my package tied up with string: these are a few
of my choice idiosyncrasies. Concept commodity
fetishes. I’m drooling. Oh: now this, this is something
different, something new. Say it and it’s no longer true. 1
What is originality? To see something that has no name
as yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it
stares us all in the face. The way men usually are, it
takes a name to make something visible for them.
—Nietzsche2

Figure 2.1: Bow

I could not see my way to dispute the transience of all
things, nor could I insist upon an exception in favour
of what is beautiful and perfect. But I did dispute the
pessimistic poet’s view that the transience of what is
beautiful involves any loss in its worth. On the
contrary, an increase! Transience value is scarcity value
in time. Limitation in the possibility of an enjoyment
raises the value of the enjoyment. —Freud 3

Introduction
To begin: novelty. Itself associated with beginnings, the novel as a semantic entity in this
sentence cheats itself out its own meaning. Most can relate to a new acquisition, travel to a
foreign place, the experience of unfamiliar art works. But “the new” as referent seems to
require and (or?) result in a something recognizable, referential, and termed. When signified,
the new saws off the branch on which it sits. In this way, the new is like surprise in that
1
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everyone can relate to having a new experience, but nobody knows what it is. If “it” had
qualities or attributes, it wouldn’t be new. The new is thus a floating signification. Its value
and punch abounds in business, marketing, engineering, the sciences—and even humanities
scholarship in pursuit of “fresh” and “distinctive” approaches to textual analysis. But the
new is a literal nothing and must be. Round and round the mulberry bush.
For this reason and others, the new is a favorite dead horse. As I will demonstrate,
scholarly treatments of novelty frequently take form as bureaucratic accounts of selfproclaimed progressives, and read their rhetorics as empty, cheap, or commercial—egotism
at best. After all, innumerable critics wail, if something were really new, it would bear the
mark of no antecedent whatsoever. Hence the new cannot be re-cognized or even identified.
If such were possible, the referent would not be new. 4
While these are important lessons with real consequences that ought to inform a
study of the new, my sense is these gripes emerge from a false conundrum attributable to a
relationship with information and intelligibility characterized by control, regulation, and
order that masquerade as somehow non-relational. Moreover, such dismissals obscure the
bigger issue: what is our relationship with the novel, to surprise? To simplify and reduce the
claim, the reliance of scholarly discourse on a “critical” relation with its content seems to
secure the fate of the new to the laughing stock. Interpretive in/security, if you like.
Critiques of disembodied Cartesianism and its subject-object relationship are a dime for two
baker’s dozens, yet mainstream forms and attitudes of scholarship buck at the vulnerability
the collapse of this divide entails. It’s worth remembering Descartes himself ranked “wonder
as the first of all passions” with a use value, reasoning that the novel instigates and inspires
4 As the epigraph from Freud alludes, an aesthetics of transience permeates the chapter. It is a minor
sensibility generally inadequate for producing the hallmarks of compelling arguments: stoppage, exhaustiveness,
completion, and so on.
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the work of thought, learning, and knowledge.5 Careful not to overdo it, however, because
“surprise” in excess can result in paralysis of “astonishment” and freeze the inquiry.6 Tracing
the genealogy of wonder through episodes in the history of science starring phenomena
unassimilable and irreducible to contemporary intelligibilities, Lorraine Daston remarks that
a general distaste for such affects has crossed disciplinary borders: “humanists are even more
chary [than scientists] of expressing wonder in their scholarly publications or even their
popular ones. To do so flirts with vulgarity, even kitsch.”7 Indeed, it is easy (and perhaps
lazy) to write the new off as fad—that which cannot and does not aim to sustain interest,
engagement, or thought. Even aesthete Edmund Burke admits it: “[c]uriosity, from its
nature, is a very active principle; it quickly runs over the greatest part of its objects, and soon
exhausts the variety which is commonly to be met with in nature,”8 a view that situates
novelty squarely in the realm of the superficial and unsophisticated. 9 Kenneth Burke remarks
that “surprise is the least complex form of fulfillment.”10 Read literally, he’s right. One can
hardly experience fulfillment of an expectation one does not hold, and it makes no sense to
anticipate surprise. Yet surprise hath wrought a proliferation of scholarship in which I
intervene with attention to the presumed relationship between relevant writers and the
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Beautiful, 34-35.
10 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 36, n. 4.
6
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information they engage and produce. So long as the relationship is basically “critical,”
engagements with “the new” (as if it were singular) set themselves up for disappointment
precisely because criticism’s job is to know, secure, and establish foothold—period. However,
my sense is that this relationship is more formal than essential, actual, or based on the
epistemological capacity of the manuscript-tool.
To be sure, one encounters great difficulty in trying to address a sensible new
without subsuming it under an intelligible category. Rather than “talk about not talking
about,” however, this chapter drives at top speed into the discursive wall dictating the
untouchability of the new. Rather than stake an ontological flag in the new and charter its
generic criteria, however, my approach will differ in its exploration of the aesthetics of rhetorics
of the new. 11 Stacking prepositional phrases such as these (“about”; “of . . . of . . .”) may
appear to be critical distancing.12 While grammatically manifest, such distance cannot achieve
deaestheticized intelligibility. A good example of this impossibility is the common
Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion format seen in scientific articles (IMRAD),
which I have used to organize the present chapter. The purpose is two-fold. First, it
demonstrates the extent to which appetites for humanities scholarship are not so unlike
those for sciences, which expect controlled analytic sequences and the dissection of
11

“Aesthetic(s)” is used in the sense established during the Introduction, having to do with a
“sensibility” in an ongoing relation among experiencing interpreting subjects and their so called objects.
12 In a certain sense, this is true and could probably be extended to other grammatical features and the
proposition itself. After all, “[s]ubject-object was in grammar before it structured metaphysics.” Gregory L.
Ulmer, Avatar Emergency (Anderson: Parlor Press, 2012), 140. In this text and elsewhere, Ulmer suggests the
subject-object relation is an inherent and endemic feature of a strict conception of the “apparatus” of literacy.
Alternative apparatuses include orality and “electracy,” a primarily image-based and yet multimedia
communications Ulmer characterizes as that which “is to digital media what literacy is to alphabetic writing.”
Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy (New York: Longman, 2003), xvii. The idea follows not only the
technologies of orality and literacy, but also their assumptions, epistemologies, metaphors, institutions, and so
on. The term thus refers not simply to computers or digital compositions, but a paradigmatic shift in moods
and modes of thinking that are in fact performable in alphabetic writing, which comprises the vast majority of
Ulmer’s vitae. Electracy is discussed further during the final chapter below.
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phenomena.13 Additionally and vice versa (sciences as humanities) it shows how the IMRAD
instrument is product of creative choices, decisions, operationalizations, best guesses, and
results more in precisely defined ambiguities than certainties. Second, use of the structure is
presented here as performance—a glitch of contexts inspired by dada and conceptual artists
who put the readymade, the unadorned painting, the basic geometric shape, and the body in
the museum.

Figure 2.2: The romantic beyond. “Flammarion Engraving” first appeared in
Camille Flammarion’s L’atmosphère: météorologie populaire (1888). Image is in
the Public Domain under PD-1923.

To be clear, it is not necessary to go beyond some firmament of “conceptuality” or
reflective knowledge to make the point that intelligibility is itself aesthetic in the sense of
being relational unto its object. Again: let us recall Nietzsche’s “stammering translation.” Or
we might amend Wilde’s maxim that “[t]he mystery of the world is the visible, not the
13 The etymology of “analysis” includes the ancient Greek ἀνάλυσις, meaning to unravel, loosen, or
reduce to parts.
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invisible”14 and fit it for our present purposes, where the mystery turns out to be precisely
what is known as intelligible. As we saw in the opening chapter, the distinction between
intelligible and sensible is untenable; each runs far too easily into the other. Here, I propose
not only acknowledgment but performance of an aestheticized relationship with
intelligibility. I assume that nothing comes from nothing, that all perceptible phenomena are
casually produced, and that works have histories—acknowledged or not. Prior knowledges
may very well intervene during a reflective process—and at varying degrees of
consciousness—but category and identification are themselves lived and temporal; there is
no white room of conceptuality divorced from the sensibility of time, place, body, or
existential condition.15

Methods
Trajectory. First, I review generalized doubt, disgust, and dismissal of claims to the
new and original the work of Peter Bürger, Rosalind Krauss, Michael North, and Boris
Groys with particular attention to critiques of various and sundry avant-garde movements.
Such aversion is compared for resemblance in particular and peculiar ways those familiar
dismissals of spectacle, kitsch, and commodity in general. While accurate, such critiques have

14

Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1908), 34.
A necessary acknowledgement here involves relations and decisions embedded in algorithmic
actants, particularly those of cloud computing proliferating in our cultural moment. We not only have driverless
cars and pedometers, but also cloud-tethered refrigerators, thermostats, and deadbolts. Adding automation and
stirring such an “internet of things” delegates “decision” processes to nonhuman objects that act
independently of wetware. One particularly astute theorist has called this practice “algorithmic perception,” an
arrangement that presents major societal promises and cultural pitfalls. Two such dangers, the scholar
maintains, are “pedestrian optimization” for commercial and governance purposes on the one hand, and
inflationary pushback amounting to “the fetishization of the human experience of human experience” on the
other. See Benjamin H. Bratton, “On A.I. and Cities: Platform Design, Algorithmic Perception, and Urban
Geopolitics,” Het Nieuwe Instituut, 2015, http://bennopremselalezing2015.hetnieuweinstituut.nl/en.
15
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limited our understanding of novelty to gimmick and reduced our relationship with
innovation and rhetorical invention itself. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is
perhaps a consequence of information systems and infrastructures regulating critical
discourse.16
Three current texts on novelty in art, literature, theory, and science are then explored.
Evaluated are Michael North’s Novelty: A History of the New, Boris Groys’ recently translated
On the New, and Jacques Rancière’s Aisthesis: Scenes from The Aesthetic Regime of Art for their
relative viability as means of engaging the new. Texts are assessed for the ability of their
respective formal approaches to actually exceed form by engaging the new temporally and
performatively.
Between the second and third analysis, an interruption of “anxiety” (angst) according
to Martin Heidegger appears. While he reserved these privileged modes of engagement for
an ultimate and supreme analytic for Being, there is great promise in the adaptation of these
moods for rhetoric I will sketch over the course of the chapter. In temporalizing essence and
endowing the work with an existential capacity to “set up a world,” Heidegger introduces an
anxiety during which familiar relations, givens, and for-granted relations with objects, world,
self, and art works are no longer tenable. In a particular and peculiar way, everything can be
new or anew. This chapter asks: Is novelty impossible or inevitable?

Results
Cheap thrill abounds, of course. From American Idol commercial break cliffhangers,
to clickbait, to the “reboot” film—that nostalgic replay of some bygone blockbuster with

16

*Not* surprisingly, consequences spillover into pedagogy too. See my fifth chapter, below.
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updated casting—there is no shortage of the empty old masquerading as sparkly new.
Recycling cardboard cutout forms as they do, it’s easy and necessary to acknowledge these
media cheat audiences out of originality in the strict sense of something new under the sun.
Perhaps the pinnacle of the form is the novelty item or the gag —the hand buzzer, the
whoopee cushion, the projectile snake from the can of “peanuts.” Such accouterments seem
to equip the prankster with the means to dupe the unsuspecting, but it turns out that the
joke’s on the jokester. Such items fetishize a short-lived and superficial escapism,
choreographed faux pas, and a feigned, safety-netted rupture of the everyday and routine.
Worse for surprise, the affective force of the novelty item is about as twist-ended as a Jackin-the-box appearing right on time, every time. Nothing new here.

Figure 2.3: Cheap laughs, or none at all: Eddy
Goldfarb signature “Yakity Yak Talking
Teeth.” Photograph mine.

Surprise Stock
It was Clement Greenberg who famously described the phenomenon of “kitsch” or
lowbrow art as “simulacra of genuine culture . . . . Kitsch is mechanical and operates by
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formulas. Kitsch is vicarious experience and faked sensations,”17 driven primarily or even
exclusively by profit motive. Although he would later attenuate his hardline dichotomy, kitsch
as such could not rise to the self-criticism Greenberg considered essential to modernist art18
given its chief audience of birds and bottom feeders. These “surprises” come in Cracker
Jack boxes, but also Netflix recommendation lists, emoji updates, or the latest and greatest
chemical remix at Starbucks. Do they also come on the pages of academic journals, or in
syllabi? Are they sold three credit hours at a time? Yes and no.
One affirmative response comes from Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s
blistering critique of “the culture industry” and its subsummation or coerced submission of
art to business ideologies. While the relationship between art and labor is fraught with
contradictions and paradoxes, one thing that is clear is that it’s nearly impossible to separate
the two. If only as a conditioning possibility, political-economic circumstance makes art
conceivable in the first place and complicates the cult of art as pure labor for its own sake.
The notion of a contemporary artistic enterprise somehow unbeholden to time, place, or
material situation is probably a myth of bourgeois origin. All this is well known. For
Horkheimer and Adorno, however, the culture industries of film, television, music, and so
on monetize art’s supposed fall from its own self-direction and does so specifically with
regard to eccentricity and idiosyncrasy: “[T]hat art renounces its own autonomy and proudly
takes its place among consumption goods constitutes the charm of novelty.”19 Singularity
17

Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan Review 5, no. 9 (1939): 39-40.
Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” in The Collected Essays and Criticism, ed. John O’Brien, vol.
4, Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969 (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1995), 85-87. Further, even
high modernist art for Greenberg did not constitute any rupture in the historical trajectory of art: “[m]odernist
art continues the past without gap or break, and wherever it may end up it will never cease being intelligible in
terms of the past.” Ibid., 92.
19 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New
York: Continuum, 1991), 157.
18
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becomes just another flavor among several choices, all of which are meticulously catalogued,
tabulated, and prescribed for particular demographics by the culture industry. Elimination of
surprise is the name of the game. Such control is epitomized by “predictive” mechanisms
like the “focus group,” which reduce aesthetic experience to quantity by means of the yay or
nay, the Likert scale, or the seemingly innocuous query. “How likely are you to recommend X to a
friend?” Products, political candidates, and pop media pilots are trialled on sample
populations, whose feedback is then used to determine whether newbies fly, die, or perhaps
how they might be modified to increase palatability and chances of commercial success.
Give the people what they want, but beware confirmation bias and the comfortable.
One particularly distressing example is the case of Shazam, a free application for
mobile smartphones capable of identifying music within reach of the device’s microphone.
In what amounts to a streamlined and crowdsourced focus group, users with internet access
or cell service all over the world can “discover” music they hear at the coffeeshop, the bar, or
a party by putting a name to the beat. Labels and radio stations purchase the resultant data
from Shazam to learn not only which songs are most popular, but also which vocal patterns,
tonic progressions, keys, and other stylistic features generate the most interest a given
moment or particular geographic region. Financial allocations for promotion and creation of
new artists follow. Knowingly or not, users give away their behavioral data in exchange for
the service of the app, which provides convenient links to purchase the song electronically
on Apple iTunes once the music is matched (resulting in yet another sales data set). One
might think this puts content control in the hands of the “consumer” and for the better,
giving the public a say in what comes next. But numerous metrics such as Billboard report a
negative feedback loop wherein today’s most popular songs tend to get played more
frequently and stick around on the charts longer than they did in the past, when interest and
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sales data came from honor system reporting by radio stations and record shops.20 The
arrangement boasts all the progress and efficiency of Taylorism, and preference for the
comfort of familiarity puts us right back in the closed and regulated system where pleasure
has no pioneering mission, but only “moves rigorously in the worn grooves of association.
No independent thinking must be expected from the audience.” 21 Hence what we might call
placebo surprises: the trusty twist ending wherein the guilty party is the one whom everyone
least suspects, the sudden foley shriek in horror, and the incessant updates for planned
obsolescence in fashion or the cellular telephone industry, each made to manufacture lack
and false consciousness. “What’s new for fall by spring means nothing.”22
The repetition in these basically farcical novelties is why Roland Barthes’ well known
study of the image mocks “the whole gamut of ‘surprises’” that falls flat precisely because it
can be accounted for as an effects stockpile: the appeal to a photographed subject’s rarity for
its own sake, the superimposition and other exploitations of technique, “the trouvaille or
lucky find,” and so on.23

20

Conflicts of interest in such reports, the thinking goes, skewed data and fabricated a false-positive
preference for new music. See Derek Thompson, “The Shazam Effect,” The Atlantic, December 2014, http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/the-shazam-effect/382237. A video supplement embedded
in the piece includes an interview with Shazam CEO Rich Riley, who appeals to the sensible when he claims
the company “can really help show when an artist is connecting with an audience.” Related company Next Big
Sound, also profiled in the video, tracks the self-promotional activity of up and coming artists to glean how, for
example, Instagram “likes” correlate with download sales in specified timeframes. A banner hanging over a
whiteboard in Next Big Sound’s office space reads, “Making Data Useful” in big, black letters.
21 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic, 137.
22 Desaparecidos, “What’s New for Fall,” from The Happiest Place On Earth (Omaha: Saddle Creek
Records, 2001).
23 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 32-34.
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Figure 2.4: Double rainbow over Clemson, South Carolina.
Photograph mine.

For Barthes, a surprise is inexplicable and must be, puzzling for an utter and radical lack of
why. 24 Contrast this ideal figuration against an early scene in Willy Wonka and the Chocolate
Factory. Shortly after the lucky Golden Ticket holders arrive and enter the topsy-turvy candy
works, the children and their parents are checking their coats when gilded “hooks” in the
shape of human hands spring to life, seizing the outerwear from unsuspecting guests who
cry out in shock. Wonka zips onscreen: “[l]ittle surprises around every corner—but nothing
dangerous!”25 But surprise and the new for the present writing are dangerous in the specific
sense of instigating vulnerability, exposure, and anxiety. As Avital Ronell in an interview
suggests, information and intelligibility can function as kind of naive fortification or an all
too thin security blanket for the psychoanalytic condition instigated by a world that includes,
for examples, the trauma of tsunamis and political turmoil: “we try to defend against

24

“The photograph becomes ‘surprising’ when we do not know why it has been taken.” Ibid., 34.
Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory, directed by Mel Stuart (1971; Burbank: Warner Brothers, 2010),
Blu-ray. The original poster for the film at once generalizes, sanitizes, satiates, and consoles the would-be
surprised—all while feigning subversion: “It’s everybody’s non-pollutionary, anti-instituionary, proconfectionery factory of fun!” By the way, Wonka lied. Children in the film nearly drown and burst from the
inside-out, and though such hardships are brought on by their own conceits, viewers eventually learn Wonka
planned from the beginning to eliminate all but one visitor in perverse survival quest of sorts.
25
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[helplessness] by building up all sorts of machinery, apparatuses, [and] cognitive systems that
pretend and claim to understand what’s happening. And then when disaster strikes—if it’s
truly a disaster—all our systems have to be destroyed, because that’s what disaster means.”26
Such a relationship with intelligibility and the violence of shock is a far cry from the “[b]anal
though elaborate surprise”27 of the culture industry, mere and momentary simulations of
anxiety for disaffected audiences. Bumper car hiccups immediately after which homeostasis
is reestablished.

Freak Control
The cliché of “new” as simulacra is readily admitted, but just to what extent are such
dismissals the result of one’s relationship with the new defined provisionally as that which is
merely yet unknown—perceptible but not identifiable? As a way of responding, let us
position the wunderkammer or “cabinet of curiosities” as a conflict avoidance mechanism.
Chests of hodgepodge specimens from the natural world, distant travels, and foreign
cultures, these encyclopedic display cases most popular from the sixteenth to eighteenth
centuries were typically populated with exotic items for the pleasure and entertainment of
what were almost exclusively European owners.

26

Avital Ronell, interviewed by Elza Gonçalves, Euronews, video, April 5, 2011, https://youtu.be/
yMXPRCdGRqk.
27 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic, 137.
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Figure 2.5: Novelty found and/or lost? Domenico Remps’ “Cabinet of Curiosities”
(1690s). Image is in the Public Domain under PD-1923.

Notable for me is not what the cabinet features or makes visible, but what is obfuscated by
the attitudinal frame of collection. While wunderkammern as microcosms were vehicles for
education, marvel, and awe, they were also social indicators of power and mastery28 that
enabled a sort of dime-store tourism. We might say the cabinet betrays a telling relationship
with novelty indeed, one characterized by spectacle, safety found through distance,
voyeurism, and domestication. The original curiosity cabinets were a highly varied and
flexible phenomenon, and some functioned as honest inquiry into anthropology, medicine,
and botany. Today, however, a similar relationship with novelty takes the form of Ripley’s
Believe it or Not!, that great institution of counterfeit orientalist plunder. Please exit through the
gift shop. Different and yet similar controls and regulations in and of rhetorics have been
28 Barbara Maria Safford and Frances Terpak, Devices of Wonder: From the World in a Box to Images on a
Screen (Los Angeles: Getty, 2001), 6-7; 153-156.
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acknowledged and roasted by Victor J. Vitanza. Questioning the desirability of a disciplined
or disciplinary rhetoric sought, for example, in the Aristotelian dream for an exhaustive
account of persuasion in this and that situation, Vitanza exposes the relational drive behind
such an effort: “[l]et us not be fooled: What they—these crypto-philosophers clothed in
sheepish rhetorical garb—are really talking about is control, these efficiency experts, these
Young Bureaucrats of Language and of Creativity and of the Imagination.”29 Systemic
management of the means of persuasion may come at the cost of closure and rhetorical
stagnation, depending upon the tonality of our relationship with intelligibility. The too likely
result is an algorithmic and, as Vitanza shows in performance, an exclusionary rhetoric
typically maintained to serve elite, privileged, or already dominant interests. It has all the
friends it needs, and newcomers are perceived as unruly threats to stability and authority of
knowledge.

Figure 2.6: Catalog. A stamp collection.30

Figure 2.7: Fixation. Entomology case. 31

29

Victor J. Vitanza, “Critical Sub/Versions of the History of Philosophical Rhetoric,” Rhetoric Review
6, no. 1 (1987): 50 (original emphasis).
30 “My Stamp Collection” by J’ram DJ is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
31 “Lepidoptera Americana” is in the Public Domain under CC0 1.0. From the collection of
nineteenth century naturalist Ludolph Heiligbrodt housed at the University of Texas at Austin. Photograph by
Alex Wild.
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I am reminded of the not so different (and yet) scientific accounting for natural
phenomena described by Bruno Latour. As an ethnographer tagalong with a team of
scientists studying Amazon forestry in Boa Vista, Brazil, Latour notes with nearcondescending delight how the team’s confidence in relation to the studied trees multiplies
when the group returns to the lab with specimens in hand. There, prior knowledges,
instruments, and most notably language can be applied to phenomena more precisely and
systematically. Distance is key: “[i]n losing the forest, we win knowledge of it.”32 While the
wunderkammer brings unfamiliar objects near, it also sets up a not so dissimilar distancing,
given that its contents are, like the Brazilian trees, “detached, separated, preserved, classified,
and tagged.”33
In light of the earlier discussion, it might seem that novelty is about as useful as a
kaleidoscope. Yet there once was a time when that device could “create, in a single hour,
what a thousand artists could not invent in the course of a year; and while it works with such
unexampled rapidity, it works also with corresponding beauty and precision.”34 Lest the
argument be misunderstood, this is no apology for trinket. What I am against and alongside,
however, are irresponsible broad brush paintings and critical-opportunistic relations with
“novelty” as a conceptual entity, 35 and, to repeat, intelligibility in general.

32

Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999), 38; 39; cf. 36-39.
33 Ibid., 39.
34 Sir David Brewster, The Kaleidoscope: its History, Theory, and Construction, with its Application to the Fine
and Useful Arts, 2nd ed., “Greatly Enlarged” (London: John Murray, 1858), 151.
35 Let’s remember, it is precisely the “questionable quality, taste, originality, and necessity” of
knickknacks that makes them easier to compare than contrast alongside some of the most significant art works
of the twentieth century. Mark Newgarden and Picturebox, Inc., Cheap Laffs: The Art of the Novelty Item (New
York: Abrams, 2004), 7.
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No Wonder
“Avant-Garde” and its relations to novelty are always contested issues. Given the
multitude of names, movements, and localities associated with the concept at different times
and places, the term itself is imprecise and probably used in excess.36 Whereas some
deployments of the term refer simply to experimental, ambitious, or progressivist arts
practices, in other cases the term ought to be associated with specific political-ideological
agendas, as in the case of the Situationist International. These artist-thinker-performers
certainly expanded the possibilities of art in hopes of a limitlessness, but did so in response
to issues like alienated labor, architectural grammaticization of the city life, and the the
society of the spectacle, image, and detachment propagated by media industries. The term’s
genealogy is further complicated by various neo-avant-gardes, which, again hazarding a
generalization, refers to relatively institutionalized or (in some cases, unabashedly)
commodified arts practices that are to be distinguished, at least in certain ways, from the
earlier nostalgias for autonomous art that could transcend historical circumstance or instigate
the injection of something alien.
Yet for all this messiness, scholarly engagements with whatever novelty something
like “the avant-garde” might offer turns out to be rotten with the perfection37 of the
categorical approach. Peter Bürger’s seminal Theory of the Avant-Garde, for instance,
recognizes the inadequacy of this impulse and sets out to recoup “the relationship between
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I am indebted to Beth Lauritis, whose conversation and thinking influences the discussion of
“avant-garde” in this paragraph and throughout.
37 I invoke the final clause of Kenneth Burke’s in/famous definition of man: “the symbol using
(symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor of the negative . . . separated from his natural condition by
instruments of his own making . . . goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order)[,] and
rotten with perfection.” Language and Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: The
University of California Press, 1996), 16.
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interpreter and literary work,” i.e., the historical or embedded quality of the aesthetic
category itself.38 While the intention is admirable, given the ultimately critical relation the
author assumes with its object, “the avant-garde,” eventually the study cannot help but insist
on the very stasis of category for “the avant-gardiste work” it set out to surpass. In fact,
Bürger presents a five-point plan of generic criteria: 1) attempted dissolution of the “work”
as unitary and singular entity, 2) newness understood as a (naive) claim of complete break
with tradition (total unprecedence), 3) chance operations, 4) emphasis on the fragmentary
and allegorical (according to Walter Benjamin), and 5) montage and collage techniques.39
When such recognizable themes began to take salience and replay themselves in institutional
contexts like the museum and consumer culture, stable motifs emerged, generic criteria were
formed, and it became difficult to see -ist and -ism arts practices as genuinely innovative.
Hence, “the neo-avant-garde institutionalizes the avant-garde as art and thus negates genuinely
avant-gardieste intentions.”40 This critique is corollary to the assessment that the mission of
integrating art and the praxis of life was unsuccessful.41 While there certainly is a sense of
the artist as arcane, obscure, and remote, the critique lacks the same subtlety missing in
“ivory tower” caricatures of the academy (what profession isn’t specialized, what worth of
any given knowledge set is self-evident to those not materially invested in its applications?).
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Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984), 4; 15.
39 Ibid., 55-82.
40 Ibid., 58.
41 “[A]rt as an institution continues to survive as something separate from the praxis of life.” Ibid., 57;
cf. 58.
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Needless to say, the response rests on a distinction between art and life in the first place, and
assumes such activities can be neatly sectioned off without overlap.42
Still, the impossibility of originality in the strict sense is a tough argument to counter.
The allures of creative genius, authenticity, origination, birth, and avant-garde mystique itself,
as Rosalind Krauss has argued, are probably better construed as “function[s] of the
discourse on originality” than actual qualities or accomplishments of associated artists.43
Rhetorical strategies. The figures are so cliché they hardly require example: the distant
prodigy, the tortured soul, the struggled labor of the all nighter that alone grants a proximity
to something never before seen, undone—new. From the postmodern vantage, these
modernist overtones seem preposterous and without basis since the results so frequently
turn out to resemble unacknowledged forebears; for Krauss, then, honesty is the best policy,
taking form here an open embrace of “endless replication.”44 Is it so bad? There is even the
(good) argument that copyright law stands in the way of new creative works. 45 But the real
strength of her assessment is, again, predicated on accounting and tracing, against which
modernist tropes parading themselves as new stand no chance.

42

Remember: “[O]nly by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject . . . does man live
with any repose, security and consistency.” Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,”
trans. Daniel Breazeale in The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and
Bruce Herzberg (Boston: Bedford, 2001), 1176 (emphasis in the translation).
43 Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (Cambridge, MA: The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1999), 158-160.
44 Ibid., 170.
45 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity, (New York: Penguin, 2004),
294-295.
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Just the Same: and/or, the Same, but Different
Far easier to posit is another, perhaps scare quoted “novelty” associated less with an
immaculate conception than with something anew, familiar but different, or somehow
revived. Michael North’s remarkably interdisciplinary Novelty: A History of the New (2013)
traces such patterns across an impressive range of discourses including that of the preSocratics, atomism, cybernetics, evolutionary biology, aesthetics, and more. Allowing for the
notable exception in creationisms like Christianity, this history operates under two models of
recurrence and recombination, whose “basic shapes” the writer claims “were established before
Plato and have not varied much since.” 46 Recurrence takes the form of the much
romanticized revolution, whose very term North is fond of reminding the reader carries
cyclical and circular connotations from the get go. His second frame, recombination, is to be
found in the play of letter and language, Darwin, the collage, and so on. In each case, what is
new is (merely?) the already given in different form, configuration, or guise. As he
demonstrates, however, this situation hardly affects the persistent cultural interest in the new,
nor does it turn down the volume on discourses fetishizing an ontologically new already
discussed above. To begin, North has to demonstrate just why these relatively conservative
models of novelty are the only tenable ones. Working primarily with Parmenidian
“invariance” of that which is, the reader is shown how this ancient cosmology crossed over
into science and philosophy: “Parmenides’ foundational premises, that what is, is and what is
not cannot come to be, were apparently so impressive that they established the essential
conditions for Plato’s ontology,”47 which is concomitant with love of wisdom as a situation
of lack in need of cure by means of pursuit and acquisition. North goes on to demonstrate
46
47

North, Novelty: A History of the New (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 7.
Ibid., 22; 23.
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how this basic unchanging ceaselessness of the natural and material world is also to be found in
Zeno, atomists like Lucretius and Epicurus, and Aristotle.
I argue that North’s attention to these two models of repetition and recurrence,
originating in the Presocratics and coming to influence “most” models of novelty,48
overlooks a veritable interest in rhetoric of the Sophistic tradition. As is well known, the
Sophists were generally associated with “the novel,” but also the merely “unusual” and
discursive maneuvers “prior to which we have no awareness” in the historical record. 49
Specifically, it should be acknowledged that the “irrationality” of Gorgias punctures a
loophole in the closed systems of the recurrent and the recombinatory. Crucially, however,
this model does not posit the appearance of something new without material origin, but
rests on a basically “irrational” relationship with logos understood here both as language
(speech, word) and our necessarily murky relationship with the material order of the world
and universe. The Gorgian alternative to the generally humanist and anthropocentric subject
has been the topic of much commentary in rhetorical studies, whose first major secondary
touchstone is the work of Italian classicist Mario Untersteiner. Again, Gorgias’ in/famous
fragment “On the Nonexistent” or “On Nature” quite clearly states the issue is not the
world of substance as it is, but rather our ability to know it in the first place. It is not an
exaltation or valorization of the sensible, but rather a qualitative analysis of the intelligible.
As already established in the previous chapter, Gorgias’ triple trouble-making—nothing
exists; even if so, can’t be known; even if known, can’t be communicated—is based on the
raw disjuncture among signifying practices and the material (or immaterial) substances to
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which logos refer. According to the Sophist, what does exist is “heterogeneity . . . between the
spoken logos, which is bound to be the vehicle of knowledge, and the possible experiences
[both] sensible and intellectual.” 50 Even the sensible (in this context, the bodily register of
stimuli in worldly experience) cannot help because of this utter gulf between substances and
logos. Yet we are forced to act on such mismatches at every turn. In the simplest act of mere
recognition turns out to be an imposition, an inessential pairing which therefore amounts to
“creating something new, irrational.”51 This is a frequently cited phrase in rhetoric by those
like myself who wish to establish an alternative relationship with intelligibility. I sense a
codependence with such instruments we use “[n]ot to know, but to schematize—to impose
upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the formation of
reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need, not to ‘know,’ but to
subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation.”52 The intelligible is
thus irrational in the sense of being a rather blunt creation.

Sophistic Stress Test
As is well known, the Sophists offered expensive lessons in oratory which only the
elite could afford. These practices no doubt contributed to an association of the Sophists
with nomos, or human/cultural law, alongside physis, or the natural laws of the physical world
50
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or universe. Such categorization invokes the stale nature/culture distinction whose moment
has passed long ago. However, along with Untersteiner, Bernard Miller’s discussion of kairos
as it appears differently in Plato and Gorgias further complicates this issue for the better.
Typical conceptions of kairos are often understood “quite simply [as] a recognition on the
part of the rhetor of a situation that he appropriately responds to or masters through . . .
propriety or expediency.”53 This is the notion of saying the right thing at just the right time
in a sort of rhetorical slam dunk commonly portrayed in composition textbooks. In Gorgias,
however, things appear differently: “kairos . . . here is not the application of language
rhetorically selected and suited to fit the occasion or proper time, but through the aegis of
the irrational logos it deals most significantly in the creative generation of language itself.”54
Importantly, then, “kairos is not a concept only. It is an experience or encounter as well.”55
As Vitanza phrases it, the Gorgian kairos proffers “a view of the ‘subject’ as a function of
Logos/Kairos” rather than the other way around.56 So much for nomos. What is your
relationship with information?
In this sense “[a] world of dissonance is depicted here, tragic in the sense that the
faith in the order and rationality of the world is dashed. On this level Gorgias’ idea of the
tragic is akin to the more basic claims of the Sophists concerning reality and appearance,”
the irresolution of the two,57 the worth of arguing both sides of a case,58 and exercise of
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“‘mak[ing] the weaker seem the better cause’”59 Far from the silly caricature sometimes
projected onto the Sophists and their supposed preference for play, pun, and satire, these so
called games turn out to function as a sort of de-anthropomorphizing “reality” checking
before, one hopes, wrecking. 60 Again, the trauma of surprise is correlate to the arrogance or
naivety of security and the avoidance mechanism represented here by a classical intelligibility
and the critical manuscript. Stay humble. (This is also one of innumerable reasons why what
I would call the aesthetic dimensions of rhetoric Gorgias describes in the Encomium of Helen
as “seduction” are not simply fun formal experiments, but deeply serious demonstrations of
how high fives among all too human, enlightened subjects can go wrong). With regard to the
new, Thomas Rickert’s reading of this discourse is that the “novelty, unpredictability, and
situated rationality in which their [Gorgias’, Untersteiner’s, Miller’s, Vitanza’s, et al.’s] versions
of kairos are better conceived less as categorical pronouncements than as descriptions
working against modernist understandings of creativity”61 someone like North demonstrates
are, after all, indebted to the recurrence and recombination models. His History of the New is
thus incomplete not so much because it fails to account for this or that Sophist per se, but
because of its identificatory frame Gorgias’ relationship with logos would surprise.
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Invaluables
Boris Groys’ On the New is an exceptionally knotty text whose coy insight is as
intricate as its pivots and reversals. His basic thesis, predicated on a selective Nietzschean
perspective, states the new springs from revaluation of values, and specifically crossovers
between sacred and profane realms.62 Duchamp’s Fountain is a strategic glitch of context,
inserting as it does the utterly mundane, industrial, and readymade into the museum;
elsewhere, the profanity of joke and pun deface the sanctity of Mona Lisa—if only a cheap
reproduction thereof. Two points are necessary here for the present analysis. First, the new
thusly figured depends upon its apparent opposite for its conceptual identity,63 resulting in a
new at least partially predicated on a “negative” knowledge functioning by means of
contrast. A ≠ non-A; new ≠ old. Yet in the case of the readymade, old does become (a)new in
a sense about which Groys is well aware. What has changed is not the object, but our
relationship with the object and the information it generates. Still, there persists for him a
necessary link between conceptual relations with art and the cultural condition in which all
material chips are already on the table, merely changing hands between scared and profane,
appearing now and then in this or that configuration, accompanied by corresponding
rhetorical charges to produce relational innovation.
The exchange of the card table is an apt metaphor given that innovation for Groys is
an activity whose possibility and, inevitably, ends are conditioned by a “cultural-economic
logic,” which is the second point that interests me here. Unlike Nietzsche, Groys does not
find the transvaluation of all values possible or desirable. His analysis replays the familiar
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dismissal of “extra-cultural” or “hidden” realities often featured in modernist mythologies.64
On a related point, it is often thought that avant-garde movements revere meaninglessness
and the nonsensical in its effort to subvert ideology and defer the inevitable installation of a
new order. Yet according to the author, the “avant-garde does not ‘empty’ lower practices ‘of
their meaning’” in celebration of pure materiality, “but, rather, endows them with meaning
by bringing them into meaningful relation with the cultural tradition.”65 Hence it is culturaleconomic logics all the way down for Groys. In a clever move, however, he acknowledges
the economy is far from an “intelligible” phenomenon, primarily because analyses of the
cultural-economy are themselves embedded within it, which makes critical distance
unavailable. 66 Like weather, even the most learned cannot pick it apart or make accurate
forecasts with consistency. Still, this study On the New operates on a literal currency, especially
in prioritizing the issues of archival perseverance and impact: “[i]t is not the meaning of
innovation which is relevant to culture, but, rather, its value” in a cultural-economic system.67
Can valuation of the new thusly surprise? No. It is in fact a retrospective abacus
analysis whose purpose is to “close the writing,” as Barthes would say.68 Economic tremors
are by no means cozy for those who weather the storm, but the framework of valorization/
devalorization alone is a comfortable intelligibility whose relational potential is limited to the
materiality of capital. Obviously, capital creates relations and conditions the possibility of art
in the first place; however, the claim that aesthetic and existential effects-and-affects may
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exceed and surprise the most exacting economic tabulations is not incommensurable with
this first, conditioning principle.

Anxiety Inaction
Please pardon the interruption of the analysis for a reminder that Martin Heidegger’s
Being and Time resurrects a foreclosed anxiety. The Question of Being—What does it mean
to be?—has been conveniently forgotten after having been relegated to universality,
indefinability, or self-evidence. That which “the ancient philosophers found continually
disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such
that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method.”69 The
treatise thus opens with insistence and provocation in the renewal of a troublesome inquiry.
Later, Heidegger introduces the mood of “anxiety,” from the German angst,70 with which he
designates a peculiar shade of contemplation prompted by radical openness; it is the terror
and/or freedom of having no orientation, no direction, no guide. In fact, “contemplation” is
probably too involved a term, since what is meant is precisely an elementary perplexity and a
lack of conceptual grounding. The trauma of such a “state of mind” or “mood”71 in
Heidegger is prompted by nothing more than blank absurdity of one’s existential situation,
i.e., Dasein or the condition of Being-there (in-the-world), asking the question, How does it
mean to be? How and why does the human contemplate the possibility of its own existence?
Of course, we never get a certifiable answer because the inquiry is itself radically open in
69
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just this way—without reliable guidance. As we saw in Nietzsche, empirical evidence cannot
help because evidence merely reflects our desires.72 The invention of specialized knowledges
along with the comforts of everyday social experience, small talk, and entertainment—all
these are distractions, suppressions, or even deliberate avoidances of anxiety brought on by
the stupefaction of human calculation in the face of its indifferent natural environment, and
even morality. But don’t forget: “[a]nxiety is there. It is only sleeping.”73 The important point
is that “[a]nxiety can arise in the most innocuous situations. Nor does it have any need for
darkness, in which it is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny,”74 because it is precisely
inauthentic tumult which inspires such terror in its very vacuity and inessentiality. Surprise:
“[e]veryday familiarity collapses.”75 According to Mary-Jane Rubinstein, “[a]nxiety thus
ruptures all of Dasein’s usual relations to itself and other beings (namely, subjectivity and
objectivity) and confronts Dasein with bare thatness in the face of ‘the nothing’” left after
everything breaks and there’s nowhere to hide.76 All frameworks dissolve, become untenable,
and appear for what they are: desperate attempts to control and account for the default
estrangement of being-there.

Sweet Nothings
In the “What is Metaphysics?” lecture delivered two years after the disruption that
was Being and Time, anxiety is introduced with a conspicuously poetic tone relative to its role
72 Boris Groys, “History after the End of Historicism” (lecture, European Graduate School, Saas-Fee,
Switzerland, June 2014).
73 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The Task
of Thinking (1964), ed. and trans. David Farell Krell (London: Harper, 2008), 106.
74 Heidegger, Being and Time, 234.
75 Ibid., 233.
76 Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008), 37.
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in the earlier treatise as a methodological necessity. Yet ironically, the mystique is logical.
After all, “what about this nothing?”77 How can nothing be?
In our asking we posit the nothing as something that “is” such and such; we posit it as a being. But
that is exactly what it is distinguished from. Interrogating the nothing—asking what and how it, the
nothing, is—turns what is interrogated into its opposite. The question deprives itself of its own
object.78

The problem is analogous to the situation articulated at the beginning of this chapter: how
can novelty or surprise, as that without properties, be known or objectified? Answer: they
cannot; they become so only formally-and-irrationally, as we saw with Gorgias and
Nietzsche. In different ways, both the nothing in Dasein’s anxiety and surprise only
“become” objects when situated in something like a proposition or a critical manuscript. For
Heidegger, it is only during the experiential, existential, and temporal suspension of anxiety
that his so called “object” is engaged. Hence the devastating collapse of a cleansed
metaphysics alone “discloses . . . beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as
what is radically other. . . . Da-sein means: being held out in to the nothing.”79 Everyday
appearances, commonplaces, and routines are unmasked and revealed as merely provisional.
The simplest recognition of an object “ready-to-hand” is thus a blockage, and “the structure
of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the framework of the sentence”; even prior to
grammar, the blithe, authoritative presumption in the “assault” of recognition does not
make objects any more accessible.80 The gigantic leap here from Heidegger to surprise, can
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in fact be made by working through the related distinction from “thing” to “work.” Let us
see what a work can do.

Work to World
Though there’s no question on the philosopher’s vitriol for aesthetics of neophilia
and the distraction of the curio, 81 Heidegger maintains a relationship with art that he
himself argues is capable of preserving surprise and instigating existential epiphany.
Although it is common to interact with art works as mere objects, commodities, and so on,82
such practices downplay the transformative potential in both creation and engagement.
Works for Heidegger are quite different, a position encapsulated in the phrase, “[t]o be a
work means to set up a world.” 83 The work is thus posited as something exceeding both
physis and nomos, as something endowed with the capacity to actually create or intervene in a
world instead of merely reflecting, representing, or responding to the world. What appears
to be nostalgic if not baldly anthropocentric turns out to have implications even more
radical than Gorgias.
The essay’s famous interpretation of the Van Gogh painting argues the “depiction”
is greater than shoes, but more importantly the owner’s relation with the world. Heidegger
waxes poetic in these sections, some lines of which are basically pastoral: “[i]n the shoes
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vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained
self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.”84 What appears in such passages is
another work of art inspired by the first which instigates an encounter anew.85 The scene
might be pretty, but it has nothing to do with visual or even aesthetic pleasure in the wide
sense. The issue, rather, is existential: “[t]he world is the self-opening openness of the broad
pathos of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people.”86 The
quotation oozes Nazism, though Heidegger’s vision was ultimately more radical—and
dangerous—than any political program could actuate. This is why his official engagement
with the party was short-lived, blatant anti-Semitism and persistent failure to repudiate the
party notwithstanding.87 The connection between the “open” relation to the work and the
irrationality of interpretation can hardly be missed: “[e]very decision . . . bases itself on
something not mastered, something concealed, confusion; else it would never be a
decision”88 but obvious, machinic, procedural. Hence we have a work whose consequence is
limited neither to its material base nor its cultural-economic operationalization. Both these
dimensions are in play, of course, but the Heideggarian work is relatively speculative and
daring in terms of what might be possible for its work.
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Showtime
In contrast to North and Groys, Jacques Rancière’s Aisthesis performs an alternative
response to shifts in aesthetic thought. The trick, as always, is one of relation with innovation,
of which he presents in fourteen “scenes” deliberately selected for their relatively minor
roles as tangential asides. The chapter-episodes comprise a string of vignettes not on art
proper, but on criticism and theories of arts introducing in different ways alternative
relations with a particular work or aesthetics writ large. He opens, for example, with Johann
Joachim Winckelmann’s commentary on the damaged Belvedere Torso, the limbless, turn-ofthe-millennium nude in whose image we cannot be sure, though one common presumption
is Hercules: “[i]nstead of compensating for the lack, he transformed it into a virtue: . . . .
[t]he mutilated statue that represents the greatest active hero miscast in the total inactivity of
thought.”89 Though the attrition of extremities took place centuries after the work was
sculpted, as a relic from its context of Platonic mimesis and Vitruvian ideal, Torso is for today’s
spectator disfigured, asymmetrical, and belatedly anachronistic.

Figure 2.8: Triumph of imperfection. Photograph of
the Belvedere Toroso. Photo by Stefano Costantini is
licensed under CC BY 2.0.
89 Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art, trans. Zakir Paul (London: Verso,
2013), 2-3. It ought to be mentioned that Rancière cites Heidegger nowhere in this text.
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Yet it is precisely in its decapitation and amputation that the figure takes on a new posture:
through with labor and motion,“‘purified from the dross of humanity . . . . absorbed in lofty
reflections,’” as Winckelmann put it.90 Is this something from nothing? From lack, from
absence as presence? The broken statue receives something grander than its status as
anecdote or exhibit during this shift from deficit to merit.
Another chapter recalls an attempted shift in conception of so called “decorative”
arts in the work of Parisian critic Roger Marx and the architectural thought of John Ruskin.
The scene begins with citation to a 1910 lecture by Marx, during which the speaker exalts a
work he claims is endowed with a “‘sensibility and intelligence directed towards nature’s
spectacle and passing time’” so subtle it “‘partakes in modern anxiety and curiosity.’”91 The
piece? A glass vase by Émile Gallé, son of a furniture manufacturer. This scene works to
undermine the demarcation between functional crafts and works of pure aesthetic pleasure
by reorienting the discussion to terms of building and making—decoration included. The
implied hierarchy here constitutes a topdown “subordination of the builder’s hands” and a
“division between the work of the artist and the artisan” Ruskin “would brutally
overthrow.”92 According to Rancière, the Englishman believed the built environment was not
only functional, but existential too; “the conjunction of these two functions is essential
because it allows one to reject the simplistic opposition between the useful object and the
object of disinterested contemplation.”93 It’s not as if these categories are mutually exclusive,
and, like the kaleidoscope those works highly involved with both of these allegedly separate
90
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domains may not amount to compromised kitsch at all, but rather a clear expression of the
human’s attempt to arrange and configure the materials of the world in some intervention.

Gallé vase (1896). Photograph released to
the Public Domain by the copyright
holder.

And so on. While these scenes are not incidental, the larger issue for the present
writing is the construal of novelty and surprise relationally. The material supplies (North)
and capital bases (Groys) are inadequate means by which to analyze novelties—however
genuine or inauthentic they might be. As these examples show, the making of the new can
be an existential and temporal enterprise that need not import something never before under
the sun. The point is rather to open and refract what is already before us, staring us in the
face and apparently usual, everyday. Holistically, Aisthesis is a collection of what Barthes
might call “neutrals,” a term which does not refer to an object with generic properties, but
functions as an open-ended designation for that which “baffles the paradigm,” past, present,

66

and futures.94 Its gestures are predicated on what Rancière elsewhere names the
“redistribution of the sensible,” a contentious notion that refers to the making possible or
available sensible experience in a given context. This “distribution” is a sort of allocation
governing “who can have a share” in that which is perceptible and thereby “defin[ing] what
is visible or not in a common space” populated by spectators.95 Unlike North and Groys,
Rancière maintains for art the capacity to “intervene in a general distribution of ways of
doing and making as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms
of visibility,”96 or, more broadly, perceptibility. His “aesthetic regime of arts,” a sort of
pioneering desire driven by “thought which has become foreign to itself,” enables what the
writer boldly calls a “transformation of the forms of sensible experience, of ways of
perceiving and being affected.”97 The passive voice in this last bit is a clue that such pursuits
are not wholly rational efforts, and that such pursuits necessitate an open, interpretive
anxiety. Works that set up worlds—whether or not they set out to do so.

Discussion
These findings suggest Rancière’s performative approach is a relatively viable means
of engaging innovation in art and theory—not because he maintains the allure of the new as
somehow alien or extra-cultural, but because he demonstrates the existential quality of
knowing innovation across time, as well as the simultaneous ease and difficulty such an
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activity entails. Rather than categorical (Bürger), ontological (North), or cultural-economic
(Groys) approaches, Rancière begins to perform some of the anxiety which presents itself
when we admit we do not know where art is going or the full extent of its capacities,
accidental and otherwise. The results also indicate that hardline intelligible scholarship
embodied by the critical manuscript cannot admit its aesthetic dimensions, though it
nevertheless bears a striking resembles to cultural industry kitsch in its search for easy
explanation, cliché, and stasis. In response to this situation, future inquiry into the new might
seek alternative modalities of engagement, perhaps those that stretch and make temporal
their engagements with such phenomena.
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CHAPTER THREE
DROP: AESTHETICS OF RHETORICS DURING TIMBRE

Sound only exists as it is going out of existence.
—Reverend Walter J. Ong1
You walk into the room with your pencil in your hand.
You see somebody naked and you say, “Who is that
man?” You try so hard, but you don’t understand
just what you will say you when you get home. . . . .
You walk into the room like a camel and then you
frown.You put your eyes in your pocket and your nose
on the ground. There oughta be a law against you
coming around. You should be made to wear
earphones. —Bob Dylan2
Note: This chapter makes fair use of audio embedded
into the PDF. The recommend viewer is Adobe
Acrobat Reader DC (free). Please visit get.adobe.com/
reader to ensure media playback. Readers using Preview
for Macintosh or other PDF viewers will not see or
hear audio files.3

Being situated in time, sound is transient: it departs as it arrives. Even when recorded,
archived, and preserved for delivery on demand, it is perceptible only as a fleeting vibration.
An aural encounter is thus qualitatively different from prevailing literate modes of discourse
in the academy not only in terms of medium, but also in an aesthetic sense of being
uncontrollably temporal for the experiencing subject. While all experience is temporal and
embodied, the sonic dimension is uniquely so because it concerns dissipating waves of
energy. Even organized and meticulously arranged compositions of sounds such as music
function in this aesthetic sense, which accents the interpretive problematics of sound
brought about by its very ephemerality. In this sense, sonic energy—including but not
limited to music—flees from epistemological tenets of stasis and verification, revealing, for
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me, the inadequacy of traditional modes of analysis to engage its aesthetic dimensions.
Reflecting and writing about sound poses unique challenges for the critic that make it a good
metaphor for an inquiry into sensibility. While we can certainly know sound empirically
through measures of pitch, intensity, duration, and so on, it is interesting to note the absence
of familiarity with these modes of analysis by no means precludes the potential to hear. Or
create.4 We can record and call up a sound at any given moment, we can modulate and edit
sound, but “there is no way to stop sound and have sound.”5 Like surprise, sound is fugitive.
Transience is only one source of the curious silence surrounding our relationship
with sound. The terms “timbre” and “tone color” in music theory refer to the idiosyncratic
character of different instruments playing the same note, which at once associates the
concepts with both the singular and relative. A trombone’s texture differs from a ukulele’s,
of course, and a sitar sounds different than a gong. Yet these deceptively simple
differentiations pose virtually limitless opportunities and challenges for the very possibility
of knowing what and how a sound actually is. But for all this, timbre plays a relatively quiet
and ambiguous role in music theory, which concentrates on relatively mathematized topics
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that structural systems of information can be brought to bear on both sound and image to variously d/evolve
understandings of these phenomena. I simply note that, unlike literacy, specialized knowledges are not requisite
for an aural or visual experience.
5

Ong, Orality and Literacy, 32.
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like tonality, harmony, pitch, meter, rhythm, and notation.6 It is for these reasons that
rhetorical scholarship has something to learn about itself from electronic music.
Although much valuable work is available on authorship, sampling, and remixing in
digital music, the aesthetic texture and affective experience of experimental and dance genres
in particular is also worth exploring in rhetorical terms. Specifically, attending to impulses in
recent electronic dance music (EDM) known as “dubstep” alongside related sensibilities in
rhetoric gives the field fresh ways to engage sonic experiences as objects of study. Aesthetics
and rhetorics of recent EDM—music which for some critics is assaulting noise—can
contribute to conversations in rhetoric increasingly concerned with the sonic dimension as a
fruitful horizon for rhetorical effects and affects, the possibility of writing as something
beyond or other than representation, complications of the split between subject and object,
and performative argumentation. To establish such offerings, this chapter will provide and
yet surpass a “rhetoric of electronic dance music.” The primary contribution, however, is a
performative exploration of the music and the aesthetic interactions among fans and the
6

The only means of quantitatively accounting for timbre is the presence of “overtones” in the
“harmonic series” of a sound. When a note sounds, what actually is emitted is not only the “fundamental” or
specified note, but a relatively faint blend of overtones at higher frequencies known as a harmonic series;
patterns in harmonic series correlate to subjective differentiations in timbre—e.g., bright; muddy; raspy. Arthur
Jacobs, A New Dictionary of Music (Baltimore: Penguin, 1958), 160; 379. It’s somewhat awkward to suggest,
however, that overtones causally produce timbre since the instrument produces the overtones. Even in the case
of early synthesizers, when the precise distribution of overtones to be emitted were known (i.e., programmed)
before anyone struck a key, the experience of timbre by the body is only ever continuous and analog. Today,
virtual instruments are typically sampled because, you guessed it, the singularity and quality of overtone
distribution is richer. The investigation here is of textural aesthetics of sound, which are to be Gorgianically
distinguished from representations of sounds achieved through signal processing and quantization. Logos ≠
substances or existing things represented. (I hasten to add, however, that encounters [relations] with logos are only
ever material, lived, temporal, and so on)! In appealing to the phenomenological experience of sound, I hardly
intend to invoke a transhistorical subject as critiqued, for example, by Jonathan Sterne. The Audible Past: Cultural
Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 13-15. I simply note that the numeric and
sampled representation of sonic energy differs markedly from the bodily register of such phenomena,
historically situated though those bodies may be. This point seems overlooked or overtly dismissed in much of
the literature on sound. One important exception, however, is Steph Cersao’s recent step forward in arguing
that listening is “multisensory act” and hence its rhetorical weight should not be limited to translating the sonic
into the semiotic. She critiques and moves beyond what she calls the “ear-centric” model of listening, which
privileges the decryption of sounds as vehicles for semiotic meanings—and an overdose of which she argues
can diminish the bodily experience of the sound. Ceraso, “(Re)Educating the Senses: Multimodal Listening,
Bodily Learning, and the Composition of Sonic Experiences,” College English 77, no. 2 (2014): 102-123.
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appeals of the art. My title proposes neither a hierarchy nor an essential divide between
aesthetics and rhetorics. Instead, it suggests a tentative distinction for the purpose of
highlighting the differences between experiencing and identifying rhetorical action. The
larger point involves the conception of so called “objects” of study in scholarly discourse
and our relationship(s) with these objects. I surmise that rhetoric may not only acknowledge
this disjuncture, but perform it as well.
The following pages perform a “glitching” of the scholarly manuscript by enacting
the aesthetics of recent electronic dance music (commonly referred to as “EDM”) as well as
other contemporary strains of experimental electronic music. The initial emphasis is on
idiosyncratic textures and timbres in electronic music known as “dubstep,” which is
presented as a modality through and during which to perform academic thinking about the
music. The discussion begins with a sampling of dubstep and an introduction of recent
EDM cultures (along with their detractors), transitions to an outline of the chapter’s
paralogical and post-critical methods, and begins to sketch a rhetoric of electronic dance
music. We then rebegin by glitching into the sequence a pair of excursions into musical
rhetoric and strains of experimental music that have been recognized as “noise,” “glitch,”
and “failure.” The piece concludes by coming “full squiggle” in acknowledging the common
critique of dance music as mere product for popular audiences devoid of artistic
experimentation. The suggestion throughout is that EDM invites and promotes an
engagement with the art that is both “sensible” and “intelligible,” and thus deserves an
inquiry that is performative as well as critical.
While I begin to trace a rhetoric of EDM in a grammatical or generic sense below,
the chapter also establishes the rewards (necessity, perhaps) of engagements with rhetorics
that go beyond identification and explore the relationship that rhetors and audiences have with
the music. In other words, more than simply discoursing “about” EDM will be required in
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order to engage the aesthetic and affective experience of such auralities to do fitting service
for this music and culture that, as we will hear, prioritizes innovative timbres and singularities
of textures over traditional generic attributes. EDM has no monopoly on artistic
experimentation, of course, and I hope the discussion of timbre here may be extended or
applied to other genres. But, as we will hear, EDM’s emphasis on idiosyncratic and novel
textures make it a good case study for the aesthetic and affective experience of music as
sound in general.
Electronic dance music has long, diverse, and international histories (not to mention
futures). “Dubstep,” one particular strain in the expansive and cross-pollinated ecology of
EDM writ large, has recently garnered near mainstream attention. Although this crosssection of EDM varies tremendously from artist to artist, dubstep might be loosely
characterized by its relatively slow tempo of approximately 140 beats per minute, generic
structural patterns (e.g., “builds,” “drops,” “interludes”), digitally synthesized sounds, and
recurring themes of its occasional lyrical content. It can be uncharacterized by its disarray of
baroque, modulated, and sometimes atonal combinations of sounds.

Clip 3.1: Datsik, “Hydraulic,” from Hydraulic / Overdose
(Kelowna BC, Canada: Rottun Recordings, 2011).

Reductive accounts of dubstep music sometimes make reference to robots or aliens
to describe the disjunctive and unusual aesthetics, timbres, and moods of the genre. One
reviewer for The New York Times describes a dubstep concert as “almost all tremor”: “That
there’s no dance music less sensuous than this was not an obstacle. Dubstep can often sound
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like the gears of an industrial thrasher groaning from overuse, or the soundtrack to the
construction of a Richard Serra steel sculpture.”7 Notable for me is the very notion that such
textuality (texturality?) is desirable in the first place, especially given that such arts are
currently experiencing a windfall of attention. While EDM and rave cultures are not new,
their recent inclusion in mainstream media is. Artists like Skrillex, Dillon Francis, and Datsik
have enjoyed a recent boom of international listenership and achieved unprecedented
commercial success in polymorphous genres like dubstep, drum and bass, and electrohouse.8 I will be most interested in American, Canadian, Northern European, and Australian
varieties of dubstep music produced from approximately 2010 to the present. The focus will
be relatively new and noisy varieties of dubstep whose roots are in artists like UK producers
like Skream, Burial, and Rusko, who, in turn, are indebted to actual “dub” music, or “reggae
dub.” Tracing this history in the detail it deserves is beyond the scope of the present writing,
but suffice it to say the focus here is a more recent wave of artists like, sure, Skrillex, but also
others such as SKisM, Kill the Noise, KOAN Sound, Adventure Club, Butch Clancy, and
many more whose era is to be carefully distinguished as its own, polymorphous and evolving
movement within the broader context and phenomenon of EDM. The idea is to consider
such genres as means or modalities through and during which to perform academic thinking on
the music.
Evidence that EDM has staked a claim in public consciousness includes the use of
dubstep to score popular films and television commercials, the fact that Skrillex has won six
7

Jon Caramanica, “Waves of Sound, Wobbles of Bass,” New York Times, April 22, 2013, http://
nyti.ms/1VOOVRM.
8

My use of the term “genre” and generic categories are in line with Carolyn Miller’s understanding of
the concept. Following Miller, my interest will not be in recurring substances (semantics) or forms (syntactics)
of music. Instead, the chapter will be oriented by a “an understanding of how discourse works—that is, [how]
it reflects the rhetorical experience of the people who create and interpret the discourse” with certain actions or
purposes in mind. Miller, “Genre as Social Action,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984): 152. While I will begin
with recurring textual and textural attributes of the music, my ultimate concern will be the affective experience
of the music and how audiences not only taxonomize, but relate with the art.

74

Grammy Awards, and the massive commercialization for live performances of associated
artists. The buzz has been sufficient to send dozens of producers on international tours and
sustain colossal festivals like Electric Daisy Carnival and Ultra Festival, which are each
attended by hundreds of thousands of people annually.9 Once the pleasure of underground
niches and clandestine warehouse raves, EDM has arrived in international mainstream
cultures. Yet scholars have only begun to learn from the aesthetics of the most successful
producers of the last decade. Rhetoric should tune in.

Intentions, Intent, Performance
In The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard uses a metaphor of soapy water to
illustrate an epistemological architecture that was stochastic in its inter- and trans-disciplinary
and fusions, relations, and influences.10 He describes the state of knowledge as a
kaleidoscopic series of generations and reorganizations, mapped as an incredible complexity
of geometry in flux at all times. Rather than the “performativity” Lyotard associates with
mastery of already established procedures, he suggests the new means by which knowledge
is to be invented is “paralogy,” or the invention of new knowledge making procedures.11 The
Report on Knowledge he sketched was spastic, proffering a “postmodern science as a search for
instabilities” that would yield “singularities and ‘incommensurabilities’” necessarily out of
sync with the methods and procedures of the day.12 I notice strikingly dis/similar energies,
impulses, and aesthetics in recent electronic music and dubstep in particular.

9

Jesse Lawrence, “With Ultra Music Festival Two Weeks Away, EDM Poised For Biggest Summer
Yet,” Forbes, March 10, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jesselawrence/2014/03/10/with-ultra-musicfestival-two-weeks-away-edm-poised-for-biggest-summer-yet/.
10

Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 58.
11

Ibid., 44 ff.

12

Ibid., 53; 60.
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Clip 3.2: Skrillex, “Rock ‘n Roll (Will Take You to the
Mountain),” from Scary Monsters and Nice Sprites (Tampa:
Big Beat Records / Atlantic Records, 2012).

The music suggests aesthetic liminality in its apparent sensibility for texture and
timbre itself—not instead but in addition to the intelligibility of meter, rhythm, melody,
progression, and lyrical content typical of popular Western music. We hear baroque
arrangements of flotsam and jetsam alongside cracks and pops fractions of a second in
duration. We hear flirtations with atonality and a primarily percussive experience. I submit an
aesthetic pleasure in electronic dance music cultures comes partly from a forfeiture of
control as listeners are awash in sounds for which they need not account as part of a melody
or progression. While some hear noise, others sense perceptual dilations and a renewed
sense of relation to music itself. Counting myself among the latter group, I am in agreement
with Jeff Rice’s remix of Lyotard for a theory of digital aurality: “to listen is not to seek out
a truth; it is to engage with the process of knowing as opposed to just the known.” 13 To
suggest listening as an activity of knowing is to underscore the processual, temporal, and
even existential dimensions of inquiry typically downplayed or unacknowledged when the
scholarly text is limited to propositional content.
I will therefore engage in both critical and “post-critical” discussions to discuss,
perform, and engage electronic dance music. My attempt will be to take up what Gregory L.

13

Rice juxtaposes this theory of “digital aurality” he dubs “ka-knowledge” with the historically “topos
based” model of knowing in literate paradigms characterized by localized information and “a fixed place of
meaning” Jeff Rice, “The Making of Ka-Knowledge: Digital Aurality,” Computers and Composition 23 (2006): 267
(original emphasis); 276.
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Ulmer describes as a “relation of the critical text to its object of study to be conceived in
terms no longer of subject-object[,] but of subject-predicate.”14 It could be argued that
EDM cultivates an aesthetic of surprise related in spirit to Ulmer’s discussions of collage and
montage, a stammering comparable to historiographical shifts in the discourse of human arts
and sciences as recollected by Michel Foucault, and a wobbling we might associate with
recursive and self-reflexive discourse. Indeed, for starters, I will first make and support these
very claims before demonstrating the ease with which these interpretations can and should
be surpassed by an enactment of the music—beyond an account of their salient features.
Hence, I move from subject-object to subject-predicate.
The question of how to approach music with alphabetic writing has been of interest
for rhetoricians in the past, most notably in the 1999 enculturation special issue, “Writing/
Music/Culture.” As editors Thomas Rickert and Byron Hawk noted, the disjuncture in
medium makes writing about music is something like “Avowing the Unavowable.” There is a
sense, they suggested, that “music composes us when we listen to it and when we write
about it,”15 and not the other way way around. Gregory Erikson’s piece in that issue deals
with some of ways music criticism interacts sonic arts. In his terms, my intentions are not
only to “describe” or identify elements in electronic dance music, “point” to its salient
features, and thus “augment” my readers’ engagement with the art; my primary or holistic
efforts will be to “emulat[e] . . . . the effect of the music”16 temporally across the duration of
the writing. Hence, I partially accept Erikson’s challenge to “write about music without
definition or description, to see it not as an artifact, but as a mysterious and powerful

14

Gregory L. Ulmer, “The Object of Post-Criticism,” in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture,
ed. Hal Foster (New York: The New Press, 1983), 86.
15

Thomas Rickert and Byron Hawk, “‘Avowing the Unavowable’: On the Music of Composition,”
enculturation 2, no. 2 (1999): http://enculturation.net/2_2/intro.html.
16

Gregory Erickson, “Speaking of Music: Explorations in the Language of Music Criticism,”
enculturation 2, no. 2 (1999): http://enculturation.net/2_2/erickson.html.
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cognitive process.”17 For me, the issue is not whether we define and describe, but rather how
scholars relate to such definitions and descriptions. I am also in sync with Adam Koehler,
who picks up the beat in this journal some years later to stress that when we imagine rhetoric
as musical (i.e., flip the notion of music as rhetorical), “we are asking rhetoric to grapple
with the aesthetic” itself—“asking rhetoric, as a mode of production (rather than a mode of
interpretation), to seek aesthetic ways of knowing.”18 And so, as Matthew A. Levy might
suggest, I invite readers to take out their “earplugs,” 19 and (why not?) hear and feel the texts
—both the aural works cited and my own—in addition to grounding the art with figures,
meanings, and referents. I begin with such an activity, but I won’t stop there.
In addition to dubstep, I will examine the moods, sensibilities, and aesthetics of aural
arts traditions that have gone under the scholarly headings of “noise,” “glitch,” and “failure.”
While not directly antecedent to the strains of dubstep and other EDM approached here,
they are related in spirit. 20 Because noise, glitch, and failure have firm groundings in
academic discourse that recent electronic music does not, this trio is a good place from
which to begin the way toward dubstep and rhetoric. My attempts will be to establish
important similarities and differences between these movements, and spell out what we can
learn from more contemporary music about how to engages its practices.
In linking (only) apparently discontinuous traditions, this chapter is itself a glitch and
may be related to Casey Boyle’s understanding of the phenomenon as an error that makes a
17

Ibid.

18

Adam Koehler, “‘Frozen Music, Unthawed’: Ka-Knowledge, Creative Writing, and the
Electromagnetic Imaginary,” enculturation 7 (2010): http://enculturation.net/frozen-music-unthawed.
19

Matthew A. Levy, “Shhhh! Or, the Methodological Earplugs of Cultural Studies in Popular Music,”
review of Mapping the Beat by Thomas Swiss, John Sloop, and Andrew Herman, enculturation 2, vol. 2 (1999):
http://enculturation.net/2_2/levy.html.
20

Such a claim might irritate some readers because it conflates so called “popular” music with
“experimental” music. While there is certainly a sense in which arts and rhetorics might aim for mere
“gratification and pleasure”—“flattery,” perhaps—this popular/experimental divide is rather coarse. I join
many others in rejecting this false dichotomy. See Plato, Gorgias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1925), 462d-462e.
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forgotten because “transparent” system of mediation opaque.21 In my case, the mediator is
the explanatory academic manuscript. Productively, Boyle’s glitches provoke what he calls a
“metastable” relationship between and among experiencing subjects and objects. Rather than
looking “at” and “through” objects, texts, or mediators themselves (a “bi-stable”
arrangement endorsed by Richard Lanham), 22 Boyle pursues an ongoing and mutually
involved engagement with objects. Emphasis here is on the preposition “with” and the
relational action of “being with” glitches by undergoing their manifest metastability; when an
instrument of mediation reveals itself as mediator in error, it is not only the subject but also
the instrument and the object that wield affective force. 23 Hence, explanation is simply not
enough, especially when the so called “object” in question is an evolving phenomenon such
as a genre of music. Then and always, relation is necessary to accompany identification. My
attempt here is the performance such a metastable relationship with both music and the
academic essay. Put differently, the argument I perform “with” glitching is that timbre can be
engaged with writing that aims not so much to represent sound as predicate itself upon it.

Switch: Glitch; Listeners, Listening, and Meter
Another way of thinking about glitch is a jamming or crossing of lines to instigate
strange or unexpected hybridizations. And indeed, some varieties of glitch music integrate
sound samples that might be described as incomplete, interrupted, clipped, or “cut short.”
Unlike a note played on a traditional instrument, glitchy sound samples burst onto the track
with the sound apparently already in progress and conclude by abruptly slicing the sample in
a way that seems a bit too early. In production terms, the “attack” and “decay” of glitched
21

Casey Boyle, “The Rhetorical Question Concerning Glitch,” Computers and Composition 35 (2015): 12.

22

See Richard Lanham, The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1993), 5-6; 80-82.
23

Boyle, “Glitch,” 19-22.
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samples, or how quickly the sound appears and disappears, is often instantaneous to the
human ear. The arrival and departure time of the glitched samples are so quick and
disjointed that they resemble a skipping compact disc, and indeed, this is how some of the
early glitch music was created. Readers interested in experimental electronic music may recall
the producer Oval, whose discography is commonly cited as pioneer work in glitch music
(Clip 3.3).

Clip 3.3: Oval’s glitches: “Shop in Store” from 94 Diskont
(New York: Thrill Jockey Records, 1995).

Recent producers such as KOAN Sound have adapted the aesthetic for dubstep and
other EDM genres, weaving meticulously arranged and yet glitchy sonic tapestries (Clip 3.4).

Clip 3.4: KOAN Sound, “Blue Stripes,” from Dubstep
Onslaught (London: Z Audio, 2011) (various artists).

The point here is that the integration of glitch into meter is a simultaneous appeal to
both experimental and popular sensibilities. Considered alongside the work of producers
associated with experimental music “proper,” these tracks sound relatively well behaved.
Take, for instance, the arrhythmic auralities of Ryoji Ikeda (Clip 3.5), whose stunning audio/
visual installations are internationally renowned.
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Clip 3.5: Ryoji Ikeda, from Formula (London: Forma, 2005).
Book + DVD release.

All the above suggests a muddled “who’s who” with regard to insiders, outsiders, and
mobile producers traversing both popular and experimental worlds. I posit dubstep as this
third sort of outsider art on the inside of the mainstream. My intent is therefore to collapse
the distinction altogether by suggesting the rhetorical strength of the art is precisely in a
collision of these two supposedly distinct appeals: intelligibility of metered rhythms and
sensibility of novel timbres.24

Electronic Dance Music, Error, Liminality
In a word, I take electronic dance music and dubstep in particular to be liminal. I
borrow, stretch, and repurpose the term from Victor Turner’s anthropological work on rites
of passage to signify a rhetorical encounter with a strange and transient moment
necessitating improvisation. Any honest discussion of a genre that relies on salient features
immediately encounters outliers and exceptions. I am therefore less interested defining a
genre or any subgenre of electronic music than I am in exploring what does appear to be an
effort in a diverse body of dubstep to push toward (and exceed?) interpretive thresholds,
aesthetic limits, intelligible margins, and affective boundaries. I claim this striving is manifest
in the contents, forms, and purposes of the art.25
24

My gesture here is inspired by Victor J. Vitanza’s attempt to be “an outsider while inside” when
accounting for histories of rhetorics. His topographic model for such histories is the Klein jar, a non-orientable
surface “which is all outside and no inside, or which is neither.” Negation, Subjectivity, and The History of Rhetoric
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 19; 7.
25

See n. 8, above.
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Actually, a common criticism of EDM is that it is not music at all because it does not
continue longstanding traditions of composition in the Western mainstream. While such
reactionary criticisms echoing those historically lodged against experimental music are by no
means unique, they are just as bitter and uncompromising. Negative reviews of dubstep as
somehow outside or other than music itself abound in popular culture. Henry Rollins,
former frontman of the legendary punk band Black Flag, contributes to this discourse in a
standup comedy routine by wondering “which came first, shitty rave music or the drugs?”
So you make music this shitty, and everyone says, “God, this sucks!”
[Rollins impersonating a particular discussant:] “No, no, take these drugs.”
[Rollins as a second individual brings pantomimic narcotics to his tongue and convulses,
imitating loss of motor control. The music review is revised:] “Fuck, that’s so good!”
[Laughter in the audience].
[Rollins as himself:] Or, were there just a bunch of people sitting in warehouse with a bunch
of ketamine and ecstasy, and they took a bunch of it, and they said, “Alright, now make
some music!” 26

Self-satisfied punchline being that results in both cases would be comparable. He goes on to
identify disc jockeys as “nonmusic fuckheads” and “record player players,”27 trivializing
producers of original content who are also necessarily DJs for the sake of live performance.
The artists, meanwhile, are aware of this counter-discourse, and even use the criticism as
source material for new productions. The audio from the Rollins gig, of course, was itself
remixed and sampled in EDM productions including SKisM’s “Rave Review” (Clip 3.6).

Clip 3.6: Rollins remixed. SKisM, “Rave Review,” from
Down with the Kids (London: Never Say Die Records,
2010).

26

Henry Rollins, Henry Rollins: Up for It (Tokyo: Geneon, 2001), DVD (my transcription, emphasis
reflects vocal accent).
27

Ibid.
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Rollins represents an extreme responses, but the framing of his complaints
as exclusionary is telling and relevant for my argument because of the emphasis on aesthetic
discontinuity and radical invention in EDM. Some strains of digital music have perceived
themselves as liminal since their inception. Kim Cascone’s landmark article, “The Aesthetics
of Failure,” ushered in the work of electronic artists who embraced, pursued, and exploited
hiccups and errors in digital audio production. These artists reveled in the mutated audio
emitted during the crashes and stalls of editing software, understanding such errors as
creations instead of scraps. While it is a banality that digital technologies afford a wide range
of tools and opportunities for producers to stretch and pioneer the sonic arts, what might be
less commonplace is that some artists actually appreciate and celebrate the failure of the
same hard and soft wares. As Cascone observes, the tools of electronic music composition
not only streamline production, but “digital technology [also] enables artists to explore new
territories for content by capturing and examining the area beyond the boundary of
‘normal’ functions and uses of software.”28 His essay calls attention to a deliberate
cultivation of breakdown and deterioration as an inventional mood: “It is from the ‘failure’
of digital technologies that this new work has emerged: glitches, bugs, application errors,
system crashes, clipping, aliasing, distortion, quantization noise, and even the noise floor of
computer sound cards are the raw materials composers seek to incorporate into their
music.”29 Importantly, the impetus for all this noise is a kind of willed liminality on the part
of the producers: “while technological failure is often controlled and suppressed—its effects
buried beneath the threshold of perception—most audio tools can zoom in on the errors, allowing

28

Kim Cascone, “The Aesthetics of Failure: ‘Post-Digital Tendencies in Contemporary Computer
Music,” Computer Music Journal 24, no. 4 (2000): 14 (emphasis added).
29

Ibid., 13.
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composers to make them the focus of their work.”30 For Cascone, failure promised forking
pathways to new sonic aesthetics.
Turner’s anthropology is also concerned with interpretive thresholds. I have in mind
his work on “liminality,” a transitional period of growth in which cultural subjects undergo
what is often a jarring experience of maturation and enculturation. Typical examples include
fraternity pledging or, in so called “primitive” cultures, a youth’s passage into adulthood
sometimes consummated with a test of survival on one’s own for a period of time while
isolated from the tribe. Working with Arnold van Gennep’s three stages in rites of passage,
“separation, transition, and incorporation,” it is the middle period which primarily interests
him; Turner writes that “[i]n this intervening phase of transition, called by Van Gennep
‘margin’ or ‘limen’ (meaning ‘threshold’ in Latin), the ritual subjects pass through a period
and area of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo” in which subjectivities and therefore reliable
interpretive capabilities are unavailable.31 Those undergoing liminality may find themselves
endowed with more than they thought possible—capable of previously unimaginable
rhetorical, aesthetic, interpretive, and experiential capacities.
Following Lyotard and Ulmer in search of interpretive free play, I take note of EDM
as cultural texts that flirt with such bending, modulating, and repurposing symbols in atypical
and improvisational ways. Texts that encourage and instigate feelings of breakage, mutation,
and experimentation as part of their reading-listening-feeling experience seek out and
promote innovative modes of experiencing arts and rhetorics. As liminal, EDM seems
deserving of an engagement that resists the temptation to reduce the art to a list of
recurring attributes, although this is perhaps the only place we can start.

30

Ibid., (emphasis added).
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Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York: PAJ Publications,

1982), 24.
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Before we begin, however, acknowledgment of a triple anxiety is necessary. First of
all, “overwhelmingly, the intellectual tradition has considered music suspicious if not
dangerous” because of its indeterminate affective force, especially when considered relative
to the cognitive prowess language supposedly affords.32 Second: according to Plato, the
music most threatening to the order of the ideal state is im/precisely the novel and
unfamiliar.
When Plato said that “the overseers of our state . . . must throughout be watchful against innovations
in music . . . fearing when anyone says that the song is most regarded among men ‘which hovers
newest on the singer’s lips,’” one may wonder whether he had in mind the boast of . . . Timotheus [of
Miletus] who said: “I do not sing what men have sung in time past. In novelty is power. . . . Far from
us be the Muse of the old days.”33

The inconsistency of the new necessarily implies deviance, abandonment, and renewal—all
of which Plato situates firmly in the realm distracting appearances: dancing shadows on the
wall. Third, all the above is in and/or out of line with Jacques Attali’s landmark study on
noise and experimental music. His position is that disruptive musical arts can rock
established paradigms and instigate social change in a way that necessarily entails overhauling

32 Thomas Rickert, “Language’s Duality and the Rhetorical Problem of Music,” in Rhetorical Agendas:
Political, Ethical, Spiritual, ed. Patricia Bizzell (New York: Routledge, 2010), 157.
33 Qtd. in Katharine Everett Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, A History of Esthetics (New York: Dover,
1972), 30. The quoted passages, respectively, are Plato, Republic, 424b and Alfred Croiset and Maurice Croiset,
Histoire de la Littérature Grecque, vol. III (Paris: Libraire des Ècoles Françaises, 1887), 34. No full text in English
of the latter exists to my knowledge, though spot translations are common in scholarship. Timotheus of
Miletus is an amusing figure, dating liminal sonic aestheticism back as far as the third and fourth centuries,
BCE.

For Carlo Valgulio, Girolamo Mei, and other Renaissance humanists, the name Timotheus of Miletus brought to
mind the image of a musician who flouted custom by enlarging the number of strings of the traditional kithara
to accommodate his innovative style, and was humiliated by the authorities of the city of Sparta for doing so. . . .
“Timotheus expanded his lyre to eleven strings, whereas up to Terpander and others like him it did not go
beyond seven. For this alteration he was exiled by the Spartans as a spoiler and destroyer of the ancient music,”
Mei wrote to [Vincenzo] Galilei.

Martha Maas, “Timotheus at Sparta: The Nature of the Crime,” in Musical Humanism and Its Legacy: Essays in
Honor of Claude V. Palisca, eds. Nancy Kovaleff Baker and Barbara Russian (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1992),
38. The cited correspondence, dated May 8, 1572, appears in Claude V. Palisca, The Florentine Camerata:
Documentary Studies and Translations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 71.

85

the prevailing aesthetic infrastructures: “[f]or the code to undergo a mutation . . . and for the
dominant network to change, a certain catastrophe must occur.”34

A Rhetoric of Electronic Dance Music?
Surprise?
If “surprise is the least complex kind of fulfillment,”35 one can’t help but wonder
how an agenda for experimentation is handled by this model. What if one’s hope is to enter
the liminal, to tinker with the unfamiliar for the purposes of invention? I neither wish to
fight a straw man nor argue with Burke’s hierarchy of complexity. My purpose in citing
Burke is rather to propose that listeners of dubstep, despite Rollins et al., are in fact less
concerned “the creation of an appetite . . . and the adequate satisfying of that appetite,” 36
than with the discovery of appetites they were not aware they held—or even knew existed.
Producers of dubstep and some other EDM genres seem to have an aesthetic preference
“closer to invention than verification,” to repurpose Gregory Ulmer’s words from different
but related context.37
A liminal aesthetic, insofar as there is any such thing available for analysis, is one that
calls to mind Ulmer’s discussion of collage and montage as “post-critical.” Using
heterogeneous elements “cut out and pasted into new, surprising, provoking
juxtapositions,”38 collage is recombinant composition in which the traditional function of
signification is altered to one not primarily concerned with referentiality. Ulmer’s linkage of
34
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the form to Derridian “grammatology” suggests that collage “does not abandon or deny
reference, but re-thinks reference in another way: ‘it complicates the boundary line that
ought to run between the text and what seems to lie beyond its fringes, what is classed as the
real.’”39 Given that collage can rely on reference for the sake of juxtaposition, referentiality is
not irrelevant; regardless, what we have here is an elevation of texture and materiality to an
equal if not higher status than the conceptual realm “beyond” the work itself. For Ulmer,
collage shifts away from “representation by the metaphysics of ‘logocentrism,’ the era
extending from Plato to Freud (and beyond) in which writing (all manner of inscription) is
reduced to a secondary status as ‘vehicle,’ [and] in which the signified or referent is always
prior to the material sign, the purely intelligible prior to the merely sensible.” 40 The
connection to EDM here is that a grammatology transposed for music might dispense with
tonality as a guiding parameter of progressions melodies. Indeed, in dubstep sounds
themselves are featured not as differential operators, but simply as textures in their own
right.

Clip 3.7: Dino Safari, “A Ghost Named Charlie” (I.Y.F.F.E.,
Au5, and Auratic Remix). Self-released.

The aggressive remix of the track “A Ghost Named Charlie” (originally produced by
Dino Safari) and Downlink’s “Factory” are good examples of such compositions (Clips 3.7
and 3.8). These works seem to rely on something other than latent, relational significations in
a tonal network (e.g., those of a key signature) and signify the timbres themselves.
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Clip 3.8: Downlink, “Factory,” from Factory / Yeah (Kelowna
BC, Canada: Rottun Recordings, 2011).

More specifically, these samples dispense with popular music’s tonal gold standard,
which is loosely analogous to language as a static system of differences prior to
deconstruction. In music theory, the distance between notes on the staff measured in
“intervals” or “steps” determines consonance and dissonance among notes (and is also the
basis of scales and key signatures). Instead of and/or alongside melodic phrases governed
by tonality, these clips offer an aesthetic of surprise by combining an eclectic array of sound
samples. And the compatibility of Ulmer’s grammatology with Cascone’s aesthetics is
striking, particularly when the latter describes the composing process of early glitch music: in
a sense, “[t]he ‘atomic’ parts, or samples, used in composing electronica from small modular
pieces had become the whole.”41 For Cascone, glitch music is “composed of stratified layers
[of samples] that intermingle and defer meaning until the listener takes an active role in the
production of meaning.”42 Such a listening experience is a key change in the relationship
between knower and known characterized by a forfeiture of expectation and an embrace of
texture of mere sound itself.

Stammer?
In The Archeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault describes a historiographical shift.
“Attention has been turned,” he writes, “away from vast unities like ‘periods’ or ‘centuries’ to
41
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the phenomena of rupture” and “discontinuity (threshold, rupture, break, mutation,
transformation).”43 For him, the task is no longer tracing stable lines in thought, politics,
philosophy, arts, and so on, but rather charting genealogical understandings of how such
discourses are paradoxically substantiated by disjunctives tossed out in favor of these very
stabilities. In so doing, he insists that scholars take up a different relationship with archive,
which itself must be reinvented in order to adequately engage rupture. The result is a strange
imperative: “suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow
development, and force it to enter a new time.”44 In so doing, Foucault was perfectly aware,
researchers may stammer in attempt to register something heretofore inarticulable or
disallowed precisely because it renders a field’s trajectory discontinuous.

Clip 3.9: SKisM, “Elixir,” from Down with the Kids (London:
Never Say Die Records, 2010).

I hear dubstep stammering in songs like SKisM’s “Elixir” and Kill the Noise’s “Talk
to Me” (Clips 3.9 and 3.10). As we hear in the latter sample, this effect is often accomplished
by dicing vocal tracks and rearranging the bits in fragmented syncopation.
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Clip 3.10: Kill the Noise, “Talk to Me,” from Kill Kill Kill
(Los Angeles: OWSLA, 2011).

The result sounds like someone interrupting themselves—these two clips can hardly
contain themselves! Notice the exact rhythm of the stammer in both samples is rarely if ever
repeated; each bar of the cited passages (un)usually offers a unique rhythmic phrase.
Recalling the sequence from memory is, I think, deliberately made difficult, and as such a
stammering aesthetic could be read attempt to brush up against limits of articulability.

Wobble?
Hayden White conceives of ideal argument as a “diatactic” movement. He prefers
this term to dialectic, which “too often suggests a transcendental subject or narrative ego
[that] stands above the contending interpretations of reality and arbitrates between them.”45
A diatactical orientation, on the other hand,
does not suggest that discourses about reality can be classified as hypotactical (conceptually
overdetermined), on the one side, and paratactical (conceptually underdetermined), on the
other, with the discourse itself occupying the middle ground that everyone is seeking [as in
dialectics]. On the contrary, discourse, if it is genuine discourse—that is to say, as self-critical
as it is critical of others—will radically challenge the notion of the syntactical middle ground
itself. 46

Such a middle ground, after all, cannot exist except as a reterritorialization. How might
White’s “metadiscursive reflexiveness” sound?
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Clip 3.11: Butch Clancy, “Boogie Knights.” Self-released.

Dubstep is known for its cultivation of an aesthetic known as “wobble,” a
tremololike modulation effect usually achieved by means of oscillating the parameters of an
effect filter applied to a sound-sample in real time and rhythmically looping the output.
“Boogie Knights” by Butch Clancy and a remix of Diana Vickers’ “Sunlight” by Adventure
Club may serve as examples of especially wobbly tracks (Clips 3.11 and 3.12). Such wobbling
is generated with technique called “low frequency oscillation,” which temporarily amplifies a
select window of low-end frequencies of a sound as it is sampled. The procedure is roughly
analogous to sweeping the “low” dial of a stereo’s equalizer during playback for realtime
modulation. The result is not a modulated sound, but a sound being recurrently modulated
in the present. Although machinically rhythmic, the result feels precarious because the timbre
is wavering in time.

Clip 3.12: Diana Vickers, “Sunlight” (Adventure Club
Remix). Self-released.

These effects and consequent affects riding on these crests of frequency recall
Turner’s liminal “interval[s], however brief, of margin or limen, when the past is
momentarily negated, suspended, or abrogated, and the future has not yet begun, an instant
of pure potentiality when everything . . . trembles in the balance.”47 If we need and desire
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rhetoric and rhetorical studies to transform our modes of thinking, listening, reading, and
writing, then suspension and trembling must be admitted to the discourse.

Rebeginning: Glitch
Experimental music is by no means a new phenomenon, and predates all three
writers and EDM by a long shot. Here, then, I will switch and trip the flow of the chapter by
claiming that the cursory discussion of attributes I outlined above does not in fact amount to
a viable “rhetoric of electronic dance music.” I surmise that what sustains audience interest
in EDM is that each surprise, stammer, and wobble is something different—by which I hope
to indicate something grander and yet subtle relative to the banal (though important) idea
that individual texts from any one genre are each themselves different. Instead, the claims are
that if anything is “signified” or “represented” in electronic dance music, it is liminality itself
in which all interpretive bets are off. The purpose, perhaps, is to “intervene in the world, not
to reflect but to change reality.”48 Hence, the questions: how, in light of its surprising
“tendencies,” should we treat experimental music in scholarly discourse—and why would it
matter for rhetoric?
Prior to, beyond, or perhaps in excess of our intelligible relationship with rhetorics as
identifiable means of persuasion, there also exists a relatively unwieldy dimension of
engagement with rhetorics, less intelligible than merely sensible.49 This qualitative distinction
becomes especially important if the issue is liminal experiences in arts and rhetorics. Next,
then, I pull the ground out from under my own argument thus far—I glitch it—for the
purpose of demonstrating that what is needed and wanted for experimental discourses on
48
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experimental rhetorics is to actually enact and perform these sorts experiences—in addition
to simply discoursing about such experiences. The subject is now how to think and write notions,
moods, attitudes, and affects associated with aural experimentalities.

Sonic Aesthetics of Rhetorics
A number of scholars have explored the rhetorical implications of listening, sound,
and music as modalities of engagement. I am in tune with Steven B. Katz, for example, who
highlights the fact that reading, like music, is temporal. His is “a temporal philosophy based
on harmonic association and holistic synthesis of thought and feeling rather than sequential
extraction and hierarchical differentiation of meaning”50 we might get through referentiality.
Katz’s suggestion is not simply that music can be rhetorical, but that rhetoric could be
musical. My attempt is to underscore the temporality of the present argument by means of
enacting a glitch. It is not that the typology of dubstep attributes I outlined above is wrong or
unhelpful. Indeed, such taxonomy is probably a necessary basis from which to begin
discoursing. But such information as mere data diminishes, potentially or to a certain extent,
the affective capacity of electronic dance music by taking it out of its lived, temporal
dimension.
Byron Hawk and, separately, Thomas Rickert and Michael Salvo have argued that
music can have a “worlding” capacity to reflect, actuate, and propel not merely technological
innovations, but also existential moods. From Wagner to Yes to Brian Eno, Rickert and Salvo
suggest that evolutions in music not only reflect or parallel but also inspire transformations
of our relation to the art and the world. Specifically, they notice that accelerations in new
media composition technologies can prompt both artists and audiences to ponder their
50
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relationships with music, which is especially pronounced in “a culture that is less resonate with
interpretation than with engagement.”51 Relatedly, Hawk’s listening sessions with the
experimental punk band Refused leads him to suggest that pioneerings in music “se[t] the
emergent ground for the rhetorical affects and future paths they make possible through their
work of art.”52 What I take from these writers is a cumulative feeling that experimental
ventures in music may afford an opportunity not merely for persuasion in the usual sense of
making appeals to existing paradigms and satisfying established formal appetites, but can
also occasion a dramatic alteration of aesthetic preferences or even reveal new “preferences”
or desires not yet formulated or recognized by audiences.
Rickert argues that ambient music is conducive less to intelligible analyses than to
“attunements” or mood based engagements that I would associate with sensibility as an
alternative to intelligibility. He notes, for example, that ambient music “eschews melody,” a
major dimension of grounding for popular Western music, “in favor of slowly unfolding
harmonic textures . . . designed to withdraw from direct attention and permeate one’s overall
environment.”53 Transposed for rhetorics, ambient music’s departure from the catchy, the
recognizable, the operationalizable, and melodic qualities of popular music helps us think of
an engagement with arts and rhetorics not limited to the intelligible relationship with
information (textual, sonic, and otherwise) we tend to take for granted. On a grander and
existential scale, this ambient dimension within which we always already dwell highlights the
ever present sensible in the intelligible, the former functioning as the basis of the latter,
thereby dissolving the distinction between the poles:
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[Ambient rhetoric] deprivileges directly conscious experience and boosts the importance of indirect,
unconscious, auratic, osmotic, and ambient phenomena. Put differently, such rhetorical design
organizes an experience, not so much to persuade in any direct sense, but to attune and inflect our
sense of bodily inhabitance and the cradle of intelligibility within which we comport ourselves.54

While the varieties of EDM sampled here are scarcely comparable to ambient music in
terms of generic properties, stylized tropes, production techniques, or textural aesthetics, the
relations among the experiencing subject, the art, and cultural attitudes toward electronic
dance music are nevertheless compatible with Rickert’s rhetoric. It is argued throughout his
book that an overreliance on deliberation and intentionality in rhetorical studies has
necessarily resulted in a selective rendering of the field and its affective capacities that
privileges intelligible salience over less manipulable engagements with rhetorics and/or, here,
the aesthetics of rhetorics. I sense a related exigency available in, through, and during
electronic music given its emphasis on idiosyncrasy in timbre that seems to invite
engagement without a requisite of “interpretation” in the sense of recognizing familiar
melodic patterns. For me, textural aesthetics of progressivist electronic music cited in this
chapter extend the frontier of timbre less to comport listeners toward a worldly or bodily
relation than to intervene and pioneer new sonic possibilities of information exchange within
that world.

Experimentalities, Popularities; Surprises.
Before closing, I would like to make a metadiscursive comment on the aesthetics of
experimental electronic musics that have gone under the scholarly headings of “noise,”
“glitch,” and “failure.” Readers familiar with such aural arts will be quick to note that the
samples of popular EDM cited earlier differ enormously with this trio of experimental
strains. My claim is not for a similarity of textural aesthetics, but a compatibility of desires in
54
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the efforts of recent EDM and dubstep in particular. It would be a mistake to class dubstep
and other EDM alongside the latest flavor of bubblegum pop for young masses—although
it may (d)evolve into that someday not too distant. For now, I simply maintain that relatively
popular electronic dance music and dubstep in particular, especially during its emergent
phase in the early 2010s, performs a rhetorical tightrope act in mixing appeals to both stasis
(in terms of meter and rhythm) and fluctuation (in timbres and textures). I begin (again),
however, with academic usages of the terms “noise,” “glitch,” and “failure” that come from
the separate works of Douglas Kahn and Cascone.
My particular interest is the special handling required in light of the semantic ironies
that arise when the objects of scholarly discourse are artworks that would hope to be
experimental or scramble existing aesthetic classifications. One of the first issues that arises
in defining any member in this trio of noise, glitch, and failure as an aesthetic entity is
whether any of these can or should be considered “music.” Kahn approaches the issue with
the subtly and care it requires in his 1999 book Noise Water Meat. The title is a nod to the
unlikely materials and mediums with and in which the Italian Futurists, John Cage, William
Burroughs, and others disrupted conventional music of their days by integrating novel and,
if you like, raucous production techniques. These artists and thinkers brought noisy sounds
like industrial machinery, teapots, and the body’s capacity to register and emanate nonvocal
sound to bear on our understandings of musical, aesthetic, and affective experience. Kahn
therefore begins instead with “sound” as any “auditive phenomena”—real or imagined,
audible or dreamed. Apropos of experimental or avant-garde arts movements, then, the first
step in conceiving noise as art is to consider this general sense of sound as art, if only
because made “significant” or “musicalized” by the artists.55
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In terms of noise, the historical texts most significant for Kahn are the separate
compositions of Italian Futurist musicians Francesco Balilla Pratella and Luigi Russolo. Each
penning essays in the genre “Manifesto,” both Russolo and Pratella are polemic in
bemoaning what they saw as complacency in the textural aesthetics of Italian music in the
early part of the twentieth century. In The Art of Noises, first published in 1913, Russolo
proclaims “musical sound is too limited in its variety of timbres” and urges his
contemporaries to diversify the very notion of music: “we must break out of this limited circle of
sounds and conquer the infinite variety of noise-sounds.”56 Russolo is remembered specifically for the
construction of his “intonarumori” devices, which he used to create his sounds that
generally resemble gas powered lawn equipment (Clip 3.13).

Figure 3.1: Russolo (left), Ugo Piatti, and the Intonarumori
(1913). Image is in the Public Domain. First published by
Russolo in The Art of Noises, 1913. See n. 56.
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Clip 3.13: Rusollo, “Risveglio Di Una Città,” (1913) is in the
Public Domain. “UbuWeb Sound - Luigi Russolo,”
UbuWeb, accessed January 25, 2015, http://
www.ubu.com/sound/russolo_l.html.

Pratella’s “Manifesto for Futurist Musicians” is specifically addressed to “the young,
who are necessarily athirst for things that are new, alive, and contemporary.”57 The text
encourages readers to abandon schools of music and create noise independently because
such institutions promote tradition and conservatism in art.58 While Pratella and Russolo
position themselves as loud and proud—virtuous because disruptive— Kahn points out a
(not so?) subtle irony in their posturing: “with so much attendant on noise it quickly
becomes evident that noises are too significant to be noises” in the common sense of being
unwanted—or, at least, too significant to be thought unwanted by all.59 What seems like a
straight forward split between the noise and music is, for both the Futurists and Kahn,
superfluous—but for different reasons. The conception of noise in an antagonistic or
contrarian relationship with music seems to position the former as somehow outside the
latter. But one of Kahn’s insights is that the phenomenon of musical noise, especially as it
developed from the early part of the century to the experimental movements in America
during the 1950s and 1960s, was and is always addressed in terms of attention, salience, and
reintegration.
This line between sound and musical sound stood at the center of the existence of avant-garde music,
supplying a heraldic moment of transgression and its artistic raw material, a border that had to be
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crossed to bring back unexploited resources, restock the coffers of musical materiality, and rejuvenate
Western art music. 60

While zeitgeist among the Futurists and other progressives like John Cage, Fluxus, and
Happenings in the mid-twentieth century called for an ambiguous and open ended venture
into that which disoriented and unsettled audiences and creators themselves, Kahn suggests
they always did so with the intent of returning from the journey to exhibit and thus make
salient newfound textures. Such a claim downplays, at least to some extent, the qualitative
difference in experimentation of recently popular EDM artists and those who do so for
explicitly counter-cultural reasons. The idea of Russolo and Pratella as subversive
minoritarians is thus somewhat complicated here since, while cultures are not monoliths,
subcultures are cultural.
Yet avoiding the temptation to simply reintegrate the different, new, or experimental
into the market, some inevitability, or the merely causal is crucial. All the above may very
well apply in various ways and to varying degrees. But the categoricism at the heart of the
critical manuscript sells the work short, and this is not so naive and nostalgic an objection as
it may seem. The argument is simply that such explanations (categorical and causal) do not
account for the impact and affect of the work—subjectively or historically. Liminal
aesthetics can and do indeed trigger epiphanic thresholds, paradigmatic shifts, and other
transformations in personal but also political and economic precincts as well.
Experimental electronic music (EDM included), for example, seems especially well
positioned to investigate relationships users have with technology, aesthetic possibility in the
digital, and relations among others, community, and world. While this chapter’s choice to
focus on electronic dance music is not incidental, those textures and timbres are metaphors
for the project’s larger effort to rethink ways of treating and dealing with the probable
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inevitability of shock and overhaul of aesthetic and rhetorical practices. For a recent
example with an electronic but entirely different sound, consider the exceptional work of
Holly Herndon. Her 2015 album Platform explicitly invites listeners to relate with the art by
oscillating between popular and experimental tendencies before dissolving one into the
other.

Clip 3.14: Holly Herndon, “Home,” from Platform (London:
4AD / Rvng Intl., 2015).

Note the use of timbre—not narrative, not tonal semiotics, not rhythm—but timbre to
explore and relate to a contemporary situation characterized by ubiquitous computing,
surveillance, and cloud feudalism. Tracks on this record are occasionally without meter at all,
simply embarking on one excursus after another—yet somehow in a way that feels
continuous, if not unified. Samples are practically tactile: rich, wet, and prickly.

Clip 3.15: Holly Herndon, “New Ways to Love,” from
Platform (London: 4AD / Rvng Intl., 2015).

Rhetorical criticism should lend an ear timbre itself. Such an approach allows us to be with
the information “about” which we supposedly discourse from critical distance implied by the
manuscript genre. Surprise: it’s not enough.
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Perhaps an irony permeating the present text—positioning glitch and noise as “an
aesthetic” to be recognized, held up, critiqued, and/or celebrated—has undermined their
disruptive edges. Cascone himself makes an interesting pivot a decade after the publication
of his perennial essay in a talk he titles “The Failure of Aesthetics.” He laments what in
retrospect seems like the inevitable appropriation of glitch aesthetics by mainstream media:
Today, glitch has become a permanent part of the arsenal of au courant stylistic sound and visual
effects invoking edginess for many opening credits of formulaic cyber sci-fi films. The tired
“technology run amok,” “gone awry” trope was given a new varnish and retooled for the internet age.
. . . As a result, glitch has become a fashion statement detoothed for our safety, commodified for our
entertainment consumption.61

What came about as a direct challenge to grammatical and overly familiar modes of sonic
production has itself been grammaticized. Yet by the end of the talk, he rebounds hope,
challenging artists to once again move beyond trope and typification to engage in yet more
stretching. The appetite for innovation cannot be satisfied by reliance on techniques or
streamlined aesthetic tendencies already dominant in electronic music. After all, it’s not as if
glitch as such is susceptible to cooptation. My attempt here has been to glitch the academic
essay for the sake of leaving open not only the aesthetic potentialities of electronic music,
but for the purposes of imagining alternative approaches-to and relationships-with scholarly
objects in academic writing.

Full Squiggle
I have oscillated between experimental music on the one hand and “popular” dance
music on the other in an attempt to demonstrate this apparent dichotomy is false. Still, in
light of all the fanfare surrounding EDM cultures, the question remains: just how
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experimental are these electronic dance music artists? To what extent are these artists simply
catering to popular or general audiences with predefined, albeit freshly minted, expectations?
With its emphasis on textural experience of the art through exploration of
idiosyncratic timbre, EDM attempts to satisfy appetites some listeners music might not
know they possess. And yet, undeniably, these same fans crave and take comfort in the
security of certain tropes, most notably the common 4/4 time sustained in a highly
structural fashion. Often the same rhythm is used throughout the entirety of a song or even
across whole albums. Hardly experimental(?). I would see this apparent juxtaposition of
experimentation and regularity as an attempt to point outside from inside, an attempt to
cater to an oscillation of appetites for both stasis and divergence. Not one or the other, but
each alternatively as a unified rhetorical gesture.
The larger issue for rhetoricians is a possible shift in mood or approach to objects of
study that would be novel or experimental. If we simply reintegrate experimental arts,
discourses, rhetorics, or modes of existence into a categorical, intelligible frameworks of
analysis we risk downplaying the very lived, affective, and sensible experiences of those
howls, yawps, and glitches.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INTERLUDE: VIOLENCES WITHIN, WITHOUT, AND WITH LOVE
Imagine such a play. It has gone on for about forty
minutes. You know the characters, you have become
accustomed to their idiosyncrasies, and you are already
tired of their peculiar habits. Now they stand before
you with their familiar gestures and it seems nothing
interesting is ever going to happen—when suddenly,
because of a trick used by the writer, the ‘reality’ you
perceived turns out to be a chimaera . . . . Looking back
you can now say that things were not what they seemed
to be, and looking forward with the experience in mind
you will regard any clear and definite arrangement with
suspicion, on the stage, and elsewhere. Also, your
suspicion will be the greater the more solid the initial
story seemed to be. This is why I have chosen a
scholarly essay as my starting point. —Feyerabend1
The track of writing is straight and crooked.
—Heraclitus2

Anecdote on Anecdotes. A common technique used in opening academic essays is telling a
story that serves as an emblem for some larger issue, argument, or theme. In this chapter, I
have written a story about reading Roland Barthes’ work on the ethics and aesthetics of
writing. What follows is not a full and true account, but, I must warn the reader, it can still be
pretty bloody if construed as the kind of scholarly narrative that is, in the end, a series of
notes on readings or an account of accountings. I confess: what appears below is the Greatest
Hits of what was in actuality a series of circlings, abandonments, temperings, erasures, and
ugly distillations. I revised it obsessively, cutting what did not “make sense,” adding what
seemed to be missing, and refining what some might find unclear. No surprises. Nothing
unusual here. In this case, however, the so called “content” made revisions more like ethical
stammerings and necessitated a sort of stretching. For Barthes, there exists a disjuncture
1
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between the gradience in the aesthetic experience of reading and what seemed to him the
“violence” of critical discourse. Although his understanding of the situation is not limited to
a simple dualism (aesthetics v. criticism; no blur), a struggle with the apparent double bind is
everywhere in his writing, and appears as an ethical imperative. Barthes sought to stretch
both our relationship with the critical apparatus and writing itself for the sake of bringing
forth an aesthetics of “critical” engagement.
For this reason, the present chapter hopes to do more than deliver an intelligible
reading of Barthes’ work. Not “instead,” but in addition to such a reading, I invite the reader
to relate to the impossible proposition that propositional content—claims, coherent ideas,
explanations—are only part of a grander interpretive event. Prior to or beyond the
intelligible content of a piece of scholarly literature, I gesture toward a relationship
experienced among author, content, and audience. Hence “interpretation” itself is at stake.
The relations among writers, writings, and readers might be romantic, constricting,
maddening, effacing, and so on—and in each of these different senses profoundly and even
violently affective. While perhaps commonplace, Barthes’ endurance through the
implications of such violences are expansive and help us write and teach writing in uniquely
ethical and aesthetic ways. His attempt was to reimagine a relationship with language itself as
not merely conflictual or paradoxical—enabling while also disabling—but multiple in the
sense of possessing capacities in excess of representation and delivery of information.
Barthes’ idea of language does not displace so much as surpass its everyday function as a
communicative vehicle or transmissive medium for an exchange of ideas by means of
symbolic representation. In addition to these sorts of transactional dimensions that help
language users meet and explore each other’s ideas, language and writing for Barthes are also
radically subjective in a way that makes grammatical arbitration a sort of violent imposition.
But it is critical to note that his position runs much deeper than the clichés that individual
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subjects interpret objects differently and that our supposedly reliable means for attaining
intersubjectivity through cultural codes and grammars are ultimately experienced subjectively
(although that is certainly part of it). The gesture is instead related to a practically
indefensible hunch that the insecure posture or attitude with which critics sometimes
approach proposition, code, and grammar betrays the inadequacy of these means to
“capture” to breadth and scope of interpretive events so much as release their potentiality.3
One thread running throughout his work was a reconceptualization of the function
of writing by stretching the relation between object and interpreting subject.
We often hear it said that it is the task of art to express the inexpressible; it is the contrary which must be
said (with no intention of paradox): the whole task of art is to unexpress the expressible, to kidnap from
the world’s language, which is the poor and powerful language of the passions, another speech, an
exact speech.4

This is one of Barthes’ many dizzying conjectures that is confusing because (only)
apparently ironic (unexpress for exactitude?). Importantly, this writing that operates within
the apparatus of alphabetic literacy but does not take referentiality as its primary goal is
more than simply paradoxical. Although often remembered for his aesthetic jubilations of
irrationality associated with “punctums” and “third meanings,” 5 another side of Barthes
involves a veritable floundering within what he understood as the violence of structural,
codified, and disciplinary ways of writing. He surmised the existence of unaccountable, even
3 I am reminded of Kenneth Burke’s contention that “the aesthetic is defensible because it could
never triumph” over what he called “the practical,” epitomized by industrialization and, in later writings, the
development of nuclear weapons he witnessed in the mid-twentieth century. Counter-Statement (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968), 113. This hunch as an “indefensible” underdog in my essay is so because
it is inadmissible to logic, codification, and perhaps even recognition.
4 Roland Barthes, Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), xvii-xviii.
5 In Barthes’ Camera Lucida, “punctum” is famously juxtaposed with “studium,” an application or
mere “consequence of knowledge” and “training.” Trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982),
25; 26. The comparatively strange experience of a “punctum” involves not interpretive mastery but an
encounter that “shoots out . . . like an arrow, and pierces” the beholder of an image (ibid., 26). “The Third
Meaning” is introduced in an essay of the same name and distinguished from “informational” and “symbolic”
levels of literal and figural meanings. Barthes, “The Third Meaning,” in Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), 52-68. At issue here is “the signifier” itself, “not the signified”; the event of
“reading[,] . . . not intellection” (ibid., 53).
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unintelligible experiences brought on by reading and writing, and a conflictual anxiety on this
point is manifest in nearly all his books, lurking here and there in even his most unbridled
texts. It is specifically this struggling with violence apparently inherent in critical discourse
that is the issue on which we should focus if we want to find a writing, a rhetoric, an
aesthetics, an inquiry that would temper itself against its own calcification of the movement
that is reading, writing, and learning. And, self conscious though he is—stammering in “a
discomfort [he] had always suffered from: the uneasiness of being a subject torn between
two languages, one expressive, the other critical.”6 And Barthes does struggle, “none the
less.”7
At issue is a subtle inkling, a barely identifiable sense that something huge about the
experience of the text is lost precisely in the instance we think we’re getting close. “In this
article” and beyond it, I tell a story about Barthes as consciously within and yet anxiously
desirous of being without structure, code, and system. He lived this struggle everywhere in his
writing, institutional life, and in his own mind against what he names this “violence.” As we
will see, his response neither resignation nor retaliation, but instead a strange love for an
inexhaustible potentiality of readings. The primary means by which he pursues this kind of
dwelling within structure involves an emphasis of sensibility in addition to intelligibility.

6

Barthes, Camera, 8.
Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1994), 88. The citation is brought in here, out of its context, where Barthes closes perhaps his most
difficult text by acknowledging “Revolution must of necessity borrow from what it wants to destroy” (ibid.,
87). As Michael North observes, revolution as a figure of the new comes with a host of ironies and other
problems. Novelty: A History of The New (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 41-47. Yet while
Barthes is perfectly aware of such difficulties, his struggle is nevertheless far from over. In any case, my
purpose here is to establish a stubbornness—even willful naivety.
7
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Reading and Writing Barthes
The Pleasure of the Text and Writing Degree Zero offer some of Barthes’ most explicit
articulations on the matter of violence, which he felt was, in some ways, inextricable from
the proposition itself. Pleasure of the Text associates the experience of its title with the
structural satisfactions of meaning making in the usual sense of decoding symbolic
information. Something else, however, lies beyond this everyday mode of reading; he names
it “jouissance,” an essentially untranslatable affective experience in for which “bliss” stands
throughout the Miller translation. Miller’s important prefatory note to the text alerts us that
this bliss in French is not a state but an “action” that is explicitly erotic and with which we
should associate orgasm.8 Barthes’ appropriation is only partly metaphorical, as we come to
learn that his desired jouissance is not only an emotional mood and hence explicitly associated
with the body as opposed to a supposedly distinct mind, but also suggestive of a transient
singularity we might juxtapose with the finality of the proposition, a basic unit of scholarly
discourse: “the Sentence is hierarchical: it implies subjections, subordinations, internal
reactions.”9 For Barthes, such a sentence necessitates a tear from the kaleidoscopic motion10
of mental activity: an operationalization, a seizure from an analog constant. Barthes
continues: “practice, here, is very different from theory. Theory (Chomsky) says that the
sentence is potentially infinite (infinitely catalyzable), but practice always obliges the sentence
to end.”11 We are now beyond the question of whether writing is an inadequate means of

8

Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), v-viii.
Ibid., 50.
10 In a coy interview, Barthes remarks that were he to write a novel, the effort would be less like a
departure from criticism than the movement of the singular and yet amorphous toy: “I prefer the play of the
kaleidoscope: you give it a tap, and little bits of colored glass form a new pattern.” From “The Play of the
Kaleidoscope,” in The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962-1980, trans. Linda Coverdale (Berkeley: The University
of California Press, 1991), 204.
11 Barthes, Pleasure, 50 (Barthes’ parentheses).
9
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representation; the issue is instead a grander aesthetic posturing, and a sort of relationality
among writers, writing, and content.
Now is a good time to recall that the status, nature, and goals of Barthes’ work as
scholarship have long been a subject of critical controversy. As Steven Ungar remarks,
[t]he obvious difficulty with writings since The Pleasure of the Text lies in the impossibility of
determining whether they are to be read as texts of pleasure or bliss. To the extent that they
succeed in transmitting a set of messages to a public of readers, they function within the
mode of articulate pleasure and rely on determinable norms such as those of verbal
meaning and implicit genre.12

Tough to shake those! But as Ungar goes on to explain, the desired effect is not so much to
complete departure from transmission so much as qualitative augmentation or enhancement
of transmission. Read literally, it is true that in some places Barthes sounds an either/or
absolutist. Passages in Writing Degree Zero, for instance, seem wholly uninterested in
communication itself when he dreams of a poetics that is “without foresight or stability of
intention, and thereby so opposed to the social function of language.”13 But this apparently
noncommunicative writing is only so if we approach it with a posture that expects clarity, the
lucid disclosure of content, and the alignment of the reader’s intentions with those of the
writer. This is all good and well (we always remain within), however, Barthes asks us look not
only at and through language, as Richard Lanham would have us do, but also beyond, to its
horizon of potentiality: “[e]ach poetic word is thus an unexpected object, a Pandora’s box
from which fly out all the potentialities of language; it is therefore produced and consumed

12

Stephen Ungar, “RB: The Third Degree,” review of Roland Barthes, by Roland Barthes, Diacritics 7,
no. 1 (1977): 76.
13 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 48.
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with a peculiar curiosity, a kind of sacred relish.”14 Gravy poetics. If asocial, this kind of
writing is so only under a particular rubric of logic and representation that have historically
arbitrated scholastic writing. But as Paul de Man points out in a posthumously released essay
he originally drafted in 1972, Barthes work is to be “read and understood as an intellectual
adventure rather than as a scientifically motivated development of methodology.”15 Texts
like Pleasure and Degree Zero offer neither transparent content nor method but a hybrid of the
two, each being stretched into the other.
Reading and writing in Barthes is associated less with calculated direction than
impulse, contingency, and latencies. Best, he says, if while reading one “need[s] to look up
often, to listen to something else. I am not necessarily captivated by the text of pleasure; it can
be an act that is slight, complex, tenuous, almost scatterbrained: a sudden movement of the
head like a bird who understands nothing of what we hear, who hears what we do not
understand.” 16 Again we see Barthes stretching the relationship between reader and critical
text, though now in a different way. Here we have what feels like a hopeful glimpsing, if you
like, a curious register of distant sounds in the woods at dark—the ripple of some remote
tremor quietly rippling over some faint ledge in the topography of the cortex. It is a strange
listening that seems to fuse active and passive states. An aestheticism for Jay Gatsby, maybe,
who held “some heightened sensitivity to the promises of life, as if he were related to one
of those intricate machines that register earthquakes ten thousand miles away.”17 An
aesthetic of subtly and gradience as an alternative the force of direct broadcast.
14

Ibid. Cf. Richard Lanham, The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 5-6; 80-82. Additionally, this is why Gregory L. Ulmer makes much of
Barthes in “The Object of Post-Criticism,” which posits a new kind of academic writing inspired by and
predicated on the associational linkages of collage and montage. See the essay in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on
Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (New York: The New Press, 1983), 83-110. This essay was discussed at length
in Chapter 3, “Drop,” above.
15 Paul de Man, “Roland Barthes and Limits of Structuralism,” Yale French Studies 77 (1900): 179.
16 Barthes, Pleasure, 24-25 (original emphasis).
17 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Scribner, 1995), 6.
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In his curious third-person autobiography Roland Barthes, he describes himself thusly:
“[l]iking to find, to write beginnings, he tends to multiply this pleasure: that is why he writes in
fragments . . . (but he doesn’t like the ends: the risk of the rhetorical clausule is too great).”18
From Dutch, “clausule” refers to a governing stipulation or law, and is often associated with
contracts. The autobiographer seems fear the proposition itself. One immediately notices the
extensive use of parentheses in his texts that serve as literal and figurative meanderings,
driftings, cruisings away at the both the sentence and, effectively, the global levels of his
writings that would otherwise be a series of “regular” propositions, all contributory to some
great finality. Colons, often several in single “sentence,” also appear in Barthes and effect a
series of extensions—leaps without proper bridges—or perhaps a series of anticipations
strung one after another. What interests me here is not what Barthes is discussing, but how he
is doing it—and yet, in such composition he complicates the distinction between those two
levels of analysis, implying that the activity is itself the message.
It is a tricky tightrope walk, and neither difficulty nor irony is lost on Barthes. The
point I want to stress is that he does not just exit out some magical trapdoor or aesthetic
rabbit hole of delights. Instead, he remains very much situated within while nevertheless
desirous of being without discipline, culture, and formality. I imagine Barthes as a yogi rather
than sublimating into thin air.19 After all, “how can a text,” he asks, “which consists of
language, be outside languages? . . . . How can the text ‘get itself out’ out of the war of
fictions, of sociolects?” Answer: “by a gradual labor of extenuation,”20 a peeling away at the
text to subject it to a liminal state in which its ontological status wavers.

18

RolandBarthes, Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 94 (original

emphasis).
19

A colleague once remarked that because his ideas seem so fantastical as to bluff transcendence
beyond the formative pressures of his cultural and historical situation, reading Barthes was like having a gnome
come out and “dance on the [seminar] table for awhile.”
20 Barthes, Pleasure, 30.

110

The issue is addressed somewhat differently in Writing Degree Zero, although there
again we see Barthes in a conflicted, dynamic tension over criticism as an apparatus that
comes with unacknowledged tolls. Yet this apparent inevitability is highlighted only in
anticipation of movement beyond it, toward a relatively flexible writing. In one of the early
Zero sections, for example, we get another set of slippery claims on the differences between
speech and writing:
All modes of writing have in common the fact of being ‘closed’ and thus different from spoken
language. Writing is in no way an instrument for communication, it is not an open route through
which there passes only the intention to speak. A whole disorder flows through speech and gives it
this self-devouring momentum which keeps it in a perpetually suspended state. Conversely, writing is a
hardened language which is self-contained and is in no way meant to deliver to its own duration a
mobile series of approximations.21

Alongside the passages cited earlier, pronouncements like this one reflect a career-long
ambivalence in his responses to a plurality “writings” and “communications,” especially
during his well known transformative period prompted by the limits of structuralism.22
Some varieties or perhaps variations on relationships with writing are dysfunctional and
constricting, some disperse orgasmic delight, and still as yet unimagined others Barthes
seems to await in hope. This last passage feels more like a lamentation than report, but the
differences between the several writings and communications become indistinguishable
when on the very next page he says that “writing, on the contrary [to speech], is always
rooted in something beyond language, it develops like a seed, not like a line, it manifests an
essence of a secret, it is an anti-communication, it is intimidating.” 23 Although the itinerary
in Writing Degree Zero’s table of contents is designed to respond to several kinds of writing

21

Ibid., 19.
For an illuminating discussion of this transformation, see Michael Halley, “Argo Sum,” Diacritics 12,
no. 4 (1982): 69-79. “What Barthes attends to is [the text’s] coming into meaning, the dynamics of signification
it effects as he reads it, and he is thus liberated from the domineering and didactic presence of the classically
conceived text too full with an already elaborated and rigidified meaning meant to be thoroughly understood as
such.” Ibid., 74. Such accords with Barthes’ emphasis on the primacy of the experience of reading.
23 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 20.
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(“Political”; “Novel”; “Poetic”; “Revolutionary”; “Bourgeois,” and so on), the weavings and
contradictions within even individual chapters coupled with what seem like rather sweeping
claims testify to the fact writing is contradictory and more so multiple—within and without the
grammar and stability ascribed to disciplinarily sanctioned texts.24
As critic, Barthes wants to recall an forgotten epistemological leap taken by writing
when it operates in this “hardened” capacity. He observes that “power, or the shadow cast
by power, always ends in creating an axiological writing, in which the distance which usually
separates fact from value disappears within the very space of the word, which is given at
once as description and as judgement.”25 A eufunctional and formulaic writing’s rhetorical
inner workings that make possible the very constitution of value are barely perceptible,
unnecessary; simply execute the program. The cause and effect of this cyclical and selfreinforcing composition is, in a certain sense, a totalitarian discourse “in which definition . . .
becomes the sole content of all language, [and] there are no more words without values
attached to them, so that finally the function of writing is to cut out one stage of a process:
there is no more lapse of time between naming and judging, and the closed character of
language is perfected.”26 We have come a long way from writing as an activity of dispersion,
but as Barthes makes (un)clear, there are multiple degrees of writing distinguished by the
relative interpretive force they command and demand.
Back in Pleasure, Barthes writes that text of bliss “imposes a state of loss,” and
“unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his
tastes, values, memories, [and] brings to a crisis his relation with language.”27 Here we have a
relatively open composition, yet one that can hardly be described as a cozy alternative to the
24

In her preface to the text, Susan Sontag notes Barthes’ ambivalence apropos of such generic
“myths” as a potential source of confusion. Ibid., xx.
25 Ibid., 20.
26 Ibid., 24.
27 Ibid., 14.

112

rigid stoppage we saw in Writing Degree Zero. Here we come upon another violence, one for
which Barthes becomes a glutton. This alternative violence is vulnerable—an engagement
with a text that reaches out and touches the supposed subject in an uncanny fashion.28
Interpretive machinery stalls and the pathos of the textual encounter widens, not displacing
so much as augmenting or exceeding its logos in such a way as to release a sequestered
dynamism.
Before closing this section, I want to return to Writing Degree Zero and its essay “Is
there any Poetic Writing?” to emphasize the meta/physical weight of this second violence.
Under the heavy handedness of closure and the name, referents are supposed to be recalled
and served up for the purposes discoursing. “For what does the rational economy of
language mean,” asks Barthes, “if not that Nature is a plenum, that it can be possessed, that
it does not shy away or cover itself in shadows, but is in its entirety subjected to the toils of
language?”29 Setting up a distinction between a linguistic “prose” and “poetry,” Barthes flips
the script with this second violence: “classical conceits involve relations, not words: they
belong to an art of expression, not of invention. The words, here, do not, as they later do [in
what Barthes calls a “modern,” preferable poetics], thanks to a kind of violent and
unexpected abruptness, reproduce the depth and singularity of an individual experience.”30
When poetics departs from the differential network of language as a system of differences,
referentiality is necessarily decentered; in fact, “this implies a reversal in our knowledge of
Nature” and our will to seize and represent it.31 A tidal wave looms and crests: Barthes
describes “the bursting upon us of the poetic word”—“words adorned with all the violence of
their irruption”; “this erect discourse is full of terror.”32 Here we have a poetics wherein a
28

Recall that punctum inflicts a “wound.” Barthes, Camera, 26.
Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 49.
30 Ibid., 45.
31 Ibid., 49.
32 Ibid., 50 (emphasis added).
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violence is done independent of and perhaps unto the reading subject, which rephrases that
second violence as a relatively affective enterprise. Displacing the ego that would systematize
the text, this violence induces a state of astonishment—a surprise: awe at the power of
poetics to create a multilateral intimacy between world and reader. It is for such a relation in
journals and classrooms that I advocate.
Importantly, the mood of this encounter is liminal: the will of the subject to locate
and verify intelligibilities, and sense gives way to sensation. We have here an “erotics of
reading,” perhaps, “a critical practice, a perspective, an attitude, not a critical methodology or
technique.”33 While the reader would be engaged, she would be so without paradigmatic
directive—not because transcendental, but because surprised at inadequacy of familiar
narratives and the necessity of a constitutive improvisation to make the text new, different,
singular. In the eponymous “autobiography,” Barthes associates an active erotization with a
curious process of making distinct from identification:
It is not the erotic, but erotization that has a positive value. Erotization is a production of the erotic:
light, diffuse, mercurial; which circulates without coagulating, a multiple and mobile flirtation links the
subject to what passes, pretends to cling, then lets go for something else (and then, sometimes, this
variable landscape is severed, sliced through by a sudden immobility: love).34

This sense of astonishment as baffling “love” is especially interesting since it characterizes a
desired attitude or posture to safeguard against the violence of intelligibility so as to unleash
that second violence lurking in the latent, productive capacities of the subject. Similarly,
Barthes concludes but more so rebegins his study of images in Camera Lucida with a relatedly
ironic embrace, sensing “a sort of link (or knot) between Photography, madness, and
something whose name I did not know. I began by calling it: the pangs of love.”35 Love,

33 Brian Ott, “(Re)Locating Pleasure in Media Studies: Toward an Erotics of Reading,” Communication
and Critical/Cultural Studies 1, no. 2 (2004): 202 (original emphasis).
34 Barthes, Roland Barthes, 62 (original emphasis).
35 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 116.
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perhaps, for that which is necessarily cut in the violence of declaration: alternative,
idiosyncrasy, supplement, enhancement, juxtaposition, surprise, and so on. Such a posture
would embrace a sort of interpretive vulnerability for the sake of an epistemic ethics, given
that “[o]bliging the loving and terrified consciousness” is prerequisite “to confront . . . the
wakening of intractable reality.”36 Stated thusly, Barthes’ project fuses aesthetics, ethics, and
epistemology as he stretches one violence into another. He blurs not only the status of texts,
but also his own as critic.

Impostors
A curious fragment in Pleasure of the Text with the heading “Nihilism” explains that,
for Barthes, such an orientation is not a passive or careless attitude, but rather a sort of
active unraveling or exposure of vulnerabilities during which “‘superior goals depreciate.’”
Yet he distinguishes this processual nihilism from antagonism: “[h]ow [to] install the
deficiency of any superior value? Irony? It always proceeds from a sure site. Violence?
Violence too is a superior value, and among the best coded.”37 If this nihilism peels away at
standardized knowings, doings, and makings, such an affront is not itself violent, nor should
it be construed as contrarian or even oppositional. Conflict cannot help, after all, since it
only institutes a new paradigm, valuation, or code.38 Barthes is not so much interested in a
refuting or replacing so much as spinning and stretching so as to reveal an original violence
of undecidability. For me, the most interesting thing about this fragment is where he goes
next in search of a tactical bliss: “the most consistent nihilism is perhaps masked: in some
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Ibid., 119.
Barthes, Pleasure, 44 (original emphasis).
38 I am reminded here of Barthes’ maxim, “[d]ifference is not conflict,” which poses a relative and/or
pluralist reading. “To the Seminar,” in The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Want,
1986), 334.
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way interior to institutions, to conformist discourse, to apparent finalities.”39 Active “nihilism”
in hopes of bliss here takes on the role of smuggled contagion or a sneaky insider job.
With this in mind, I observe this sort of limit-work from the inside-out underway in
rhetoric, composition, and feminist studies in the innovative work of Lynn Worsham,
Cynthia Haynes, and Gayatri Spivak. I read each of these thinkers as enabled but also
disabled by their disciplinary apparatuses, and therefore consciously seeking a way to live
within but to minimize epistemic violence. In short, impostors I admire. These three women
practice an attitude or desire to augment prevailing methodological assumptions as a
response to perceived violences in disciplinary procedures. Impostor posture.
Worsham addresses the phallogocentric quality of hermeneutics itself and the
problems that situation creates for philosophers who would be feminists. Noticing that
traditional philosophy pretends to be “the regulative discourse on discourse” and “launders
the practices that wash the body in a sense of its own positivity,”40 Worsham asks how
women oppressed by a historically masculinist tradition can rely on its assumptions for
feminist progress. Epistemologically, she doubts “the discourse of hermeneutics and its
promise to unlock the secrets of the human spirit across temporal and cultural distance or to
excavate a truth hidden deep within the individual” from an apparently transcendent
position.41 Insofar as hermeneutics create “understanding in terms of the code of
domination and submission,”42 the resultant knowledge is pornographic in the sense of
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42 Ibid., 55.
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emphasizing the “penetrability and accessibility” of the truth.43 In a naive extreme,
hermeneutics becomes a kind of epistemological “rape.”44
Like Barthes, Worsham favors an eroticized reading that acknowledges the
interpretive energy within the realm of the subject instead of an exterior hermeneutics that
domineers its subject into doing its service. Here a crucial distinction is necessary between
the erotic and the pornographic: “Simone de Beauvoir defines eroticism as ‘a movement
toward the Other.’ The pornographic, which is often mistakenly defined as the erotic,
actually aborts that movement and instead eroticizes a hierarchical relation of dominance,”
and usually the subjugation of women45. I recall here Barthes’ aversion to another sexualized
violence. His suggestion was that the ultimate pleasure is not in seizure but rather its
possibility: “is not the most erotic portion of the body where the garment gapes?”46 His aesthetic
is one of “intermittence,” “flashing,” and “appearance-as-disappearance” 47—erotization
precisely in not exposing, not penetrating; rather, a flirtation with virtuality.
Critically, Worsham knows her move in the very structure she “confesses” to
professionally reside within cannot be a simple counterpoint against it.48 She seeks, instead, a
confession from hermeneutics itself. In asking hermeneutics what its logical apparatus thinks
about its own claim that the supposed space of its epistemic activity occurs in-between subject
and object and therefore exterior to each produces an interesting result: “though
hermeneutics claims the in-between as its rightful place—mediating between subject the
Self/Same and the Other, or more originally, between gods and mortals—the Self/Same is
clearly the master of the hermeneutical situation, for once again the discourse of the Other
43
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47 Ibid., 10.
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must pass through, and submit to, this discourse to achieve intelligibility.”49 Worsham helps
us understand just how removed the epistemology of hermeneutics is from something like
Barthes’ “variable landscape” of transient associations and what now seems like the flux of
nature. Heavy handed violence can only produce understandings that flatter the ego, and
Worsham therefore concludes brilliantly in a way that Barthes would have liked: “intimacy is
not identity. One respects difference; the other annihilates it.” 50
“Offshore,” Cynthia Haynes is struggling with the overvaluation of our “exhaustive
search for the explicable in the inexplicable—the why, the reason, the rationale” in
composition pedagogies,51 the bread and butter of English departments widely understood
as the university’s means of establishing argumentation skills featuring logical proofs and
demonstrations. Writing in the Journal of Advanced Composition, Haynes intends to “draw us
away from the shoreline of philosophical reason and its alluring beacon of argumentation”
and point our sterns toward “abstraction. In casting off from ground metaphysics (a difficult
and dissuasive move), we occupy a paradoxical position; we must stand with one foot on
land and one foot on our vessel. The release—the letting go (gelassenheit)—shifts our stance
in relation to footing in general.”52 Haynes is within and without when pursuing the
Heideggarian suggestion that “philosophy, as a thing of reason, is the result of an oblivion
of the fact that things do not depend on human justification, that they emerge before us on
their own.”53 Her suggestion is that the result of such ignorance and arrogance is writing
curriculums emphasizing logic—always already ideological—belie the capacity for thought.54
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Such a structure, of course, requires a structurality or scaffolding with which reason can
simultaneously support and reaffirm itself as a governing epistemological principle. Inspired
by the conceptual work of architect Lebbeus Woods—much of it never actually constructed
—however, Haynes would have us “step back and view the unground (der Abgrund—abyss)
beneath the structures, and to sketch a rhetoric of the unbuilt,” 55 or as yet unimagined
structuralities.
The strength of this approach is that it gives instructors and their students a postphilosophical license to experiment with alternative modalities of thinking that are not
beholden to rubrics of reason or logical proof and act instead on the basis of sensation. A
rhetoric of the unbuilt therefore “suggests a mode of transgressing threshold that is between
inside and outside”56—which I take to emblematic of the way in which Haynes herself is
stretching what composition is or could be. Her essay as an impostor text might callback
Barthes’ involuntary “amassing of minor voices coming to me from the outside: I myself
was a public square, a sook; through me passed words, tiny syntagms, bits of formulae, and no
sentence formed, as though that were the law of such a language.” 57 In this strange metaphor
Barthes becomes a hypothetical blueprint for an unbuilt bricolage structure, or perhaps more
precisely a structure that promotes the authoring of unbuilt bricolage assemblages. The
experience (encounter?) is less a writing in the traditional authorial sense than a channeling,
less dictation than cataclysm. It would be a radical receptivity—an open door policy for
thinking or, better, ways of thinking.
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Ibid., 667-668 (original emphasis).
Ibid., 688. Haynes continues: “Let me wear the moniker of irresponsibility if it means divesting
oneself of responsibility in order to probe the depths of a more responsive relation to students, to each other,
and to each Other. It is time to put off the mantle of autochthonous authority, to disavow our discourse of desired
roots from which we erroneously believe we are giving our students the gift of ground ” (ibid., 674).
57 Barthes, Pleasure, 49.
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Like Barthes and Worsham, Haynes is quick to point out that this movement “is not
as simple as countering the ground with air or water,”58 but instead involves working within while
pushing, stretching, striving to be without. She therefore proposes “(t)reason,” an
compositional exercise that involves “putting legitimacy under quarantine (as we saw in
Heidegger) in order to pressurize the realm of decidability so cleanly ruled by the lockstep
‘jackboots’ of reason.”59 Under such a heading, the emphasis on reason and proof in
mainstream composition pedagogies and curriculums is not negatively deconstructed, but
perpetually troped: “displacing argument is rhetoric’s supreme task; disinventing logos is
rhetoric’s sacred duty.”60
Gayatri Spivak in her work on feminism and deconstruction, more than any other
writer, has helped me understand how the movement of poststructuralism can be understood
as a useful tactic for those like Barthes. She offers a hugely important corrective or
refocusing on that which is accomplished by the processual unfolding of deconstructive
reading in pointing out that “when it is understood only as a narrative, deconstruction is only
the picture of an impossibility” and not the activity which brings it about. 61 I associate this
activity—which is the opposite of destructive—with the emphasis on the kinds of
productive reading practices and postures Barthes advocated. As Spivak makes clear, it is not
a question of simply declaring oneself free from strictures or structures, but a labor struggle
with the regime of intelligibility: “if one looks at the deconstructive morphology (rather than
simply reading it as the narrative of the decentered subject), then one is obliged to notice
that deconstruction has always been about the limits of epistemology”62 as opposed to
58

Haynes, “Offshore,” 694 (original emphasis).
Ibid., 704 (original emphasis).
60 Ibid., 707 (original emphasis).
61 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Feminism and Deconstruction, Again: Negotiating with
Unacknowledged Masculinism,” in Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis, ed. Teresa Brennan (London: Routledge,
1989), 208.
62 Ibid., 209 (original emphasis).
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simply jumping over the fence. Again: “it is not a matter of going to the outside, but being
an outsider while inside.” 63
This association of deconstruction with epistemic thresholds calls to mind Barthes’
movement in his essay “From Work to Text.” In it, he describes a reading wherein, first of
all, “the Text is not to be thought of as an object that can be computed,” but instead an
object with which to commence relation: “the Text is experienced only in an activity of
production.”64 Compositions that deliberately set out to provoke these kinds of experiences
might be a sort of “limit-work,” which for Barthes involves an irrational and strange
aesthetic that “goes to the limit of the rules of enunciation (rationality, readability, etc.)”65 to
produce not gobbledegook for its own sake, but a kind of un/intelligible stretching of effect
and affect. Hence, such an activity might, as Spivak phrases it, “open up a text towards an as
yet unknown horizon so that it can be of use without excuse. Let us now call this:
negotiating with structures of violence”66—rather than simply opting out in fantasy or
mirroring the terror of the structure in a contrarian assault. Not despite but precisely
because of the political significance, Spivak’s posture takes on an empathetic tone in this
“giving of assent without excuse, so much that one inhabits its [hegemonic] discourse—a
short word for this might be ‘love.’” 67
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Victor J. Vitanza, Negation, Subjectivity, and The History of Rhetoric (Albany: The State University of
New York Press, 1997), 19.
64 Barthes, “From Work to Text,” in Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang,
1997), 156; 157 (original emphasis).
65 Ibid., 157.
66 Spivak, “Negotiating,” 212.
67 Ibid., 213.
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Full Squiggle
Is the present text complicit in the exact violence it hopes to exceed? Of course, but
“is that all?” 68 As Barthes would, I hope to have attested to the desirability and necessity
stretching the manuscript so as to register on both intelligible but also sensible—or, better,
oscillation between these two poles, each false and naive as absolutes. What opening Barthes
accomplishes for the aesthetics of reading and writing, I, along with Worsham, Haynes,
Spivak would hope for rhetoric and composition. In “closing,” then, I offer the following
reopening: in response to violence—aesthetic, epistemic, pedagogical, gendered, or
otherwise—more than reactionary critique and more than paradoxical acknowledgements of
complicity are required. Instead, we ought to take up an alternative relation to intelligibility
itself by ceding and unleashing its aesthetic affordances beyond form, including
conceptuality and proposition itself. Instead: implosion.

68

Barthes, “Third,” 53.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BRIDGE TO PEDGAOGY
[Interviewer:] What is the relationship between culture
and art?
[Jean Dubuffet:] I think art is creation . . . . and culture
is creation done, already done—creation of the past.
And I’m sure that studying the things already done is a
danger for artists, because what is wanted from an artist
is [that] he [sic] invent new things, not to confirm what
has already been done by others in the past. He has la
contrevie, he must do something new.1
For me, it is rhetoric’s attention to invention that
differentiates it from all other practices and fields of
[English] study. —Sharon Crowley2

A piece titled “Learning to See Data” in the New York Times from last year describes
collaboration at Albert Einstein College of Medicine among geneticists and artist Daniel
Kohn, whose painting and installations explore themes of science and information. For about
250 words, it sounds like popular media is going to hear what the arts have to say about the
project of human knowledge in a way that surpasses the superficial, sentimental, and
ornamental lip services often paid to arts and humanities by even their own universities. Too
soon, however, readers learn the piece is a missed opportunity of an article, replete with an
embarrassingly facile replay of warm and fuzzy clichés that ultimately do more harm than
good for the humanities so often framed as needing defense and justification.
The gist of the report is that scientists are drowning in their own massive data sets,
and Kohn’s role is to propose alternative ways of approaching and visualizing the
1

The Artist’s Studio: Jean Dubuffet, directed by Michael Blackwood (New York: Michael Blackwood
Productions, 1973), online video trailer, https://youtu.be/v0HvEJnyRJo.
2 Sharon Crowley, “Composition Is Not Rhetoric,” Enculturation 5, no. 1 (Fall 2003), http://
enculturation.gmu.edu/5_1/crowley.html. The context of the quotation concerns various emphases of
instruction in Departments of English.
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information. The artist as token is brought in for “expert” analysis, watered down and
dreadfully misrepresentative though it seems—“What if the data were turned sideways? Or
upside down?”3—but only before the heavy lifting. When a visualization strategy seems to
make data comprehensible, sensory-perceptual triggers and cues observed during successful
absorption can be identified and operationalized for instructional purposes, the ultimate goal
being to “fast-forward a person’s gut instincts both in physical fields, like flying an airplane,
and more academic ones, like deciphering advanced chemical notation.”4 By noticing trends
in “gut reactions”5 to everything from the instrumental cluster of the cockpit to
“aestheticized” visualizations of genetic code, the team is able to adjust the presentation and
streamline apprehension and accessibility. It is a basically Aristotelian process of accounting
for means of persuasion.
Although researchers hope to stockpile visualization-to-body-to-information transfer
strategies, “for now it’s a lot easier to invite a visually creative expert over to the lab to see
what he or she can add.”6 But worry not. We won’t have to rely on thinking forever. The
popularized version of scientific disclosure will come up with a fix for that too:
The most important question when dealing with reams of digital data is not whether perceptual skills
will be centrally important. The question is when, and in what domain, analysts will be able to build a
reliable catalog of digital patterns that provide meaningful “clues” to the underlying reality, whether it’s
the effect of a genetic glitch, a low-pressure zone or a drop in the yen.7

Un/Fortunately, this is not about some sentimental appeal to “the gut” we only need “for
now.” This is about being existentially involved with the invention and ongoing maintenance
of information and knowledge itself—nothing less is at stake. The use of the phrase
3 Benedict Carey, “Learning to See Data,” New York Times, March 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/29/sunday-review/learning-to-see-data.html. What appears here is not a quotation from the artist but
a hypothetical attribution to the artist by the writer. I encourage the reader to view Kohn’s work at http://
kohnworkshop.com, where anyone can see the relationships with information in, for starters, the metaphors
and color of his work are a far cry from simple rotation.
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“underlying reality” reveals ignorance of what Kohn, the arts, and humanities in general offer
in the writer’s own concluding paragraph, where the artist explicitly states the matter is one
of “‘frameworks of recognition; how you choose to look, rather than what you’re trying to
see.’”8 Instead, the quotation serves only as a misconstrued soundbyte, a temporary bow on
this neat and tidy chapter in a naive chronicle of human progression toward omniscience and
the elimination of surprise. It is a dangerous simplification of both the arts and the sciences.
Ideas and arguments about the function of the humanities, how they constitute or
enhance education, and their “worth”—economic and otherwise—are typically fraught with
overaggressions, silent treatments, and/or defensive tonalities that make substantive dialog
unnecessarily difficult, nostalgic, and, at least to some outsiders, quaint. Reliance on such
strategies diminishes the rhetorical effectiveness of associated arguments, and besides,
misrepresent the point: the relationship between the aesthetic and the generalized progression
of human cultures—both its successes and failures—is perfectly serious business. The view
that arts and humanities are “creative” while disciplines like engineering and sciences are not
is, to put it gently, uninformed.9 Each has so much to learn from the other(ed) that the
factionalization is disgraceful. Tightening economic conditions beget institutional
compromises, politicizations, and ideological scapegoatingsm, but let us not forget: lines
drawn between narrative and demonstration (aesthetic/epistemic, feeling/thinking,
experiencing/knowing, whatever you like) are themselves narratives, and it’s not just a
theoretical point. False dichotomies such as these make shrinking the arts and humanities

Ibid.
Students in my courses report and appeal to this distinction-identification semester after semester.
What creativity “is” is, of course, a notoriously difficult question presenting the same difficulties we saw above
with surprise and the new as referents. But I might posit that one relevant skill or attribute is the ability to relate
to information in alternative ways, and to generate or invent new relations altogether.
4-8
9
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seem not only expedient, but necessary for social progress. However, such cuts may come at
the cost of intellectual stagnation, a possibility I explore and attempt to counter throughout
this final chapter on the teaching of writing.
Here, I take composition as a locus and event during which students might not only
compile and manipulate information, but also begin to investigate their “relationship” with
paper topics, inquiry in general, discourses, informations, and writing itself—that is, how the
performance that is the engagement of information reveals, affects, and participates in the
composition of an otherwise disorderly world, profession, or life. Related emphases are
sometimes seen in “social-epistemic”10 pedagogies and those with civic angles. My attention
here is on something even more fundamental and yet relatively broad, prior and/or anterior
to operations within a given social configuration and its prevailing notions knowledge and
reality. More simply, I have tried to show that engaging information—phenomenal or
reflective—from texture to terabyte, is a mutually affecting activity whose constituents do not
wield essential control or the capacity to determine whether any course is the best way to
go.11 Marvels like antibiotics and the combustion engine give us immunological defense
mechanisms and high speed transportation, but they also yield superbugs and oil
dependencies (to say nothing of geopolitical turmoil). Information may empower only in a
limited and provisional sense; it can also surprise and instigate anxiety—and we should let it.
To say as much is not to advocate for a nihilistic spiral of meaninglessness and relativity seen
10

“For social-epistemic rhetoric, the real is located in a relationship that involves the dialectical
interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social group) in which the observer is functioning, and
the material conditions of existence. Knowledge is never found in any one of these but can only be posited as
a product of the dialectic in which all three come together.” James Berlin, “Rhetoric and Ideology in the
Writing Class,” College English 50, no. 5 (1988): 488 (emphasis added). Berlin contrasts social-epistemic rhetoric
with “cognitive” and “expressionistic” rhetorics, which view the real as situated in material conditions external
to the subject or within the subjectivity of the self, respectively. Ibid., 474-494.
11 Victor J. Vitanza, “Three Counter-Theses: Or, A Critical Inter(ven)tion into Composition Theories
and Pedagogies,” in Contending with Words, eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb (New York: Modern Language
Association, 1991), 142.
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in caricatured postmodernism. The point is simply that when and where pressing decisions
on the most troubling problems we face are required, we need better relationships with
information characterized neither by relativistic paralysis nor naive faith in the ultimate
power of reason. Greater epistemological nuance is necessary—yes, at the undergraduate
level. 12 Such issues seem well suited to rhetoric and writing instruction, where engagement,
invention, and relation with information is the featured “content.”
The argument here does not define (i.e., limit) the value of arts or humanities as
being equal to x, y, or z, but it does suggest that an invaluable relational quality is perceptible
in research from biochemistry to civil engineering—all of which, not incidentally, must
exceed protocol when presented with novel circumstances or pressures. Craft, improvisation,
and contingency are necessary when experts in these fields approach, engage, and relate to
their professional worlds—on both good and bad days—eureka moments and meltdowns
included. Given their magnificent flexibility and frequent status as general education
requirements, rhetorics and writing instruction do seem uniquely positioned to help students
see and feel this point as well as possible ways of meaningfully integrating such relationality
into their studies, professions, and lives beyond the writing classroom. In particular, then, I
am after a pedagogy capable of instigating and engaging surprises by means of aesthetic or
relational treatments of so called “objects” in critical research papers that are the cornerstone
of most composition textbooks—and for good reason. Again, even the critical manuscript is
itself an aestheticized relation with its supposed “content,” formal and formatted appearance
notwithstanding. Teachers, students, and professionals alike need viable ways of bringing
forth phenomena into the domain of legibility in such a way that preserves meaningful
12 I find the watering down of instruction, particularly at the freshmen level, abhorrent and
irresponsible. There may well be a line of diminishing returns, but the assumption undergraduates will not
understand challenging ideas is a shameful bet against one’s own students.
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intellectual growth. Based on the foregoing chapters, I submit aesthetics of information itself
is one possible avenue for developing awareness of the sensibility of intelligibility. Again,
what is meant here is not beauty or taste per se, but rather the conceptual blur between the
phenomenal experiences of reading or writing and reflective knowledge making. Toward
pursuit of meaningful acknowledgement and performance of such conditions during writing
instruction, the discussion offered below attempts to formulate and design a pedagogy
promoting healthy, flexible, and resilient relationships with information.

How do you do?
This chapter is written in response to disaffected relations among students, their
writing, teachers, textbooks, and institutions. I perceive a tendency—on the part of both
students and instructors—to relate with “the material” or subject as mere data to be
manipulated, mere content to be arranged advantageously for the sake of winning arguments.
University becomes a content delivery mechanism, content becomes trivia, and written work
includes identifications without relation; A+ student as Watson, the Jeopardy! supercomputer.
Indeed, machines help use with storage, counting, and other repeatable tasks (why would we
bother with these in the classroom?), yet students reaffirm such preconceptions when they
arrive to class expecting to learn “how to write” in a single semester. But higher education
ought to—and does—exceed content delivery. It’s worth noting some of the most prestigious
and richest institutions in the country including MIT, Yale, Harvard, and The University of
Texas system, and more have simply made available introductory content online for free,
and, increasingly, low cost certification options as well.13 The in-residence university degree

13 See, for example, content from several institutions at edX (https://www.edx.org), Open Yale
Courses (http://oyc.yale.edu), or Harvard’s Online Learning Initiative (http://online-learning.harvard.edu).
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as proof of lecture attendance and download access to notes will not and cannot endure.
Relatedly, metrics and “measurable” assessments including “student learning outcomes” are
generally, though not necessarily, content-oriented and, I would therefore argue, are poor
longterm strategies. I am in agreement with Gregory L. Ulmer when he says “learning is
much closer to invention than to verification,” although a survey of prevailing instructional
methods hardly reflects it: “the modes of academic writing now taught in school tend to be
positioned on the side of the already known rather than on the side of wanting to find out
(of theoretical curiosity) and hence discourage learning how to learn.”14 This twenty year old
statement is still too true. As more content goes online and the rise of tuition skyrockets, I
suspect the university will need to adopt relatively inventional, generative, and yes,
experimental pedagogies and learning experiences for students.15
In terms of interacting with research, arguments, and writing situation are sometimes
framed as a double-bind. The conflicting impulses involve, on one hand, the necessary task of
outfitting students with skills, habits, and practices for engaging information an composing
arguments for contexts beyond any given writing course. On the other hand, the aesthetic
and affective dimensions of reading and writing that reveal even the most bland and prosaic
14

Gregory L. Ulmer, Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,

1994), xii.
15 Needless to say, free content or non-degree earning certifications are no substitutes for the
immersive enculturation of attending college (at least not yet). While apocalyptic and utopian forecasts for
higher education abound, it’s simply too soon to know the full scope and consequence of free content
composed specifically for instructional purposes. Democratic implications notwithstanding, drawbacks that
come to mind include reliance on self-direction, universal design and accessibility issues, impersonality, and
assessment at scale, to name a few. Of course, a range of voices on all sides of the conversation would swoop
in here to console and corroborate this cursory list of concerns. Moreover, just what exactly a Massively Open
Online Course (MOOC) is, could, or should be for composition remains a question even those in the field are
still working out. See James E. Porter, “Framing Questions about MOOCs and Writing Courses,” in Invasion of
the MOOCs: The Promises and Perils of Massive Open Online Courses, eds. Steven D. Krause and Charles Lowe
(Anderson: Parlor Press, 2014), 14-28. “[W]e have to identify and challenge a number of related some-for-all
substitutions that synecdochically threaten to diminish what a university education is supposed to mean: Course
= course materials. Course = lectures. Course = content. A university education = a collection of courses.”
Ibid., 19.
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information as something with which student writers can have a relationship characterized by
something grander than disaffected, managerial tasks of processing, compilation, and
synthesis. This chapter does not propose to resolve the double-bind, but it does suggest that
these tensions are not always mutually exclusive. Much has to do with the relational frame
with which these necessary research tasks are presented to students. The problem is not
procedure and program as such, but that these vocationalist orientation tend—not always,
and certainly not necessarily, but tend—to promote and reward careers, lifestyles, thinking,
and relationships within already existing structures of composing and interacting with
information. No surprises. A concomitant approach to teaching writing is perhaps too bound
up in efficiency, expectations of presumed audiences, and prevailing parameters of valuation
and assessment. I agree with Steven B. Katz that related instructional emphases, in overdoses,
make for a pedagogy prey to a potentially disastrous “ethic of expediency” that too easily
infects deliberative rhetorics such as the argumentative manuscript. He argues that which is
expedient, cost-effective, and (too) narrowly focused on a decontextualized set of particulars
“gives impulse” or directs nearly automatic relations with information as they appear in
workplace communications like technical writing, which of course reflects broader, cultural
sensibilities and intelligibilities.16 Ironically, the emphasis on information command and
rhetorical opportunism disempowers students because it promotes the notion of humans as
rational, autonomous agents while at the same time remaining conformist in the patterns of
its thought all along.17 I think of Antonio Gramsci’s hierarchy of intellectuals: “at the highest
level would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., [and] at the lowest
the most humble ‘administrators’ and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated
16

Steven B. Katz, “The Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the Holocaust,”
College English 54, no. 3 (1992): 257.
17 Victor J. Vitanza, “Three Counter-Theses,” 156-157.
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intellectual wealth.”18 As I have tried to demonstrate in the previous chapters, such a relation
with information, i.e., deaestheticization, is untenable even as widespread belief in this myth
corrodes knowledge making practices (ironically, this is nowhere more evident than the
humanities). Regulation and arrangement of information and research in strategic
configurations presumes, even in novel syntheses, that what is available to be known is
already done, over, open to revision by means of deconstructive latency, but de facto the
given. However, as Thomas Rickert says of rhetorical studies in general, “there is too much
emphasis on a rhetor’s powers for leveraging kairos and not enough sensitivity to what the
situation itself affords” in its “ambient” dimensions.19 That salience can operate as a blind
spot is crucial because it creates the possibility of surprise, not knowing, and knowing that
we don’t know—at least not by means of heavy handed coercion of content represented by
the critical manuscript. Another relationship with information is prerequisite.

Engagements
Several composition scholars have addressed the merits of affective, emotional, or
otherwise engaging pedagogies to cultivate meaningful and enlivening student relationships
with writing. Several articles from Journal of Advanced Composition in particular have already
taken up these questions about affective pedagogies in ways that are resonate with my
figuration of “aesthetic” as a relational and mutually affecting engagement with text, object,
or idea. Christa Albrecht-Crane, for example, seeks a pedagogy of desire in the Deleuzian-

18

Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, trans. and eds. Quintin Hoare
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 13.
19 Thomas Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh
University Press, 2013), 76.
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Guattarian and Lyotardian senses, in which desire is figured as production rather than lack.
The position is one that runs counter to the necessarily regulatory nature of higher education.
We know that, as a disciplinary mechanism, school enacts and maintains systematic repression and
domination . . . . However, this normed and norming system is never leak-proof, sealed. It is porous.
What escapes, then, is desire that manifests itself, for instance, in . . . intensive/affective moments of
writing . . . . This sort of desire comes from within the system, within the school, is immanent to it.20

The image here suggests the authentic as embedded within the inauthentic, the institutional,
and the procedural; the direction is from inside to outside—emissions and catharses.
Surprises in this pop-up figuration, here and there as infrequent but inevitable occurrences,
might seem to jive with the discussion of “impostors” in the previous chapter. However, I am
inclined to agree with Thomas Rickert when he freely admits “teaching writing is fully
complicitous with dominant social practices,” and hence the idea of teaching anomaly is not
only ironic, but harmful.21 Albrecht-Crane and Rickert are not exactly at odds, then, though
their relationships with the challenge of engaging students are quite different. Both, however,
unambiguously associate schools as sites of conflict capable of producing, on the one hand,
students “prone to disaffected attitudes and behavior, including cynicism, apathy, disregard,
and violence,”22 and, the other hand, a naive and ultimately circular attempt to create
“empowered and liberated students and teachers”23 through pedagogies of resistance.
Another prominent voice in composition on affect and engagement is none other
than Geoffrey Sirc. His arguments on behalf of experimental compositions inspired by

20

Christa Albrecht-Crane, “An Affirmative Theory of Desire,” Journal of Advanced Composition 23, no. 3
(2003): 581-582 (original italics; emboldening added).
21 Thomas Rickert, “‘Hands Up, You’re Free’: Composition in a Post-Oedipal World,” Journal of
Advanced Composition 21, no. 2 (2001): 290; 314. Cf. Albrecht-Crane’s article, which “argues that affect, and what
makes affect possible—namely desire—form the conceptual turning points through which individuals
experience and in fact struggle with and against places of learning.” Albrecht-Crane, “An Affirmative Theory
of Desire,” 564.
22 Rickert, “‘Hands Up, You’re Free,’” 291.
23 Albrecht-Crane, “An Affirmative Theory of Desire,” 587.
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Situationist and Happenings arts movements as inspiration for writing curriculums
necessitates a new understanding of the notion of curriculum (more on these as they appear
in Sirc below). In his article “Godless Composition, Tormented Writing,” Sirc indicts the
entire field: “composition, as I read it, is ascetic” to an extent that students are done a
disservice and cannot relate to their own work.24 Specifically, Sirc identifies the formal
rigidity as the problem in writing instruction, whose “measured style is debased, slavish; to
give students a space to develop as sensitive people, able to communicate, we need more.” 25
For Sirc, “more” is that which experiments stylistically or gives students license to partake in
their alternative forms for credit. As we will see below, such impulse is driven at least in this
case by a nostalgic quest for the genuine, the sublime, and an emancipated subject. Though
he rightly rails against the empowerment narratives of all too narrowly defined writing
instruction, he too posits another empowerment26 predicated on mystique of the arts
practices and revolutionary pathos.
Affective classrooms, however, may need massage and repair. Lynn Worsham
approaches the engagement question at the level of paideia, by which she means today’s
generalized cultural sensibility that constitutes an “affective relation to the world” whose
trained incapacities are the erasure or marginalization of emotion. 27 Her insightful article on
“Pedagogic Violence” observes that schools have historically set up false and

24

Geoffrey Sirc, “Godless Composition, Tormented Writing,” Journal of Advanced Composition 15, no. 3
(1995): 556.
25 Ibid., 553.
26 “What would empower students more—teaching them how to accommodate to the rules of
academic discourse; or teaching them that if they organized they could demand that they be allowed to write
any way they wanted, that they would not have to waste so much time learning to speak like us (their own
language being almost all right)?” Geoffrey Sirc, English Composition as a Happening (Logan, UT: Utah State
University Press, 2002), 222. Analysis of key essays in this book is developed below.
27 Lynn Worsham, “Going Postal: Pedagogic Violence and the Schooling of Emotion,” Journal of
Advanced Composition 18, no. 2 (1998): 216; 221.
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counterproductive relegations of emotion to the feminine, the irrational, or the personal and
hence illegitimate—a violence she argues may backfire, erupting in the form of workplace
violence, school shootings, sexual violence, and misplaced hate crimes.28 Though these
incidents are often framed by news media as isolated and anomalous, the frequency of such
terror29 complicates the narrative of the troubled individual, divorced and detached from
some pleasant normal and everyday. For Worsham, such tragedies are devastating and
unbearable, but they are not surprising; in a specific sense, they are predictable—read:
neither individually foreseeable nor immediately causal, but ambient consequents of a social
order embodied by school and which denies students their own emotions and subjectivities
through inscription of social positions and prescribed “patterns of feeling” deemed
appropriate for race, class, and gender roles.30 Her work shows how the ideology of
intelligibility and concomitant interrelations among knowledge, culture, writing, school, and
self might afford useful insight into otherwise paralyzing social conditions.
Most of the work cited here is fifteen or more years old. I revisit the conversation to
ground my own thought in work on relationships with information and writing, but also to
28

Ibid., 223.
When mass shootings are defined as incidents during which four or more victims “generally . . .
unrelated and unknown” to the murderer(s) perish, the average number of days between such shootings from
late 2011 to late 2014 had dropped to 64; from 1982 to 2011, the average hovered consistently around 200.
Amy P. Cohen, Deborah Azrael, and Matthew Miller, “Rate of Mass Shootings Has Tripled Since 2011,
Harvard Research Shows,” Mother Jones, October 15, 2014, http://motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/massshootings-increasing-harvard-research. Violence wounding victims or ending the lives of any four or more
people, regardless of their relationship with the murderer(s), of course, is even more frequent; see the rationale
for the methodology of the analysis cited here. The authors are academics at Harvard and Northeastern. No
peer-reviewed publication from these authors with a primary focus on this data is available at the time of this
writing. All this does not even begin to address the separate and yet related atrocity of rape, which is also taken
up in Worsham’s article.
30 Worsham, “Going Postal,” 223. The article offers more nuance and greater explication of complex
linkages than I present here. Crucially, Worhsam warns that typically adversarial, so called “critical pedagogies”
often carry precisely the same authoritarian pitfalls as the “traditional” teaching they purport to undo;
“postmodern” pedagogy demonstrating the arbitrariness of everything cultural also fails students in its reliance
on primarily “intellectual” process of “demystification” where affect is absent. Worsham, “Going Postal,”
235-236.
29
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extend the conversation with aesthetic emphases that have been the focus of this dissertation.
As the review shows, the conversation has primarily focused on the politics of affect and
aesthetics in classroom. When I suggest supplanting this discourse with an aesthetic or
relational tonality, I hardly intend to suggest aesthetics are somehow disassociable with
politics or vice versa. In fact, the manner in which these simultaneities characterize and
contribute to the building and maintenance of intelligibility is precisely the point. My feeling
is that the aesthetic dimension, defined here in the Nietzschean, relational sense, was and is
like the political always present in composition, but that it was perhaps obscured in
conversations wherein the focus was on alienation, subjectivity, and reform. However,
aesthetics is not presented here as a hero that can exhaustively dash the whole range of
epistemic and political problems reviewed above in every situation. But aesthetics are
advanced as a crucial inroad to developing a healthy relationship with information generated
and “consumed,” if you like, in academic contexts like the writing classroom.

This, That.
In order to propose such a composition, I bring to bear key inspirations I will refer to
as “aesthetic” and “electrate” pedagogies, which I figure below primarily under the guidance
of work by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Gregory L. Ulmer, respectively. The primary
advantages of such pedagogies are their abilities to withstand in meaningful ways “new”
phenomena, even in traditional forms, while retaining affective and epiphanic engagements
with information in student learning. “New” here includes the familiar seen and felt anew
upon revisitation, as well as the capacity of information to reveal itself as an artistic invention
in the sense of reserving the capacity to affect even the enlightened subject.
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Aesthetic?
As we saw above, Friedrich Schiller asserts that the very awareness of an ambiguous
“middle disposition” between physical sensation and rational thought creates the possibility
for “the aesthetic” in the first place. Not despite but because of this epistemic slippage, he
designates for the aesthetic a political or civic function wherein this “middle” is utilized so
that art and letters function as a discursive tools. This arrangement may very well describe the
reality of textual and aesthetic engagement, though in the practice of budget allocation and
(core) curriculum designs, it is a foolish bet, a blank and rubber check for the beautiful. In
her book An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization, Spivak takes issue with this hope,
“productively undoing” Schiller as the patron saint of the politicized aesthetic. The aesthete
fueled by grant money and the “gracious permission” of a Prince,31 according to Spivak,
shows too great of faith and not enough commitment to the challenging work of navigating
between the aesthetic and practical.32 Spivak’s attempt is rather to “double bind” herself into
the challenge of meaningfully implementing Schiller’s gulf into today’s increasingly careerist
and econometricized university—to live rather than wiggle out and “resolve” this double
bind in an age of information command and the regime of the intelligible. Hence it is a
pedagogy that acknowledges its situation within the prevailing assumption that sensibility
and intelligibility can be disentangled, managed, or perhaps just ignored—that is to say,
Spivak acknowledges this pervasive orientation without succumbing to it. Her aesthetic
education is “training the imagination for epistemological performance,” a vaguely defined
notion in her text, but perhaps performance maintains humility and tolerance during the

31

Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters, trans. Elizabeth M.
Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 3.
32 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 514 n. 42.
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traumatic condition of there being “no adequate analogical fit between the mind and the
sense-perceptible world.”33 It sounds like a mind/body division, however, it is “no mystical
exercise this, but an effortful suspension,”34 one I would associate with the anxiety of the a/
new explored above.
Let’s double back to Sirc and demonstrate how his approach differs in terms of its
figuration of arts practices and their relevance to pedagogy. In short, he positions alternative
forms (particularly those of his choice-idiosyncratic tastes) as beyond and other than
“traditional” writing pedagogies. Again, for Sirc composition always demands adherence to
“the codified scripts of academia . . . . The search for intelligible structures is over; the goods
have been found and now they need only be routinely delivered.”35 Instead, Sirc suggests
writing instructors embrace and allow alternative forms with whatever is at hand—“the
operative grammar [of ] the sound bite, the tee-shirt/bumper-sticker slogan, ad copy, graffiti,
stadium bannerspeak”—suggesting that instructors position even “online chats as glitzy
funhouse in the arid Mojave of university writing.”36 He recalls and praises, for example, a
collaboration of four students who dropped “a 20-line rap song on the subject of Mother
Teresa,” a particularly impressive showing in Sirc’s judgement—“true Composition as a
Happening.” 37 Indeed, Sirc’s text often resembles manifestos from the Happenings and
Situationists movements quoted throughout the book: “we must pursue the world beyond
disciplinary tradition.”38

33

Ibid., 197; 25.
Ibid., 202.
35 Sirc, Happening, 243.
36 Ibid., 199; 233.
37 Ibid., 199.
38 Ibid., 185.
34
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Clarification. While alternative forms of inquiry and production are most welcome in
a pedagogy that wants to cultivate aesthetic relationships with research, framing these
activities as portals to special or exclusive access to liberation is problematic. Again: because
intelligibility is sensible, such an aesthetic relation is always already the case in all
composition events, whether arid or juicy. Sirc’s emphasis on formal experimentation
positions the “Writing Classroom as Factory,” an inspiration he takes from Andy Warhol’s
1960s studio-hangout bursting with all sorts of experiments and innovative in production
techniques. “The Factory,” they called it, and “[w]hatever it was, it was the absolute opposite
of the Academy.” 39 As a model for composition instruction, Sirc’s composition as notAcademy is a remarkable claim, for it posits the academy may not be the academy. While the
contradiction is not an issue for the present writing, the use of the factory as a rhetorical
frame for revolutionary purposes in the context of first world writing instruction is troubling.
I have in mind Claire Bishop’s undeniable critique of “relational aesthetics” movements of the
late 1990s, which were typically installation and/or performance pieces with some
participatory dimension within the institutional or gallery space. The textbook example is the
work of Rirkrit Tiravanija, who cooked and served Thai food dinner party as an art show;
participants were meant, by the artist’s own account, to consider not the food but the
relations and interactions among those attending the event.40 As Bishop makes clear, such
exhibitions deploy “metaphors like ‘laboratory,’ ‘construction site,’ and ‘art factory’ to
differentiate themselves from bureaucracy-encumbered collection-based museums,” but can
only remain artificial, “feel good” environs conditioning the possibility of a “cozy situation
[wherein] art does not feel the need to defend itself, and . . . collapses into compensatory

39
40

Geoffrey Sirc, “Writing Classroom as Factory,” Composition Studies 36, no. 1 (2008): 35.
See Claire Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” October 110 (Fall 2004): 55-58.
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(and self-congratulatory) entertainment”41 indistinguishable from spectacle and culturalindustrial product, the very bane of the Situationists’ plight. Therefore, the notion that
“legitimizing other forms and functions (and teaching them), even ‘frivolous’ ones like those
of an e-chat transcript, might make the landscape less alienating,”42 is difficult to accept. In
any case, things are a lot scarier than this traditional/experience appearance of choice let on.
The IMRAD form itself, as I demonstrated above, is performative, relational, and aesthetic.

Electrate.
At least two decades ahead of his time, Gregory L. Ulmer foresaw the blooming of
what he describes as the “apparatus” of “electracy,” something he describes as that which “is
to digital media what literacy is to alphabetic writing.”43 Importantly, however, the apparatus
includes not only the technologies of orality and literacy, but also their assumptions,
epistemologies, metaphors, institutions, and so on. Hence electracy refers not simply to
computers or digital compositions, but moods and modes of (thinking about) knowledge
production, with no apparatus winning out over the others. The key insight is that
conceptual processes in digital composition necessitate a dramatic shift from the habits of

41 Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” 52; 79. Another, informal, and/but equally and
perhaps therefore valid, comes from Hennessy Youngman, alter ego of artist Jayson Musson:
[S]omehow congregating in a gallery to take part in the same activities [that people do regularly out in the
real world] is a socially autonomous refusal of capitalism, because we all know that a gallery is an
ideologically-neutral environment that has nothing to do with the accumulation of wealth, or the
advancement of global capitalism, or any of its sordid subpractices. And that’s, you know, why the walls
are white in the gallery. Because white’s neutral, it’s good, it’s neutral—white: I can think, I can think—
that’s why I’m here.
Hennessy Youngman, “Relational Aesthetics,” ART THOUGHTZ (vlog), March 15, 2011, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yea4qSJMx4.
42 Sirc, Happening, 207.
43 Gregory L. Ulmer, Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy (New York: Longman, 2003), xvii.
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thinking associated with alphabetic text technologies of literacy.44 Of course, multimedia
have an ability to streamline linear, propositional thinking and communication as we have
understood it in literacy, but taking advantage of electrate opportunities involve thinking in
and through and during with media—images, sounds, and combinations of modalities for
affective and temporal ends. 45 My task here is to address how electracy cultivates aesthetic
relationships with information in which a mutually-affective capacity between writing and
“content” is sustained for the (a)new.
Coming out of Eric Havelock’s work on orality and literacy, Ulmer reminds us these
technologies were invented and bear no essential relationship to knowledge as such. Although
once dominant, neither necessarily constitutes the pinnacle of knowledge making practices.
Crucially, Ulmer’s electracy proposes something quite different from the algorithmicism and
mathematization associated in common parlance with technology—nor does it pursue
enhanced communication in the sense of transmitting idea from writer to audience. With its
focus on aesthetics, “electracy makes possible some new learning behaviors that do not have
exact equivalents within literacy,”46 namely an emphasis on interpretive idiosyncrasy.
Although Ulmer uses different neologisms in different texts as he develops the notion across
nearly thirty years of scholarship (electracy, videocy, teletheory, etc.), one sustained theme has
been the student-scholar’s relationship with image and other rich media. As many have
44

I hasten to add that the fashionable distinction between an allegedly static print text and the
supposed dynamism of the digital is overblown; neither is entirely stable, and neither is wholly fluid. For me, it
is crucial to harness the potential of media and multimodality while at the same time nourishing a critical
consciousness attuned to abuses of computationalism, cloud feudalism, big data profiling, and a new politics of
accessibility brought on by industry standard software you cannot own—only rent. To name just a few. Still, my
feeling is that digital natives on our rosters are behooved by an approach to electracy characterized both by
progressivism and caution.
45 Hence the common critique of text-heavy PowerPoint presentations without design.
46 Gregory L. Ulmer, “Electracy and Pedagogy,” Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy, http://
users.clas.ufl.edu/glue/longman/pedagogy (supplementary online material on the author’s university
webspace).
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already argued, image and video in scholastic contexts figures learning as an enterprise that
exceeds referentiality and explication with its affective, visual, sonic, and even tactile
dimensions. The relationality of electracy, however, suggests the apparatus be exploited not
for enhanced transmission, but for a relatively open-ended pursuit of epistemic surprise. Like
Sirc, Ulmer also acknowledges “the projection of . . . forms onto writing itself,”47 which is
neither limited to the critical nor alphabetic manuscript. The difference between the two
scholars, however, is that Sirc’s eyes are on a particular prize: the liberated student subject.
Speaking of eyes, Ulmer embraces a flip of the traditional frame of camera as a visualprosthetic whose primary function is reproduction. Assignment of the device to this archival
role is consistent with the truism that “knowing in the modern paradigm is scopophilic”
deals a pleasure not unlike that of the “voyeur.”48 (It also prioritizes visual and ocularcentric
knowledges, a sonic complement for which was the focus of an earlier chapter in this
dissertation). Metaphors like “capturing,” “taking,” and “getting” the photos reveals the
camera’s alliance with the lack-based wisdom of acquisition seen in earlier chapters, but its
rhetorics of display and reproduction are consistent with what we might call an “ideology of
the visible” and an attendant “analytico-referential discourse.”49 Inspired by experimental film
that flouts logics of bread crumb narratives and overt mise-en-scène, Ulmer attempts “to use
the machine of realism operating in our [academic] discourse to say something else,
something more and other.”50 Hence the literacy of scholarship is not abandoned or burned
downs, but augmented and reinvented anew.

47

Gregory L. Ulmer, Teletheory, Revised 2nd ed. (1989; New York: Atropos Press, 2004), 22.
Ibid., 24.
49 Ibid., 25.
50 Ibid.
48
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Perhaps surprisingly, Ulmer makes much of installation and performance artist
Joseph Beuys, figuring him as a tutor for invention in academic inquiry. An extended
discussion of Beuys’ Fat Corner figures the work as parallel or synergistic with the work of
Jacques Derrida. Margarine or some alternative is spread where two walls of a room meet,
erecting a small sort of triangular pyramid on the floor, crawling up the corner. The work
appears utterly meaningless and foolish: “[t]he elements of the piece are the fat; the action of
putting the fat into the corner; the corner itself, a geometric form; time and the process of
putrefaction; and the viewer’s response.”51 But according to Ulmer, the piece calls our
attention to the spread and sculpted mold of the material itself, which eventually turns limp
and becomes contaminated by dust in the air. Ulmer also notes the foregrounding of corner’s
uncompromising right-angle limit, peripheral and yet ubiquitous in architecture. As glob and
edge meet in this apparently ridiculous installation, “Beuys interrogates materials the way
Derrida interrogates terminology.”52 Curiously and in a particular sense, “there is no need to
translate what Beuys is doing from art into pedagogy, since he is already engaging in
pedagogy”53 by performing how givens might be other and anew. Metaphors cycle in. One’s
relationships with fat and corner—cholesterol and the built environment in which they sleep
each night—are renewed. Prior connotations and charges reveal themselves as provisional.
Such renewals in Beuys, while certainly different, are not unlike the renewal of the
image for education discussed above. In both cases, commonplace understandings are
surprised and challenged as orientations with these informations are overhauled during a
statelessness that is surprise. Ulmer’s electracy informs the dissertation less as a guide for

51

Gregory L. Ulmer, Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 242.
52 Ibid., 243.
53 Ibid., 246.
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digital media than the shock of its apparatus relativity. While things like television or the
internet catalyze and motivate his writing, his own account refuses to hold any one media or
discursive apparatus above another. Most important for his work is the liminality instigated
by the shift from one to another.

Innovation
Transposed for writing instruction, my sense is introducing the idea that information
is something with which one can relate will begin to respond and attenuate some of the
dysfunctional engagements with discussed above. Specifically, the issue is a surprise-adverse
discourse that too quickly chokes the new before rendering it trivia, data. The cumulative
suggestion I take from the this interdisciplinary discourse above is that it is necessary to show
how information work can and does involve more than the advantageous manipulation of
identifications; relation is necessary for holistic, ethical, reflective thought and action. In the
remaining section below, I begin to sketch ways of integrating contemporary art works into
the writing classroom by drawing connections between their apparent energies and typical
themes in composition courses and textbooks.
I also suspect that such features of a writing classroom are capable of responding to
the zeitgeist of “innovation” currently permeating higher education—and do so in both
“useful” and healthy ways to boot. I suspect the innovation discourse is a desperate response
to the shrinking “failure loop” in business, the instability of longterm investments brought
on by the shift from agricultural and manufacturing economies to volatile idea and service
industries, dorm room startups, increasing frequency of career changes, and so on.54 The

54 See Adam Davidson, “Welcome to the Failure Age!,” New York Times, November 12, 2014, http://
nyti.ms/1yyqlVn.
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increasing prevalence of surprises, perhaps. While such conditions reflect the precarious
neoliberal conditions in which we live, the issue is also beginning to show in composition.
The subject will be the focus of Joyce Locke Carter’s Chair’s Address at the Conference on
College Composition and Communication in 2016. In a teaser for the talk, Carter reveals
her conflicted relationship with the concept: “while [innovation] sometimes evokes a
mindless (and needless) overthrow of conventions, it also serves as an encouraging nudge for
innovators upon whose inventions such disruption depends.”55 Saying “when” is tricky.
Jean Dubuffet’s mythological fetish for the new notwithstanding, his epigraph above
is nevertheless a helpful reminder that framework, if left unchecked and unvisited, can
function as a blinder.56 Even technical communication knows this well. A field unjustly
caricatured for its alleged keep calm and carry on writing memos proceduralism, technical
writing is in fact a creative sort of existential “conduct” that structures and builds
communities in the broadest sense.57 Figuring the field in this matter means “we can no
longer view [technical communication] as merely the skill or art of information transfer,”
when indeed it is nothing less than the construction of communities, professions, and lives.58
The plain and economic stylistics, the bulleted list, the deliberate reduction of excess—all
these simultaneously belie and betray the constructed order of such documentation. I suggest
we teach these implicit relationships with information here as a way to callback and recollect
the sensibility of intelligibility.
55

Joyce Locke Carter, “Making, Disrupting, Innovating,” Sailing the Four Cs (blog), January 17, 2016,
http://joycelockecarter.com/CCCC/making-disrupting-innovating.
56 For a related discussion of Dubuffet’s aesthetic sensibilities and motives, see Lucienne Peiry, Art
Brut: The Origins of Outsider Art, trans. James Frank (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), 35-38.
57 Carolyn R. Miller, “What’s Practical about Technical Writing?,” in Technical Writing: Theory and Practice,
eds. Bertie E. Fearing and W. Keats Sparrow (New York; The Modern Language Association of America,
1989), 22-23.
58 Stephen Doheny-Farina, Rhetoric, Innovation, Technology: Case Studies of Technical Communication in
Technology Transfers (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1992), 220.
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Information Aesthetics for Composition
The discourse of “participatory art,” wherein some degree of agency is allotted to the
spectator, is sometimes motivated by a “desire to invest art with nonart social or political
intent.”59 Entertaining briefly the faulty art/nonart division, I would turn it right around by
trying to learn from artistic practices modes of engagement for writing. Rather than see art as
an escape or escapism from composition, I would suggest we note the similarities between
these two separate practices while letting each remain different. Stated thusly, “open spaces
for undefined interactions could radically change our general perception of the institution as
an inflexible, deadening container.”60 While participatory utopianism has been critiqued by
Bishop and others, the formulation here is interesting in that it specifies alteration of
perception and relation rather than a revision of the institution’s material or ontological
configurations.
My point would not be to position art works as alternatives to so called “traditional”
forms like the dreaded five paragraph essay, but to help demonstrate that “even . . . the most
chaste discursive prose” cannot shed its metaphorical or tropological qualities—that is, its
relation unto its “putative subject matter.”61 Needless to say, the forms, functions,
institutions, contexts, audiences, and other rhetorical variables of works typically considered
“art”—e.g., those painted, photographic, plastic, cinematic, sonic, participatory, installed,
and so on—are understood, engaged, and interpreted in different contexts, with different
(though overlapping) audiences, and for different purposes. Erasing all difference between
59

Rudolf Frieling, “Toward Participation in Art,” in The Art of Participation: 1950 to now, ed. Rudolf
Frieling (London: Thames & Hudson, 2008), 34.
60 Ibid., 47 (emphasis added).
61 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978), 3; 4.
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the two would be irresponsible. But the material and affective capacities of art do seem to me
crucial affordances for writing instruction. Specifically, they make the aesthetic encounter we
have with any object or “text” more palpable and apparent. The word and the letter, the pH
test, and the chi-squared analysis—not unlike pigment or pixel—are media constituting a
relation with “content,” be it concrete or abstract, “known,” intuited, or invented during the
creative act. I would like now to present some examples of art works I have recently brought
into the classroom with surprising success.
Specifically, I look for conceptual works that don’t look like art works to those
unfamiliar with contemporary art. Try sharing, for instance, Damien Hirst’s The Physical
Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living and asking students whether the work is
art or a museum exhibit. Squints, smirks, raised eyebrows. The piece is a nearly eighteen foot
long “tank” and consists of an actual shark suspended in formaldehyde, poised to chomp a
nearby victim. As the cheeky title alludes, this work permits one to safely engage danger, fear,
threat, and the relative vulnerability of otherwise comfortable humans in the food chain. In
one more turn, however, the shark is not any of these things because it is not real, which
makes the joke less on the shark than the unreflective spectator. This vicarious threat is
secured for indefinite contemplation, access, and retrieval; it is hyperbolic preservation also
seen in the critical manuscript, which affords control found through acquisition and catalog.
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Figure 5.1: Spectator with Damien Hirst’s The Physical
Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone
Living. “capturing the art shark” by Art Siegel is
licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

Other Hirst pieces with medicinal themes such as Pharmacy or his “Pill Cabinet” series also
make good provocations. These pieces work with rhetorics of display, sterility, and, along
with the shark, archive.

Figure 5.2: Detail photograph of a Hirst “Pill
Cabinets” aestheticizing pharmacology.
“Damien Hirst” by Johnny Vulkan is licensed
under CC BY 2.0.

Behold: the creation of industry, of proprietary research, of chemical synthesis—
advantageous configuration of worldly materials. Students typically note the cleanliness of
the piece and the almost “too perfect” configuration of materials. In fact, it does not resemble
a lab or a pharmacy, which is almost assuredly messier. Something about it seems plastic and
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artificial—airless. Is this our library, our database? Is information just sitting on a shelf,
waiting to be plucked and popped?
Next, try displaying Minimalist works and asking the biologists and chemists in the
room for help making connections among the elementary geometric shapes, the apparent
minimization of the artist’s hand, or the machinic repetition. The flat grids of Agnes Martin
or Frank Stella’s early work, for examples, have worked wonderfully for my courses. Typically
students are off and running, noting the imperfect precision (look closely, divisions are not
quite equilateral) whose symmetry I suggest might come to inform our discussion of
methodology in a Science Writing course. Grids function in these conversations as
quantization cookie cutters for the otherwise inchoate constant of material reactions and the
qualitative decisions that transpose observation into replicable quantity. Not quite perfect,
but pretty darn close. Invariably, a group of students forms and rallies for the interpretation
that the grids are somehow “pleasing” or “comforting.” Almost like a method.

Figure 5.3: Detail Photograph of “Frank Stella, The
Marriage of Reason and Squalor, II, 1959,
Whitney.” Image by Sharon Mollerus is licensed
under CC BY 2.0.

Figure 5.4: Detail photograph of
“Agnes Martin, Untitled #12,
1977.” Image by Sharon Mollerus
is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Finally, share Hans Haacke’s MoMA Poll, a pioneer work of institutional critique that
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aestheticizes the survey instrument. This piece is simply two voting boxes appearing beneath
a sign that prompts visitors to cast their responses right into the work:
Question:
Would the fact that Governor Rockefeller has not denounced President Nixon’s Indochina policy be a
reason for you not to vote for him in November?
Answer:
If ‘yes’
please cast your ballot into the left box
if ‘no’
into the right box.

Figure 5.5: Photograph of “MoMA Poll by
Hans Haacke in the Museum of Modern
Art.” Image has been released to the
Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons.

The piece is a jab at Nelson Rockefeller, a Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) trustee at the
time, but it also creates an aesthetic relationship with polling as such. It makes the process of
collecting and counting a creative effort to engage and come to relate with the political
attitudes of a sample population. The work actually performs and temporalizes the social
scientific effort of the survey probe. What are they thinking out there, and why? Not unlike
the shark, an indirect worldview is here operationalized, contained, measured, and tallied in
real time. The theatrical frame of it all helps students understand the relationship with
information constituted by the survey instrument: a controlled but wide netted scoop of
preference and disposition.
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Relations
My intent has been to develop ways for students to cultivate nuanced and subtle
relationships with research capable of instigating and sustaining the surprise of new and
aestheticized understandings of information itself. The ideal writer is sometimes caricatured
as a hyper-practical synthesizer of source material, but arranging the already known in
advantageous configurations is an apolitical proceduralism that erases or, at best, downplays
the aesthetic and inventional qualities of composing. If we construe the educator’s task as
something grander than mere certification for the immediate, contingent, and, (let’s face it)
temporary, then the tension between satisfaction and invention ought to occupy a sustained
role in courses setting out out to help students process, relate, and compose information.
What is at stake is nothing less than an existential effort to get along in the world—to
variously secure, enhance, entertain, or conserve professions and lives. It is not a grandiosity
to say that students are tomorrow’s knowledge builders and decision makers. They need and
deserve the chance to examine the formative pressures and aesthetic assumptions governing
their intellectual work in school and beyond, and learning from the arts is one way to
provoke this investigation.
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APPENDIX
Notes on the fair use of copyrighted materials
organized by the criteria of judgment stated in Title 14 Chapter 1 §107 of the U.S. Code.

1. The purpose and character of the use of copyrighted works: The works are
sampled in the chapter for the purpose of citation in a scholarly analysis and for the
sake of exalting the aesthetic achievements of the artists. The samples are explicitly
discussed as the works of others and should not be construed as writer’s own
inventions.

2. The nature of the copyrighted work: While the partially reproduced works are
creative in nature, the present writing and its scholarly audience is qualitatively
different such that the creativity of the present author is manifest in an altogether
separate medium: alphabetic writing.

3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole: Samples of the copyrighted works are typically 20-30
seconds in duration. The sole exception (Clip 3.6) itself remixes another copyrighted
work. The full range and development of the copyrighted works cannot be heard in
the chapter.

4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
works: The brief clips in this essay would make poor substitutes for the original
works, even in spite of electronic music culture’s association with sampling and
remixing. The samples are so brief as to be useless for DJ sets. Further, the present
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writing and the original works have different audiences, although overlap is
conceivable. I encourage readers to explore electronic music, including but not
limited to artists cited here, and to pay for creative works at one of many digital
outlets such as Beatport or iTunes.
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